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# MODERN EDUCATION

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A BORZOI BOOK  
PUBLISHED BY ALFRED A. KNOPF

# MODERN EDUCATION

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*A Critique of Its Fundamental Ideas*

*by*

OTTO RANK

*Translated from the German by Mabel E. Moxon*

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New York



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First Edition

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MODERN  
EDUCATION





## Chapter One

# EDUCATION AND THERAPY

*Psychologists are of the opinion that a man's character is derived from his mother; it begins to form in the second year of life and is established at four or five years of age. . . . These individuals have from childhood a definite way of seeking their happiness, a way, that later adjusts itself to changing conditions, yet always remains the same.*

STENDHAL

THESE WORDS OF Henry Beyle's,<sup>1</sup> written more than a hundred years ago, begin only today—as, moreover, he predicted with regard to his works—to be generally accepted by therapists and pedagogues. I do not know what “psychologists”—apart from his own intuition—Stendhal refers to, although apparently he has been influenced by Montaigne's and Rousseau's views

<sup>1</sup> *Journal*: Gedanken, Meinungen, und Geschichten. Selected and translated by Arthur Schurig. Leipzig. Insel-Verlag. The quotation is to be found in the Napoleon Fragments, begun in the year 1816, written in 1818–1821, and continued in 1837 (p. 466 of the Edition mentioned).

with regard to temperament and disposition inherited by the child. But with the exception of this dogmatic statement which is supported by Psychoanalysis today, I have found this view nowhere else expressed. Although it appears to be an astonishing statement for Stendhal in writing his biography of Napoleon, yet nowadays, I consider it only a convenient excuse for modern psychologists who do not understand the individual and his development dynamically, but only from the causal mechanistic point of view. If with his reference to the anonymous "psychologists" Stendhal evaded the responsibility for the initiation of this view, it has been the main concern of modern psychology to establish this viewpoint scientifically. This scientific theory, however, maintains not only the psychological assertion that the child forms and establishes the kernel of its character in the first years of life, but, by means of this knowledge, it also includes the hope of developing therapeutically and pedagogically other and better characters.

This last assumption leads us into the nuclear problem of all education, namely, moulding and developing better characters. But the question immediately presents itself, better for whom? For the individual or for the community, and further, for what kind of community? For education is a community problem, or rather, education as such, is no problem at all but *is a product of the community*. It becomes a problem

only subsequently, through and in the individual. If we divest Stendhal's diagnosis of Napoleon's character-formation of its general form, there is revealed the hidden educational problem as to whether it would be desirable to create other men better than Napoleon, presupposing that it could be done. But we immediately recognize the inadequacy, not to say absurdity, of such an objective which the psychologist Stendhal avoids because he speaks as biographer and historian and not as pedagogue. For even if we ourselves had at our disposal the pedagogic recipe for training a Napoleon, it probably would do no good at the present time since we should have no use for him. On the other hand if the need for a Napoleon existed, we should scarcely be able to prevent his coming into existence through purely pedagogic measures. Presumably, in the days of the French Revolution, there were several "born" Napoleons roaming round, of whom one among them crystallized into *the* Napoleon. And probably the others also inherited their character from the mother. Moreover, it is not only determined in what way the individual *seeks* his happiness, but also whether and how he *finds* it. Only too frequently it happens that man seeks the happiness—that he found or desired in the mother—but only finds success, which however does not make him happy. For happiness and success seldom go hand in hand and mostly they arrive when unsought for; but success or failure in this re-

spect determine the further development of inherited characteristics in just as decisive a manner as the mother may determine the way in which they are sought for. Finally, the mother-complex which, moreover, Psychoanalysis thought necessary to reveal in Napoleon<sup>1</sup> is by no means characteristic of Napoleon, but rather of Stendhal himself, for instance,<sup>2</sup> without his having been a Napoleon. Thus it is more than probable that the psychologist whom Stendhal refers to is himself at the time when he was studying his own psychology in Napoleon, and that the man of whom he speaks is Stendhal at an earlier date before this intuition was perceived.

In other words we have two Stendhals before us—just as there are two Napoleons, namely, the one before he became Napoleon and the other after he had become Napoleon. That means, however, that the individual has at least two characters, the one formed and shaped by the mother, whereas the other is the self-created character formed from it. Sometimes perhaps also this self-created personality is only a materialization of what the mother (or some other person) wanted to make of us, although often enough it is not only opposed to it but turns out to be completely different

<sup>1</sup> *L. Jekels: Der Wendepunkt im Leben Napoleons I (The Turning Point in the Life of Napoleon I) (Imago, III, 1914).*

<sup>2</sup> "I was always in love with my Mother. I always wanted to kiss my Mother . . . she died just before I was seven years old . . . forty-five years ago I lost what I most loved on earth" (Stendhal in his Autobiography).

from it. In either case, however, this second character which alone moulds the creature into the individual is self-created, certainly created from given elements in the past and in the present, namely, from the original Ego and from present circumstances, yet nevertheless created by one's own Self, sometimes in harmony with the first character, sometimes in contrast to it, but mostly as a compromise between the two.

Moreover, we have to differentiate not only between these two characters in the individual, that are often in lifelong conflict with one another, but in the first phase of the individual's life we also have to differentiate, as it were, between the *two mothers* that determine the early character formation. The one would be the physical mother who conceives, carries, gives birth to, suckles and nurses the child; the other would be the psychical mother, that is, her personality, her own character that determines to what extent she will carry out all these necessary physical functions dictated by Nature, and to what extent she will herself individually turn aside from their performance. Stendhal has in mind this latter personal character of the mother which the man to a certain extent assimilates; the modern psychologists of the analytic schools emphasize the other, physical side of the mother which operates directly on the impulse life, and influences the childish character formation. Through this biological consideration, they naturally came upon quite general hu-

man factors of character formation that are given in the child's physical helplessness and in the mere existence of the mother, such as, for instance, the Oedipus complex, the weaning conflict, the training in cleanliness, and the birth trauma, etc. But these influences seem to be as regular as they are inevitable, if we do not want to neglect the physical basis of our existence. Education has no power over this early influence of the mother, yet the mother's influence is necessarily the first instrument of education. In the same way also the adult's final self-conscious character formation lies beyond pedagogic influence, since it takes place only when the individual has outgrown education. The question is, then, where and how can education be employed, and what are its aims and limitations?

From what has been said it follows that the educational influence lies *between* the two essential factors contributing to the formation of character; namely, the mother who represents the surrounding world and lays the foundation stone of education, and the individual Self, the personality, which is the aim and final product of the whole process. Hence we had better differentiate between the *impulse-disposition* and the *impulse-character* following from it mainly under the early influence of the mother; further between the *disposition influenced by the milieu or environment* and the *social character* resulting from it and influenced by other members of the family and particularly

by the school; finally, on the basis of all this there is built up the *individual character* or personality created under the influence of *experience*. Education cannot alter the impulse-disposition, but can only influence its development or inhibition, and this in two ways through the *What* and the *How* offered to the child, that is, through the *content* and also *dynamically*, through the emotional force with which the content is presented. Fundamentally, education is still today, and has been since primitive times, focussed on the *What*, that is, on giving some definite content to the child-like thoughts, feelings, and actions. This content conforms at all times to the ideology of the community, without giving much thought to the *How*; indeed it has made use of any means for the attainment of its end.

In primitive communities the *What* and the *How* merge into one indissoluble unity, as for example manifested in the myths and ceremonies of the boys' initiation rites. The training of the primitive is divided into two relatively simple parts which become separated rather than united by the conscious ceremonies of education. Up to puberty the child belongs to the mother and mixes with the women, then follows an "education" compressed into a relatively short period of time to adulthood. This education aims at, and also attains, practically nothing else than adjustment and subjection to the tribal ideology. The fact that the



separation of the child from the mother (in the rebirth ceremonial of the boys' initiation rites) takes place only at *puberty*, is closely related to the primitives' whole concept of life, to their social and religious ideology which is founded on the belief in the soul. In the course of our investigation we shall return to this theme, since here we must further elucidate the two phases of education and the two corresponding aspects of character-formation in the relatively simple example of the primitives. In the first phase of spontaneous expression of the impulses their *training* falls to the mother, and originally takes place by means of *imitation*; its emotional correlate in the present-day individual has been psychoanalytically designated *love-identification*. The second phase of *impulse idealization* falls to the community and takes place by means of instruction, through correction, or by application of force, through a mechanism that Psychoanalysis has called *sublimation*. At the later stage of the social development, the family—including the father and brothers and sisters—forms the intermediary and connecting link between these two phases of education sharply defined and quickly alternating in the primitive community. There is in connexion with this, another important difference that will later occupy our attention. In the primitive community the child belongs to the mother, a quite general concept which found, so to say, its official recognition in the so called matriarchy but

which is everywhere at the root of the primitive's world-concept. Our family organization first makes the father the joint owner, and finally the exclusive possessor of the child; this was crudely manifested in the Roman patriarchy. However, in every case, it is the community that sooner or later, in greater or less degree, reclaims the child as a co-equal member of the whole.

Thus, the actual *ideology of education* emanates from the community with the expressed purpose of making the child a valuable member of society. This has remained the aim of education from the time of the primitive tribal organization up to the time of our highly developed state organization. The social community furnishes the prevailing ideal to be striven for, also certain traditionally obtained means for its attainment, these means however, always remain subordinate to the purpose which sanctifies them. In case of difficulties it was assumed that the child and not the education was to blame and therefore force was used, from which developed the educational concept of punishment. Frequent difficulties in the education of many individuals—not merely of isolated ones—nevertheless indicate that the collective ideology of the community is shattered. Hence these difficulties cannot be overcome by a change in the educational *method* because fundamentally this would only mean an aggravation of punishment. For the changed ideology that can be

established only after passing through long periods of crisis produces methods of education adapted to it, whereas experimenting with the methods in order to save an old ideology leads only to an intensification, perhaps also hastening, of the crisis.

The great crisis in the ideology of Europe which also provided the New World with its new ideology, was at the same time the birth of *modern pedagogy*. I mean the French Revolution with its climax in American democracy prepared for and determined by Rousseau's concept of the world and his ideal of education. But only when Rousseau's educational idea of the equality and equal inheritance of all men had been forcibly materialized in the French citizenship, only then did modern pedagogy emerge with the aim of creating citizens who would be placed on an equal footing one with another. This ideal of citizenship seems to be a revival of the primitive tribal community of men on a higher organized social level. But here we are interested solely in the educational aspect of this movement, not in its historical and social aspects which only contributed to the content of the new ideology but did not supply the driving force. This emanated from an individual, a strong personality who opposed and who could oppose the traditional ideology because it had already been severely shaken. *Rousseau created the ideal of equality* from his own personal experiences and suffering. These may be of interest to psychologists and

pathologists but are irrelevant to our theme. However, the pedagogic significance of the ideal of equality is as great as its social significance. Rousseau's idea that all men are equally free-born gave modern pedagogy the scientific presupposition implicit in every system of education; namely, that also the psychical aptitude of all men is the same and hence any individual can be made a representative of any ideology that the community likes. This is correct to a certain extent as the great educational systems of civilized peoples show. This has been dealt with in a masterly way by *Ernst Krieck* ("Bildungssysteme der Kulturvölker," Leipzig, 1927). On the other hand one dare not overlook the decline of these great civilizations, the cause of which lies in a changed ideology that proceeded from an individual with apparently a stronger inequality of aptitude and power of development. But with regard to freedom, even *Rousseau*, presumably from personal motives, was not able to see that every human being is also equally unfree, that is, we are born in need of authority and we even create out of freedom, a prison; as for example *Rousseau* himself had to buy his spiritual and moral independence at the price of masochistic bondage to a person.<sup>1</sup>

At first the child was blamed and punished if he did

<sup>1</sup> It is probably no accident that not only the emancipator of the child, *Rousseau*, but also the spiritual emancipator of woman, *Bachofen*, reveals clear characteristics of the mother complex.

Not readily accept education, then Rousseau's idea of equality started modern pedagogy to realize that now the methods must be wrong if the desired ideology cannot be impressed on this natural *tabula rasa* of the child's mind. So the coercive method of education was followed by the pedagogy that endeavoured to improve its means without, however, giving up its chief means, the use of force and punishment which was further employed in the home and in the school, till finally it has been projected into the newest phase of education, namely, the psychological. Even this last phase which is just beginning, has its ideological forerunner in Nietzsche's new ideal of the superman (in contrast to Rousseau's man of equality) and in Freud's psychological return to the man of instinct that opposes this idealization. But it also found its historical and social correlates in the World War which, in essence, corresponded to a European collective revolution as is shown by its political results of Communism in Russia, and in the idea of a European Confederacy of States. As it was in the French Revolution, however, it was again the case here, that the bearers and supporters of the old ideologies were forcibly removed before the social reorganization could furnish the content of the new ideology for which the slogan and the scientific foundation had previously been given (just as it had been by Rousseau).

This *psychological phase of education*, in contrast

to the earlier one, is distinguished through the fact that the responsibility for its failure is not so much attached to the pupil or to the method but rather to the educator himself. This apparent step forward to self-realization amounts, however, to a tacit admission that there is something wrong with the ideology itself, the supporters of which are the "educators," meaning by that, either the parents or professional pedagogues. The scientific character of this new psychological attitude in education has been one reason why today the chief blame has been placed by professional specialists in education on the parents, who through their unsystematic influence in the pre-school period, and their foolish, often obstinate attitude towards the school, are supposed to hinder and make more difficult the teacher's task of education rather than to further it. Behind this obvious demand that the education of the children should actually begin with the education of the parents, there is concealed the tacit exclusion of the educators themselves from this claim, and thereby they give the appearance of possessing a superiority in which they themselves can hardly believe.

Here Psychoanalysis may be considered for the time being as the last educational ideology, in that it finally places the blame on the educator himself who actually belongs in the class of parents, or at least in his pedagogic capacity corresponds psychologically to a parental representative. Psychoanalysis emphatically de-

mands that the educator himself shall be educated, a request which in its general form has at all times served as the foundation and means of educational tradition. But Psychoanalysis not only demands that he shall be trained as an educator, this being taken for granted since the spread of scientific pedagogy, but it also demands of each individual that he shall be trained for *the vocation of parenthood*. With this, Psychoanalysis goes beyond the narrow field of pedagogic education and encroaches into that of the first maternal or family character formation which hitherto had been a sphere withdrawn from pedagogues, in which outside the parental authorities only the collective forces of religion with its moral and ethical codes prevailed. In going back to the training of the instincts, Psychoanalysis at the same time questions the content and methods of the prevailing educational ideology, or rather, it formulates in an apparently objective way the shattering of the old ideology prepared for and precipitated by Nietzsche and the World War.

In so far as this formulation is possible in a scientific manner, analytic psychology signifies a final summing up, the diagnosis of our rotten ideology, the symptoms and genetic origin of which have moreover already been classically described and investigated by Nietzsche. Attempts to deduct from Psychoanalysis, positive aims and methods of education—not implied by Freud himself but by virtue of the propagandizing

tendencies of Psychoanalysis—seem to me not only premature but also questionable. Because for the formation of a new ideology, ever so good an insight does not suffice as a recipe without a previous or simultaneous formation of a type of man who will supply the prototype of the educational ideal. At present, however, neither the new type of the European of post-war period, nor the New World type of American in process of formation, has taken definite enough shape to supply a correspondingly austere ideology for a new ideal of education: although the advancing Americanization of Europe and the acceptance of continental methods of education by America, already point to a mixed type formed from both spheres of civilization. For the time being, however, the educational idea of our transitional crisis, corresponding to the educator's own uncertainty, paradoxically consists of a lack of a coherent ideology. It is obviously a time of educational experiment on a large scale as particularly the two extremes of the present civilization show:—America and Russia in revolutionary form, and the school reforms of the conquered, in more moderate form <sup>1</sup> (for example in Austria, Germany).

<sup>1</sup> Russia with its consciously purposed communistic ideology, needs *no kind* of new educational *method* and gives only its new content to the old and tried methods, whereas Germany in endeavouring to re-establish the overthrown national ideology has also to reform the methods of education although it has experimented less than America which is still developing. See the two excellent and informing works "The New Education in the Soviet Republic" by Albert



It seems yet once more confirmed that a nation, having lost its ideology, can only produce similarly unstable individuals, since it is able to transmit to its citizens only confused or shattered ideologies. But whether any kind of an ideology that is derived from perception, such as Psychoanalysis, can help at all before the political, economic, and social conditions are established, is a question that as a matter of principle one must answer in the negative, although one may be only too willing and ready to see this turn out to be an error. But for the moment whilst one endeavours to consider Psychoanalysis not only as a symptom but also as a remedy, it is important for us to investigate what it has to offer which is of *positive value to education*. In other words there needs to be an investigation of the psychoanalytic ideology itself from the standpoint of its pedagogic productiveness, leaving out of the question the possibility of any practical achievement in the present or the future. For such an investigation it is necessary to go beyond the rational formulæ of the analytic program of education itself and to press forward to the ideology, the manifestation of which Psychoanalysis itself is. For the three expedients that Psychoanalysis has offered<sup>1</sup> pedagogy are, first, the education of the educator leading to a better under-

Pinkevitch (London, 1930) and Th. Alexander and B. Parker's "The New Education in the German Republic (London, 1930).

<sup>1</sup> Anna Freud: *Technique of Child Analysis* (Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series, No. 48, Washington 1930).

standing of himself, secondly, to a better understanding of the child, and finally, in extreme cases, the treatment of the child leading to a better understanding of itself; all these remedies presuppose, however, the acceptance of the psychoanalytic ideology as one that is educational and constructive.

In order to test this claim it will be advisable to investigate how Psychoanalysis first happened to make this claim at all. To repeat here only briefly what is already well known, we may remind ourselves that Freud got the impression from the analysis of adult neurotics (analyses undertaken for therapeutic purposes) that the patients' symptoms all had their origin in early childhood. The obvious conclusion seemed to be that an improved and more appropriate education in childhood endeavouring to avoid certain crude mistakes would at least prevent later neuroses. This hope seems not only to have diminished with experience but even deeper reflection shows that the situation cannot be so simple. Not only every individual, but the successful person in particular, has to wrestle in childhood and in later life with difficulties and emotional conflicts. Genius and insanity dwell side by side, at least, extreme talent and neurosis seem to be inseparably bound together although they appear in the most-varied and mixed relationship.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Wilhelm Lange-Eichbaum "Genie, Irrsinn und Ruhm" (München 1928). Further concerning this in the discussion on the rôle of the Leader.

We must ask ourselves the question if in the prevention of neurosis there may not also be a danger of preventing genius, perhaps even the proximate danger of preventing the development of men—in the human sense of the word. But this question leads back again to the problem of the ideology of education, for in order to be able to answer it we must first be quite clear as to what the aim of education is. For the present, however, we can determine it only diagnostically, that is, one-sidedly and negatively, as long as there is lacking a human type representative of a new ideology. Thus we know, or believe we can state with certainty, that we do not want neuroses. But who shall determine the concept, that is, the border or extent of neurosis, when the medical concept of illness very soon proved to be inadequate for its delimitation? And then we may ask, do we want no neurosis for the child or for adults, or do we want no neurosis at all? Apparently that; but who is going to tell us that a childish neurosis must unconditionally continue to an adult neurosis, or whether or not a neurosis acquired in childhood may make that person immune from psychical illness later on? Experience speaks for both, statistics rather for the second. For doubtless, there is a majority of more or less adjusted average human beings as against a minority of manifest neurotics and both groups have in childhood passed through the same difficulties of education, difficulties that were designated childish

faults by parents and pedagogues, and neurotic symptoms by psychologists with therapeutic inclinations. Where then is any latitude given for childish deviations from the norm of education? And who guarantees that a good child who gives no trouble to the educator shall be invulnerable to later neurosis? Experience certainly does not! Nor does reflection, which rather recalls to mind the fact that this goodness may be attained at the cost of a too extensive repression of instincts which later in life avenges itself and may lead to neurotic inhibition.

We have already hinted that the whole therapeutic attitude to the problem of education seems to us inadequate. For if we could prevent neurosis in the adult by correct education in childhood, the next question would be, of what does a right education of the child consist? The answer could only be, in the prevention of childish neurosis, and everything would again depend on what concept we have of the neurosis. Perhaps the neuroses themselves or at least their symptomatic forerunners in childhood, are unavoidable products of education, that is, are the individual's reactions to the necessary restriction of instincts. That is precisely what Psychoanalysis maintains in that it urges at the same time a radical alteration in this instinct-training. But this has been recognized by judicious analysts themselves as dangerous, since one runs the risk of remaining behind the minimum standard of education, and

of increasing the quota of the delinquent and criminal instead of decreasing that of the neurotic (Aichhorn, Anna Freud). Two considerations lead us further. First, with such mass production as the present-day system of education strives for, must we not reckon with a certain percentage of waste product? We can as little turn a deaf ear to this argument, as to the justified hope of lowering this percentage where possible. We should certainly prefer to attain this end through an improvement of the methods of production instead of by lowering the quality of the average produced. Again, is there not a possibility that the claim to produce high quality, a claim present in every system of education, might also be the cause for a relatively high percentage of failure?

The second consideration reaches further and is more important. Real education, in the sense of the prevailing ideal of type, is a community affair and as such it is far less problematical in primitive groups as well as in rigid state organizations, than in middle-class democracies where everyone carries a marshal's staff in his satchel. But if individualization has reached a certain latitude, as in our Western civilization, it becomes the rule and no longer the exception. Hence education in the meaning of a mass-ideal and mass-influence becomes altogether impossible and new methods must be sought; of these the psychological method of education seems to be preferred because it is manifestly in-

dividual. The fact is, whether intended or not, that many children through naughtiness or illness compel individual and special treatment which education cannot allow because this would be anti-pedagogic. However, one need not feel so smart if one "sees through" the child and compels it either by force or cunning to go back again into the educational machinery. Perhaps the child is also right if it protests in its way against the oppression of individuality by a mighty ideology, though a dying one, and in so doing unmasks the adult who himself no longer believes in it but still has to preach it. *Rousseau's* idea, that appears in practice grotesque, of an individual teacher for every single pupil, has been materialized by the naughty child who obstinately keeps his individuality. But this individual education must be based on a quite different principle which Psychoanalysis has likewise formulated, although it has been known for a long time and naturally practised in every nursery. This is the *principle of love* on which the child's first education by the mother is based and which indeed makes education possible at all. It is fundamentally different from the *principle of coercion* that dominates the *community* education and that starts with the idea of making individuals uniform, and of suppressing individuality. But we can introduce the love principle into community education as little as we can achieve anything in the first phase of the tender unfolding of individuality with the principle of force.

For love respects, protects, and wants individuality; the state on the other hand wants none of it, and hence it must necessarily have a system (or several systems) of compulsory education. As far as I know, there is only one historical example of a people who achieved the later education of the youths in the community ideal by means of this principle of love, which is a continuation of the maternal development of individuality in the child. These are the Greeks, who, in their adoration of the youths, continued individually the maternal education by love at a later stage of mature development. But it seems that this educational ideal was not possible without falling under the spell of Eros.<sup>1</sup>

We must be quite clear about the love-education urged by Psychoanalysis; it is, according to its very nature, individual education and as such must be opposed to every prevailing community ideology; hence also its failure in radical but anti-individualistic Russia. In Greece it was possible to reconcile these two fundamental opposites of every educational system by means of the principle of love, because the individual ideology coincided to a great extent with that of the community. Hence also the love principle in its direct effect could be utilized pedagogically, in that the pupil by identification with the teacher realized his own

<sup>1</sup> Hans Blüher has understood and has taught that the present pedagogic endeavours at reform could only be undertaken in the same spirit (*Die humanistische Bildungsmacht in Pädagogik der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen*).

ideal. This system of education was indeed built up on the individual love principle, but it did not intend to create individualities, so much as to produce a type of individual, although from a relatively high average standard. Paradoxically it might be said that the *community-ideal* of the Greeks was "individuality" adjusted to the collective ideology, was, so to say, a collectively approved individuality, and this today might be designated "artist." Nevertheless, it seems as if the artistic type, so abundantly produced by Hellenism, was not consciously aimed at as an ideal, but was only an unexpected by-product of their educational system. From Hellenic tradition we clearly see that the Greek ideal was *wisdom* and we know well enough that even Plato wanted the poet omitted from the ideal state. This Greek ideal of wisdom has nothing to do, however, with our concept of "Knowledge is Power"—on the contrary the Greeks seem to have perished from their unpractical philosophizing (Krieck)—but this their ideal is an expression of their dearly fought for rational world concept that wisdom can at the same time be virtue and beauty, or at least, can bestow them. The Greeks, as Nietzsche first recognized, overcame the impulsive dangerousness of their nature through reason and harmony, and this Apollonian victory was their world-ideology and their educational ideal. They considered art as the necessary correlative to it, as a permissible form of discharging affects and gratifying im-



pulses, that helped to maintain the ideal of wisdom and virtue.

This idea that virtue—in the broadest meaning of the Greek concept—is teachable, seems in spite of existing experience to have become the slogan of the modern psychological doctrine of education. But the definition of the concept of virtue again depends on the collective ideology of the community; whereas among the Greeks it designated a definite mental and physical bearing, in our world concept it has a peculiarly moralistic connotation and at the same time a more negative character, namely, the absence of vice. Similarly, also, the Greek ideal of wisdom has become among us the ideal of knowledge, which no longer signifies a definite attitude to life but the accumulation of concrete matter for instruction which has become necessary for practical and technical control of the external world. In this knowledge alone which to a certain extent everyone must possess, the collective community ideal seems to have found its only expression, since most of the other community ideals have been sacrificed to advancing individualism. Hence the lack of a definite community-type that could serve as an educational ideal. The prototype of the present-day education is not only negative in that it lacks, as already stated, a community ideology, but it is destructive in the pedagogic sense, indeed, is anti-pedagogic, for it produces individuals who must stand in opposition to

every community type and hence this latter, where it still exists, is pushed further and further into the background.

This viewpoint leads beyond the present-day problem of education as confined to prophylaxis and therapy to the actual problem of *educating human beings*. This is something other than the prevention of neurosis, or of types; it is besides not negative, but is positive in setting up its aim and purpose, that ensues from the community culture and from its ideology. This aim is given in rising civilizations with the necessity for an austere unified ideal-formation; just as the child's individual disposition is also a given factor with which education has to operate in order to attain the prevailing community ideal. Between the child's individual disposition, and the community ideal, education has to establish a compromise which must always be somewhat unsatisfactory, but for which also it produces in all the different forms of this conflict a variety of individuals such as no deliberate education, however lenient or however careful of the preservation or formation of individuality, could create. In other words, the education and development of individualities is like a game of chance,<sup>1</sup> uncontrollable through the co-operation of disposition and milieu (education) as is the occasional departure into neurosis, and the State

<sup>1</sup> See Wilhelm Ostwald: *GröÙe Männer, Studien zu Biologie des Genies*, Vol. I (6th Edition, Leipzig, 1922).

risks deviations from the norm above as below, in the educational endeavour to attain as many as possible average values.

But this knowledge does not help us much at the present time, since the difficulty lies momentarily in the lack of a sufficiently established community ideology. Striving educationally for individuality apparently tends more to neurosis than would the enforcement of a strong educational ideology permitting rather of a reaction towards constructive individual development. In other words, the suppression of individuality by a strong community ideal may also lead to the formation of neurosis, but the educational furtherance of individual development seems to produce still more neuroses, and ever less strong personalities who rather spontaneously develop in resisting the pressure of a collective education. From this it follows that the modern ideal of education cannot simply consist of a replacing of the community type by developing individual personalities. For the formation of individualities can never be the program of education, the very nature and system of which is to form types. For every individual education according to its nature would be anti-pedagogic, just as the educator himself must be fundamentally conservative if he wants to attain the pedagogic aim of the collective type. A more revolutionary individualistic educator is a contradiction in terms, for because of his educational principles

he would be able to train only like-minded pupils and this continually advanced process would precipitate in a few generations the collapse of the whole system of education. For not only must such pedagogues struggle against influencing the children in any kind of way but also the children themselves would soon resist any educational influence.

Nevertheless, educators must at least attempt, even in such a transitional stage as we find ourselves in today, to build into the old scheme of education certain new factors of individual education, such as those urged by therapy and prophylaxis. Of course, according to the very nature of the task, there will be difficulties. Two of these we should like to emphasize here. First, the present reform in education proceeds from the pedagogues themselves. This was not always the case; indeed, to a certain extent it is an innovation, that must also be considered a symptom of individualization. Many modern pedagogues who emphatically speak of the emancipation of the child, really mean the emancipation of themselves. And although they are intelligent enough to admit that we do not know what goes on in the child and therefore, from our adult standpoint, we cannot understand the child, yet they do not appear to ask themselves whence they know that their reformatory ideas are suited to the child and would be more acceptable to it than the prevailing methods. Experience teaches us that children love and

understand far less the books written for them by great poets, than the mediocre works manufactured by narrators of stories who are themselves already on a childish level, instead of first having to descend to it. The old methods of education starting from the primitives' initiation rites of the boys, leading up to the austere system of the pedagogues before and since *Rousseau* were at least suited to a childish level. This cannot be said of the psychological interpretations in the modern child-guidance councils. By this I do not advocate a crudeness in education, but simplicity, indeed even primitiveness need not necessarily manifest itself in crude forms.

The second point concerns the essential content that modern psychology has to offer or at least has hitherto offered pedagogy, namely, the principle of love. But this only leads to a strengthening of the mechanism of identification, a danger that has not even been avoided in the psychoanalysis of adults undertaken as a "re-education" (Freud). In education founded on the old style, the *conscious* application of this principle would possibly have been of use, but certainly would not have been harmful, as seems to be the case in our age of individualism. The difficulty lies in the fact that for the development and unfolding of individuality, we need love. But this love also leads to the love-identification, that again counteracts the development of individuality, because the individual by identification endeavours

to become like the loved person. In order to exclude—or at least to restrict—this undesirable by-product of education based on the love principle, the psychoanalytic therapy has resorted to a technique that endeavours to achieve individualization without identification. This measure has also become of great significance to modern education and we shall discuss its pedagogic aspects in the following chapter. In brief, it is, apart from the conscious utilization of love as an educational means, also the simultaneous explanation to the pupil concerning the application and operation of this means itself. In the analytic situation we speak of revealing the “transference” and of explaining to the patient its nature and influence; in the pedagogic situation the same tendency is conspicuous as the demand for the sexual enlightenment of the child who in this way shall be educated not only by means of love but at the same time shall also be instructed scientifically concerning the nature of love. This love is made not only consciously a means of education, but it is likewise made the subject of education. The fundamental *means* of modern individualistic education thus consists of an elaboration of the old *principle of love*, the fundamental new *content* of psychological education is *sexuality*.

## Chapter Two

# SEXUAL ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE SEXUAL IMPULSE

*I consider it a most significant advance in the science of education, that in France, in place of the catechism, the State should have introduced a primer which gives the child the first instruction in his position as a citizen and in the ethical obligations which will be his in time to come. The elementary instruction provided there, however, is seriously deficient in that it includes no reference to sexual matters.*

FREUD<sup>1</sup>

WITH REGARD TO the much discussed problem of sexual education, we must first separate two aspects of it; the education of sexuality or the training of the sexual impulse, and the education through sexuality or by means of love. Although the two sides are practically inseparable, yet it seems to me necessary to separate them theoretically and to consider each in regard to its

<sup>1</sup> Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 43.

own significance before considering their mutual relationship. The educational systems of primitive peoples somehow seem to reconcile sexuality and education in that they defer the education of the boy to man's estate, to the time of puberty. Whether it is only a matter of a forced sublimation of the sexual impulse (threat) as inferred by Psychoanalysis, or of a deeper mystical, symbolic act, we shall not discuss here. Obviously through the ceremonial of the boys' initiation, as already mentioned, the second adult or mature phase of the individual is ushered in. This initiation withdraws the child from the influence of maternal training and "drums" into him (in the true sense of the word) the community ideology represented by the fathers (elders), not *the* father. I should like to formulate this process that is still operative in all our systems of education, thus: at a given period in individual development the rôle of educator is transferred from one person (mother) to the community; more precisely expressed, that in *place of a human being as a pattern of education*, a collective ideology appears as *the educational ideal*. One might almost say that instead of an education using emotional means (love) there appears the intellectual (compulsory) education, if one did not know to what extent all collective ideologies have to be emotionally based in order to be capable of becoming an educational ideal. The primitive initiation ceremonies of the boys show this quite



clearly, their emotional impetus being so much greater than their intellectual significance. Indeed it seems just as if these ceremonies had to remain unintelligible in order to exercise more surely their emotional and affective value.

There is no doubt that the intellectual part in education has continually increased in the course of time, yet it is also evident that there can be no effective education at all without strong emotional influences. Here is to be found another difficulty inherent in every system of education; a difficulty that we shall consider more closely in dealing with the emotional development, but perhaps also one that will throw a first ray of light on the significance of the sexual problem in the present psychological educational ideology. By increasingly intellectualizing education and making it more technical, new and stronger emotional forces had to be mobilized for its achievement, and also to give it balance. This emotional force Psychoanalysis believes it has found in its appeal to the strongest factor of the emotional life, namely, the sexual impulse. Whether we entirely approve this or not, it has been, perhaps, a necessary step in the utilization of the last emotional resources which an exaggerated rationalization of our education has left us. It is naturally always precarious to call to one's aid the last relief-forces, above all, because only a desperate crisis compels one to such a step, on whose success life or death depends. But we can only

take cognizance of the fact that this step is forced upon us, and try to understand what advantage and disadvantage may be derived from it.

If we compare this last phase of psychological sexual education, at the commencement of which we are now, with the earliest known to us, namely, that of the primitive initiation of boys, immediately two essential differences strike us. Psychoanalysis shifts the beginning of sexual education from puberty to childhood and makes the incision between family and community approximately there where it had already been made by the state (compulsory education). Secondly, Psychoanalysis raises this sexual education from the purely emotional sphere to the intellectual level of our community ideology, in that it proclaims sexuality—as mentioned—not only a means of education, but—in the form of sexual enlightenment—also the subject of education. But for both these a prerequisite—or rather a consequence—would be an earlier maturity, not to say prematurity, of the child in an emotional as well as in an intellectual respect. Again we may regret this, but we may perhaps have to be resigned to an earlier maturing of our children since they have to achieve a greater development to reach our present-day level of civilization. As life apparently cannot be prolonged at the one end, it must indeed commence earlier since we have more to assimilate. In so far as this is the case, it is valid only for the child of a definite cultural period,

namely, our present Western civilization, and it scarcely has the universal significance for mankind which Psychoanalysis would obviously like to claim for it. •

However, we must investigate how far this is correct even for the present-day child, in other words, how far the psychoanalytic ideology which now exists, is an objective comprehension and correct description of existing conditions, and how far it comprises on the one hand an interpretation of the same and, on the other hand, an ideological preparation for new conditions. This is not meant to be critical, and could only be taken as criticism from one narrow viewpoint which would accept the whole Freudian ideology at its face value, as an objective description and explanation of facts. If the Freudian ideology were only that it would be nothing at all; but its influence alone proves that it is much more than that. It is what every influential ideology always was and, according to its nature, must be, namely, a genetic explanation of existing conditions, but at the same time a psychological interpretation of the same and an ideological indication as to their future reorganization.<sup>1</sup>

In relation to the problem we are considering here, namely, that of modern sexual education, this would

<sup>1</sup> Eduard Spranger finds the same factors at work in the far more objective science of history and estimates it from a philosophic point of view ("Das deutsche Bildungsideal der Gegenwart in geschichtsphilosophischer Beleuchtung" Leipzig, 1919, 2nd. Edition).

mean, speaking simply, is the present-day child already actually mature (or premature) for sexual enlightenment? If so to what extent and what are the reasons for it, and in what way shall sexual enlightenment take place? If the child is not ready, then it is a matter of an interpretation, which projects into the child our own problem, and hence it must at least throw some light on the psychology of the interpreters, that is, ourselves. Probably both possibilities are correct to a certain extent, and they suggest a third question, namely, to what extent is it a matter of a correct perception of a commencing process of development that Psychoanalysis has interpreted in the meaning of its scientific ideology and which will work itself out only in the near future? In the following pages we shall mainly consider the interpretative aspect, because it is by far the most interesting, the most important, and also the most characteristic for the psychoanalytic ideology. Psychology, and particularly Psychoanalysis, is a predominantly interpretative science, and what specifically concerns the problem of education, has been gained only indirectly through the analysis of adult neurotics. The actual observation of children was undertaken with the ideology already accepted and, according to the reaction of educators and experience hitherto, the future prospects of its universal application seem for the time being too few to be taken into consideration.

It is well known that Psychoanalysis became aware of

difficulties by an early inoculation with a dangerous serum. Expressed in psychological terminology it would be a matter of the avoidance of a later sexual shock by a timely and gradual preparation.

So far this sounds quite plausible, but apart from the technical question of improving this prophylactic measure, there is the doubt as to whether and how far physiological viewpoints, especially of a medical nature, are applicable to the psychical sphere. Sexuality of course is without doubt a biological factor of first importance, but even Psychoanalysis could not overlook the psychical significance it has among individuals, and has taken this into account in its concept of "psychosexuality." But if the mental significance of sexuality for mankind could be questioned, yet the influencing of it educationally is a purely psychical affair and the anti-toxin of sexual enlightenment may have as its consequence undesirable reactions in the whole psychical establishment which may paralyse the desired effect in the purely sexual sphere. To this may be added further reflections if we follow the comparison to its final consequences. Serum therapy ought to prevent disease, sexual enlightenment ought to promote progress. We do not want to suppress the sexual impulse but only to emancipate it. This desired result, however, is supposed to take place only at a later period. *The question, how is sexuality to be discussed and explained, and at the same time its activity restricted,*

*seems to me not yet solved.* The explanation, for example, concerning masturbation, treating it as something harmless and not dangerous, is supposed to have a calming effect and not a threatening one; but I should say there are few parents, even among the pioneers of modern education, who would be inclined to draw from this enlightenment the conclusion to let their children masturbate. But when they do not allow it, they place themselves in a new difficulty of having to give a reason for it. The whole movement of sexual enlightenment is doubtless praiseworthy in its tendency to consider sexuality as something harmless and not as something sinful and forbidden, an attitude which can only poison the entire later life of the individual. But this inoffensiveness tacitly comprises the release of sexual activity, for it cannot be comprehended—especially by the child—why one should not do something when it is not “bad.” In its extreme consequences, then, sexual education would not result in an education of the sexual impulse (in the sense of training it), but in a release of it, and this would lead us back to the level of the primitives, who have no sexual problem and no sexual education because they give free rein to sexual expression at least up to the time of puberty (or marriage).

Fortunately the child himself vigorously upsets all our psychological calculations by carrying on his sexual activity independently of our attitude towards it.

But that means that the child not only gives in to his sexual impulse in spite of our prohibitions, but also that he experiences it as something forbidden, bad, and something to conceal even when we permit and release it. This is the first momentous discovery we have made with our sexual propaganda for children. This experience points to the fact, that it is not the external prohibition or the influence of education that connects sexuality with the idea of sin and guilt, but something inherent in it which is experienced by the individual as dangerous and, perhaps, rightly so. But this also shows that the hitherto prevailing education of the child was not—as our radical psychologists maintain—false and unreasonable and based only on ignorance so that it needed merely the focussing of our better knowledge on it, in order to wipe out with one blow all evils of education.<sup>1</sup> Certainly the child has always asked questions, wanted explanations, and above all wanted to be understood. But the answers that religious education gave to these questions were not false but only adequate if we understand them correctly; as the child has in any case a guilt-feeling in reference to sexual matters, religion, then, has only sanctioned it for him, although sometimes in too drastic a manner.

<sup>1</sup> Such naïve radical tendencies appear in the symposium brought out by V. P. Calverton and Sam. Schmalhausen (New York, 1930), "The New Generation. The intimate Problems of Modern Parents and Children," although a minority of contributors (like *Havelock Ellis*, *Bronislaw Malinowski*) represent a sober and scientifically sound objectivity.

On the other hand however, also our sexual enlightenment does not have the desired effect of taking this guilt-feeling away from the child because the child then seeks elsewhere to have this guilt-feeling corroborated if the parents do not do it. Whether for this the child goes back to religious and mythological ideas, or gets false information from companions or unenlightened people is irrelevant in comparison to the undeniable fact that the child refuses the correct scientific explanation including the release of sex implicitly implied in it.

What is apparently manifest in the conflict between school and church is that sex education is on the point of replacing the religious training, and it is now also psychologically evident that the religious education has been a legitimate precursor of the psychological education and not merely a hindrance to it. This is clearly shown in the different answers given to the famous question of the child as to where we come from; the religious training answers it by pointing to God as the creator of mankind, modern education answers it by giving a biological explanation. But still no child has been satisfied with this sexual explanation, even not when the rôle of the father was explained with it. The statement of Psychoanalysis that most of the child's questions really aim at something other than their pretext, would have been much more meritorious if it had not obstinately kept to the preconceived opinion that



this did not hold good for overt sexual questions. I call it a prejudice, for the experience that children are not satisfied with the biological answer to their sexual questions, seems strongly to contradict this assumption. I believe that most of the child's questions concern philosophical and religious problems, that also occupy the minds of adults even today, and are still unsolved and perhaps even are insoluble. I am convinced, however, that particularly the sexual questions of children have this enigmatic background and that we answer these eternal problems of humanity concerning our origin, our future, and the meaning of our whole existence at the time only in the natural scientific terminology of our sexual-biology and materialistic psychology. But this answer does not satisfy the child in the least and if we want to be honest we have to admit also that it does not satisfy ourselves, and it only seems to satisfy because we know we have no other reply. Perhaps this explains why the adult seems to suffer from the sexual problem as much as the child; because the biological solution of the problem of humanity is also ungratifying and inadequate for the adult as for the child. The religious solution was and still is so much the more gratifying because it admits *the Unknown*, indeed, recognizes it as the chief factor instead of pretending an omniscience that we do not possess. Besides, religion is also more consoling, I should like to say more therapeutic because, with the admission of the unknown and

unknowable it also leaves room for all kinds of hope that it still may not be so hopeless as it seems. The feeling of inferiority from which apparently our children now seem to suffer, is certainly increased by the impression they get of the godlike omniscience of their parents and their own ignorance in sexual matters. But the sexual instruction of children, that is, putting them on an equality with adults in *this* matter, does not help much if the parents' valuation of the sexual problem excludes their religious belief, or in other words, if the parental knowledge of sexual matters has the appearance of being a knowledge of all the mysteries of life, a knowledge which the child does not and never will possess even as the adults do not possess it. Religion, from the very beginning, here places children and adults on one level in so far as their inability to know ultimate things is concerned.

If we compare the idea of sexual education with the religious education hitherto prevailing, we shall find that in sexual training there is an element of wishful-thinking carried over by the adult into the childish ideology. It has indeed thus arisen that the therapist has wished that the adult neurotic might have been sufficiently experienced as a child to be able to avoid all later difficulties. It is a primitive wishful-thinking projected back in this form, and in this respect sexual education differs in no way from other ideologies of education that want to spare the child the adult's harmful

experiences or at least to give the child a taste of them in the form of education. But since sexual education differs from other educational ideologies in early childhood neither in this respect nor in relation to its disappointing answer to life's riddle we must concentrate our attention on the one point in which it does clearly differ, and that is, *its content*. Before we go into the psychological significance of this difference of content, I should first like to emphasize its intellectual quality. This new content is not only different from earlier contents, but it differs in this respect, that it is supposed to be the "truth." This truth however is here confused with reality. We might give the correct biological answer to the child's concrete question as to the arrival of a little brother or sister but we do not thereby touch the child's fear of life that is behind this question and which cannot be explained causally because it is rooted in the fear of the Unknown and Unknowable. The new educational ideology thus seems to be enforced by a fanaticism for the truth, which has found its clearest expression in the demand for sexual enlightenment, but which extends beyond this to the whole attitude of the modern educator. This may be, among other things, also a protest against the existing opportunism in education which at the same time has not always coincided with the truth. But this craving for the truth is rather a fanaticism for reality than a real love of the truth and hence stops short before the

admission of the truth concerning our lack of knowledge. This is predominantly expressed in education in a negative way, namely, by avoiding what we consider "untruth," the true value of which we no longer understand, such as for example, religion. Thus, also, this ideal of over-valuing reality, a characteristic of our natural scientific world-concept, originates from adults and is carried over into education by them. The child like primitive man tends more to the unreal, he does not want logical, causal explanations, but emotional consolation and he denies reality in favour of consoling illusions which therefore seem to him to be "truer." These are apparently necessary in order to live and the child has the right instinct for it just as did man of the primitive and religious ages.

But again, we must bear in mind that the present-day child sooner or later has to recognize these illusions as disappointing, and it might be better to prepare the child for this at an early age. But it seems that also adults still need illusions and always know how to create them anew as soon as earlier ones disappoint. Precisely the sphere of sexuality has formerly been an essential promoter of illusion and it has already been brought as an objection against sexual enlightenment, that by it, one might possibly be damning up this fertile source of illusion. It seems as if the child feels like the many disappointed adults who react to the first sexual experience with the exclamation "Is that all!"

for one actually has the impression that most children react in the same way to sexual enlightenment. And rightly so! For it is not all! But the rest, which is the most important for so many, seems to be based on illusion, as, for example, the quite general idea of romantic love. The question, that we approach here, leads us back again to our starting-point, namely, education of sexuality or education by means of sexuality. From its own sphere, the therapeutic situation, where education through love besides being the greatest furtherance to education became also its greatest hindrance, Psychoanalysis has drawn the pedagogic conclusion that naturally the chief thing to do is to give sexual education or, more correctly, to train the sexual impulse. But at the same time it is believed that in the sexual impulse itself there is to be found the real agent of educational sublimation. Now perhaps one can use sexuality *consciously* as a *means* of education as it always has been used *instinctively*, and get good results from it; the question is only, what happens thereby to the sexual impulse itself? Might not the result be similar to that in our colleges where the students are compelled to study the Greek verbs in Homer? The student may indeed in this way learn the conjugations but his taste for the beauty of the poems is thereby spoiled.

Whatever one's attitude to sex is, it cannot be denied that a great part of its attraction arises from curiosity,

from its being kept secret and forbidden. The purely physical sensations of pleasure would scarcely be strong enough alone to overcome the resistances which apparently oppose the sexual activity in the individual himself. This resistance to sexuality inherent in the individual, is the real problem therapeutically as well as pedagogically. The answer of Psychoanalysis to this question has proved to be inadequate, because it is only a rational paraphrase of the old Biblical explanation. We are supposed to have sexual difficulties because our religious education teaches that sexuality is "bad," that is, it has made it a moral problem whereas originally it was a natural source of pleasure. But, as the study of primitive races shows, this is not so obvious as it seems from purely biological considerations. Indeed, the primitives furnish us with a grand example of the fact that even unrestricted sexuality becomes a moral problem, exactly as we can observe it in our enlightened children. The primitives certainly do not separate, in our meaning, the function of pleasure and the function of procreation, but they act as if the latter did not exist at all for the individual, which is true to their group-ideology. This group-ideology arises, however, from the belief in the soul, according to the original concept of which the individual is immortal and hence procreation in one's own children is looked upon as a danger that threatens personal immortality. I believe that the deepest resistance to sexuality arises from the

claim of the species that directly threatens individual integrity. The child, who, as it were, begins at birth to sunder itself from the species and to develop its individuality, feels sexuality first of all to be an inner claim of the species hostile to individuality and hence resists it. This leads as I have already stated elsewhere <sup>1</sup> to an inner strife in the individual against sexuality, a conflict which arises necessarily and independently of external influences. This strife within is carried out by the individual in the same manner as in external strife, namely, by means of *the will*. For the will represents the individual energetically, it is psychologically synonymous with individual will. *Sexuality* is a kind of racial will forced upon the individual, the final acceptance of which is made possible through the individual love choice, against which, however, the individual and the individual will are continually striving. *In this strife between the individual will and the biologically given community ideology of the species we have before us the prototype of the educational problem* with all its conflicts and difficulties.

This means to say that the sexual problem necessarily provokes in the child itself the conflict inherent in all education between the individual will and the community ideology, and indeed presents this conflict in its most human form, because the sexual conflict is uni-

<sup>1</sup> Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit (Leipzig 1929). Chapter on Selbst und Ideal, (especially p. 57). Further in my book "Seelenglaube und Psychologie."

versal and independent of the particular educational ideology characteristic of definite systems of civilization. Certainly also the specific ideology of any particular civilization is influenced by the attitude taken towards the sexual problem. This is not only on account of the fundamental significance of the sexual life in itself, but because in the individual's attitude to it there is implied the mutual interplay of individual and collective ideology. In this sense the sexual education would be the educational problem par excellence. The application of this knowledge to pedagogic practice is, however, not so simple as it is imagined to be by the psychoanalytic educator, who has in mind chiefly the therapeutic and prophylactic effect of sexual enlightenment. In relation to the positive constructive side that forms the real task of education, the sexual education signifies a radical attack on the fundamentals of all pedagogy and this, not prudery, explains the resistance against it. But first we must be clear as to whence this "resistance" arises and for this we must understand what the very nature of sexual education signifies.

These considerations are necessary not only for practical reasons but so that we may be able to lay the foundation stone for a new educational ideology. This can only gradually be crystallized out of and following on the revolutionary advance of the psychoanalytic theory and its precipitate application to radical pedagogic reforms. For the construction of ideologies con-



sists not in revolutionizing, but in the conscious elaboration of the dangerous as well as the useful elements, which latter are naturally over-rated by the radicals. So the idea of sexual education gives the appearance of emancipating the individual and his impulse life from the chains of a religious and conventional morality; whereas its practical application in educational reforms is in fact not at all radical but conservative because it is not individual but collective. In that sexuality is first consciously and then officially made the subject of education, the idea of sexual enlightenment loses its individual-revolutionary character and necessarily becomes—like every educational ideology—a representative of the collective community will. This regular and necessary *transformation of an individual's revolutionary ideas into the conservative ideology of the community* encounters in the sexual problem quite peculiar difficulties. Not, perhaps, because sexuality is too individual, too personal, to be made into a community ideology, but just the reverse, because in essence sexuality is a collective phenomenon which the individual at all stages of civilization wants to individualize, that is, control. This explains all sexual conflicts in the individual, from masturbation to the most varied perversions and perversities, above all the keeping secret of everything sexual by individuals as an expression of a personal tendency to individualize as much as possible collective elements in it. On the other hand we

see the community at all times and under all circumstances endeavouring to deprive the individual as far as possible through convention, law, and custom, of the arbitrary practice of sexuality. But the community's every step in the direction of making the sexual life collective leads to new attempts at individualization which again bring forth community reactions.

This everlasting armament of the individual against society, and vice versa, has hitherto been carried out chiefly in religious, social, economic, and lastly in educational ideologies. In other words it has been a fight for belief, for race, for class, a conflict between the older and younger generations, certainly also a fight of the sexes against one another, in which each group wants to assert its individuality as against a bigger or stronger group, ultimately against humanity. What is most characteristic of the present educational struggle is that it seems to concentrate more and more around the sexual problem which contains in it the two irreconcilable antitheses of individual and species. One might express this figuratively thus, formerly the solution of this difficult problem had been attempted in algebraic formula and now one attempts to solve it in terms of its real value. But it might easily happen that the calculation did not turn out as one expected because one cannot correctly estimate the value of sexuality. Psychoanalysis also is not free from this error, since from its medical standpoint and by reason of its

therapeutic attitude it has over-estimated the individual pleasurable factor of sexuality rather than another more important factor. This other is the collective factor, which Freud valued only as a social inhibition (moral training), not, however, as an element inherent in sexuality itself and characteristic for it. From this racial claim inherent in sexuality, arise all the individual's resistances which Psychoanalysis has simply understood as the result of intimidation.

However, if we consider the collective nature of sexuality and assign to it the position due, we recognize that the modern sexual education which seems to be so individualistic is really aspiring to exploit this collective character of sexuality in order to combat increasing individualization of it. Sex teaching as a subject of education with the admitted purpose of introducing sexual enlightenment into the curriculum of the schools would thus prove to be a grave interference with the individual's personal freedom. As I have already stated in an earlier work,<sup>1</sup> there seems to be a peculiar inner connexion between the personality development and the development of sexuality, and indeed, I believe chiefly because the sexual sphere had hitherto been exempt from educational influences. It remained the only domain which was surrendered to the individual, as it were, for self-education and

<sup>1</sup> *Gestaltung und Ausdruck der Persönlichkeit. (Genetische Psychologie, 2nd. Part, p. 69 and ff. Wien und Leipzig, 1918).*

self-development, and the child reacts with open protest or with secret resistance to insure that this remaining sphere shall not be withdrawn from self-administration and be "socialized" like everything else. In spite of all infantile sexual curiosity and incessant questions, we cannot overlook the fact that the child does not want sexual education—as it does not want any kind of education—and refuses sexual enlightenment as unsatisfying. The more positive the enlightenment, the more is the child compelled to create its own private sexual ideology and sexual sphere where it can do as it likes in individual freedom, unhindered and uninfluenced by adult educational tendencies.

Even if sexual education were necessary as the last resort of the community from increasing individualism, we should not pretend that it is in the child's interest but in the interest of the community represented by the educator. It seems to me that this threatening socialization of sexuality, indeed one might say communization of sexuality as implied in modern enlightenment, is a necessary reaction of the community in its struggle for self-preservation against increasing individualization. On the other hand I believe that the individual's stronger inclination for sexual freedom manifested in the increase of divorce, promiscuity, and perversions, is nothing but an individual reaction against the threatening invasion of the uprising sexual socialization which is implied in the modern ideology of

education. Another symptom of the same, deserves to be brought forward. Education actually begins at adolescence not only among the primitives, but also with the higher standing civilized races such as the Greeks and Romans, so that time and room are given for individual development and unfolding before the direct intervention of collective forces takes place. Modern psychologists would like education to begin as early as possible, which has been the case only in the religious systems of education of the Jews and Christians. In these systems the individual is trained from the beginning to carry on and transmit a religious ideology that had been created for a self-protection only at a definite period and can fulfil this aim also only temporarily. Since man always needs and wants collective ideologies, the possibility for creating new ones must be permitted him when previous ones wear out. The earlier they are inoculated in the individual, the earlier will they also lose their value, and the more difficult will it be for man to replace these deeply rooted ideas with others. The sexual ideology of education as it may appear from the therapeutic and prophylactic viewpoint, thus signifies, not only an enrichment and necessary improvement of the present system of education, but it contains at the same time a completely new ideology of education altogether, which is marked by the systematic communizing of the individual sex impulse. In this sense the modern

sex education is conservative, that is, however, anti-individualistic, and hence it may provoke a revolutionary protest from the individual, a protest that one cannot explain as a moral resistance alone. The fact that the demand for sexual enlightenment appears to be revolutionary is to be explained from the emphasis laid on the *individual* aspect of the sexual impulse by Psychoanalysis, which valued it therapeutically only as the individual's source of pleasure. But the individual's struggle against the collective force of sexuality is as old as humanity and is repeated in every child in the well known sexual conflicts which can be avoided by no kind of education or explanation because they are inherent in the dualistic nature of the sexual impulse and of man himself as an ego and as part of the species. And the more parents and educators advocate from their collective attitude the sexual enlightenment of their children, the more (so experience has taught us) will the children themselves oppose this interference of society in their private lives.

### Chapter Three

## THE TRAINING OF THE WILL AND EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT<sup>1</sup>

*To rear men is to lead them into  
the path of Recognition; where Will  
is evil.*

LAO-TSE

ALL EDUCATION is fundamentally a training of the will. It is obviously so in the primitive systems of education, and, though less openly admitted, it is still so in all our modern methods of education. Indeed, all education is, in effect, a matter of somehow moulding the individual (whose most natural self-expression is the will) into a social and collective being. This is accomplished partly by rousing or strengthening in him that which is common to humanity, partly by toning down that which is too individual, and finally by applying to, and imprinting on him, the positive community ideals

<sup>1</sup> This was given as a Lecture at the First International Congress for Mental Hygiene, Washington, May 1930, and at the Mid-West Conference on Character Development, Chicago, Feb. 1930; printed in their Proceedings entitled "The Child's Emotions" (The University of Chicago Press, 1930).

and ideologies, such as religion, morality, knowledge, and technical skill, etc. In the primitive community the training of the will directly coincides with the ideologies, in that the initiation rites, to a certain extent break the individual will and consciously use for that purpose the ideologies expressed in the myths and rites. In modern education the same factors operate, but conforming to the changed cultural milieu they are valued differently, that is, pedagogically. The inculcation of the ideologies, the conscious intellectual acquisition of knowledge, is set up as the aim of education, and the training or breaking of the will is tolerated only as a means to this end. Hence also the two phases of education have become sharply separated; broadly speaking the training of the will takes place in the home, and the education of the intellect for which this home-training lays the foundation, takes place in the school. I need not here point out how extensively these two competing spheres, the home and the school, intersect and overlap each other in practical education and what difficulties arise for the child and for the educational aim from the necessarily imperfect co-operation of these two spheres. The school, with its colossal program for uniformity, naturally wants to receive the child as far as possible prepared for its task; on the other hand the parents, being pre-occupied with the training of the child's will within the small family group, expect in their turn considerable help from the school in the



difficulties unavoidably arising in the home.

But education in the home not only differs from that in the school in relation to the ideology, in that the one is predominantly a negative form of will training, the other predominantly a positive group education; but in the conflicts and difficulties arising from this, there also come into play the emotional factors and affect-attitudes fundamental to these ideologies. For the parents, however much they may approve community or group education, yet emotionally want to transmit and immortalize their own individual self in their children. Whether this wish is manifestly egoistic or is rather in the nature of an ideal, it is in any case anti-social, although not necessarily in the bad sense of the word. In the school, there arises a twofold difficulty; not only does the community ideology represented by the school necessarily run counter to the parental wishes and leanings, but also this community ideology is unavoidably represented by an individual, *the teacher*, who again tries (although unconsciously) to imprint his or her own individual ideology—or, if one likes, his or her personality—on the child. The teachers as individuals have, so to say, their own “parental ideology,” that is, they also want to make the child in their own image or according to their own ideal picture. Certainly the teacher is restricted in this tendency to a far greater degree than the real parents of the child, and indeed by two factors; first of all by the community ideology

which he officially represents and which through his special training for the scholastic profession has partly become his own ideology (his professional ideology); and secondly, by the community ideology of the school itself, in which the child besides being influenced by the teacher, is also influenced by comrades of the same age and with the same interests and sympathies. This, together with the individual-ideology of the pupil and the community-ideology of the teacher is in the same way pitted against that of the parents, so to say, as a child's community ideology.

Without being able to enter here into a description or even estimation of all these various and unequal influences in the child's life, I should like only to mention one point that is important for an understanding of the fundamental will problem. One might say that the *parents are the natural educators of the child's emotional life*, and that the teacher is the educator ordained by the community for the systematic training of the child's understanding and intelligence. Since, however, these two spheres cannot in practice be separated at the school age, this view would scarcely have a pedagogic significance unless the parents realize this their task, and hence prepare themselves better for it. For the school in its age-long development of thousands of years, from the Rabbinical temple school to our modern school, has sprung up as a firmly erected system with conscious aims. The emotional training of

the will, on the other hand, was left to the parents' arbitrary judgment, certainly supported by religious tradition reaching its climax in the intervention of the church in the field of education. This religious influence, in its systematic and purposeful aim, has eventually become equal to that of state education. The critical phase in which our education at present finds itself seems to be due to a slackening of the religious training of the will in favour of psychological training, which, according to its scientific nature, aspires to a similar systematic and conscious aim in the sphere of the parental training of the impulses, as the school has traditionally developed in relation to the intellectual training. Although, from the point of view of the school this could only be welcomed as an advance, since the school certainly could only gain if the child had gone through a period of systematic "discipline" of the impulse life before entering the real period of learning, yet from this new movement, new competitions and disputes have arisen between the home, the school, and above all the church, disputes which only gradually can be smoothed out and settled.

In one point certainly one must admit that the opponents of this new reform in parental education are right. Nevertheless, they overlook the fact that their chief objection applies only to the present situation, and not to the nature of the thing itself. They have behind them tradition, thousands of years old, and the

experience gained from it; the spokesmen of the modern movement on the other hand, have at most a couple of decades of new psychological orientation, and can offer neither a satisfying theoretical system nor any kind of reliable practical method. Indeed this whole field of impulse education in early childhood is for the moment like an educational laboratory, in which educators are experimenting theoretically and practically in an aimless way that is certainly not always for the good of the child. Now one attempts to influence the child psychologically; again, to enlighten or to educate the parents; then again to reform the methods or to change the theories on which they are based. Even a combination of all these desperate attempts apparently does not lead to the desired result.<sup>1</sup> The novelty of our modern viewpoint, the relative suddenness with which the psychological impulse education is demanded in place of the collapsing religious ideology, the inexperience of parents and psychologists in this new field, all this has obviously contributed to the confusion which for the moment reigns in the minds of the pedagogues and teachers of elementary classes, as well as in the nurseries at home.

If we are to have a systematic and consciously directed education of the child's impulses, we must first know and understand the child's impulse life. Psychol-

<sup>1</sup> Thomas; *The Child in America, Behaviour Problems and Programs*, New York, 1928.

ogy has this as its aim, an aim we are yet far from reaching today, yet when attained it will be the first real starting point of a new educational era. Psychoanalysis in this respect has made the first promising advance, but it has remained at a point round which an embittered and fruitless strife has been waging. From its study of the adult neurotic, Psychoanalysis has postulated the *sexual impulse* as the nucleus of the infantile impulse life, and hence declares sexual education to be the chief task of pedagogy in early childhood. The resistances against this view among parents and educators are, however, not only emotional and moral, but are supported by the scientific arguments of other psychologists who have not approached the problem of the child's impulse life from the standpoint of the adult neurotic. The first and hitherto strongest reaction against the *Freudian* "sexualization" of the child's impulse life started from *Alfred Adler* and his school of individual psychology. *Adler* emphasized the significance of the will psychology in the child; this was not new but a profitable point of departure. What was new was his concept of the will as an overcompensatory tendency for the adjustment of organic or psychical inferiority, which he assumes no child can escape in our cultural milieu. Also his method of interpreting this manifestation of will, though taken from Psychoanalysis, was new for educational ideology. He, however, explained the manifestations of will not as a nat-

ural expression of the individuality but as an exaggerated expression of a neurotic need for proving one's superiority, and hence an obstacle in the path of social adjustment. His psychology has in common with the *Freudian*, the interpretation of the will, and indeed in the sense of a socially disturbing, and pedagogically undesirable manifestation of individuality. He differs from *Freud* in that he recognizes and acknowledges the will as a strong factor in the child's impulse life, whereas *Freud* gives a sexual interpretation to the manifestations of will without recognizing them for what they are. Adler follows Freud, in that he sees it necessary to interpret the will, although in the form of an ideology which originates from the sphere of will itself and thus specifies it as a will to power or superiority.

The basis of the child's psychical life, namely, *the emotions*, is badly accounted for by both. For *Freud*, all emotions originate from the sexual sphere, an assumption that even if it is proved to be genetically correct, leaves unexplained precisely the essential characteristic of the emotional life, namely, its differentiations. For *Adler*, besides the so-called "feeling of inferiority" there is no other feeling of essential importance, since all other emotions can apparently just as easily be explained from the feeling of inferiority as, according to *Freud*, they can be from the sexual impulse. Even granted that we actually find explained in these two theories the source of our whole emotional life, I main-

tain that we still need a theory of the emotional life itself in order to understand the manifold gradations of the emotions in the human psychical life. For both explanations, that of *Freud* and that of *Adler*, are causal, although the latter uses final explanations in order to interpret the phenomenon of will from the individual's point of view. It seems to me, however, that we need another point of view in order to understand such an eminently dynamic sphere as that of the emotional life with its constantly changing attitudes and moods.

Since we are not dealing here with a theory of the emotional life but with problems of education, on the ground of other experiences it may be stated that the therapeutic as well as the pedagogic experiments of the new generation of psychologists have taught us how inaccessible and difficult to influence the emotional sphere is. Just this very fact has led to the setting up of such simplifying theories, as those of *Freud* and *Adler*, with regard to the emotional life. Both theories are according to their own admission *practically* oriented; this was indeed an advantage over academic psychology, although it had considerable disadvantages. *Freud's* psychology is primarily therapeutic, *Adler's* doctrine, primarily pedagogic. In practice, however, every educator or therapist has finally to face the problem of the emotions, this the above mentioned theories have handled from the practical side, without having had at their disposal a satisfactory

theory of the same. This necessity was proclaimed a virtue; but into this ideal picture of a scientific approach, there has crept unnoticed a blemish that has become disastrous to the whole. In order to be able somehow to approach the dynamics of the emotional life it was necessary to schematize, as *Freud* did in his sexual psychology and *Adler* in his theory of inferiority. That would have been justifiable at least as a beginning and as a rough working hypothesis, if it had not led underneath to a falsification of the whole picture and hence of the whole problem. For soon one had forgotten the purely practical need that had led to the simplification and a theory was evolved that postulated a similar simplicity of facts. This was possible, however, only by reason of a second and still more disastrous false conclusion; namely, one had obtained a simplification of the complicated state of affairs, not through pure observation of facts but already by means of interpreting them. In other words, at the root of the practical-scientific standpoint of Psychoanalysis and Individual Psychology, there lies a presupposition, not a theory, but an ideology, and this is in both cases the old pedagogic ideology, thus the very same that these theories pretend to reform.

The result was that the emotional life of the child, as of the adult, was not observed and hence remained no better understood than before: it was interpreted, and indeed for practical reasons which at the outset



were pedagogically and therapeutically justifiable. But the presupposition was that of the old pedagogic psychology which is primarily concerned *not with understanding but with changing the individual or something in him because it is undesirable*. Certainly we consider this as a part of the program of education, especially that part which concerns the early impulse life, yet it is no new factor, much less a modern factor in education. For early education, at least according to our present concept, ought first of all to *develop* the child's given impulse disposition and not subject it to correction. Indeed, even when it appears to be in need of correction, we must ask ourselves the question whether we must not avoid too early an intervention just as much as too late. So the educational ideology of modern psychologists, proves to be as conventional as that of the old school of pedagogues; namely, it wants to guide, correct, and restrict the child's early manifestations of will, and the rationalization of this bending of the will is now a psychological one, whereas the moral attitude has remained the same.

This is obvious in relation to the problem of will which *Freud* interprets as sexual striving, *Adler* as striving for recognition; both interpret it with the obvious pedagogic tendency to restrict and to adjust the expressions of the individual will in these two spheres, to an average normal standard. Only this moral tendency is at present not justified by religious dogmas, but

is disguised in psychological terminology as therapeutic necessity and pedagogic expediency. This supposedly scientific ideology corresponds to the moralistic tendency in the parents, who consider the *child's emotional life*, apart from the sphere in which it is manifested, as *in itself undesirable* and therefore not to be allowed expression. Had not a deeper study of the individual already taught us that the emotional life is extensively an expression of individual will, one could have drawn this conclusion from the affective repugnance that parents and educators feel towards all manifestations of emotion on the part of the child, as if they were obviously expressions of will. The psychoanalytic and the individual psychological formulation, that the sexual impulse or the striving for recognition is the source of the child's emotional life, thus seems only a simplified psychological justification of the instinctive repugnance of parents and educators to the whole life of the emotions as a manifestation of the individual's will.

Actually all educational difficulties seem to be traceable to a will conflict between child and educator, but this is not because the parents want to suppress the sexual impulse and the educator the child's striving for power, but because such will conflicts are unavoidable where two people live together with one another. If one does not force the child's will, one can observe that the child itself tries to provoke sexual prohibitions

from the parents and in the sphere of will shows an inclination to devotion, even submission, which contradicts the theory of inferiority, as the desire for sexual prohibition contradicts the Freudian libido theory. If *Adler*, for example, explains this submission as merely a disguised method of achieving the will, yet in this finalistic schematization which explains everything teleologically, he overlooks the diversity of Nature, or at least one of the most important aspects of the human life that we commonly call the emotional life in the narrower sense of the term. For even if his explanation should be ultimately correct, yet it explains only *what the child wants to attain, but not how or by what means he hopes to attain it*. Psychologically, we are concerned with this feeling of surrender, of submission, of obsequiousness. Granted that it stands in the service of the striving for recognition or of the sexual impulse, the question still remains, what is it, whence comes it, what causes the individual to achieve his sexual or self-seeking will tendency in this paradoxical way and what conditions and processes in his psychical life enable him to do this? These are the questions that a psychology of the emotions must first put to itself. *Adler*, however, has not even asked them and *Freud*, on the other hand, has answered them far too schematically and inadequately. Both were interested only in the tendency, the purpose, which the one saw in the social striving for recognition, the other

in the sexual striving for pleasure; but it has proved to be that there are not only strivings for powerlessness and pain, paradoxical as this may sound, but there are also emotional reactions which—independent of our own endeavours—are provoked in us by other persons and hence cannot have a final explanation in the Adlerian sense. But also *Freud's* causal explanation, with its stressing of the genesis of the emotions, is inadequate because ultimately it is again finalistic, that is, it is valued only with reference to its pleasure or pain effect on the ego. However that may be, the emotions are the medium, through which another human being is able to influence us. That means that the essential factor in education is the emotional life, of which in essence we know so little; and the little we do know is anti-pedagogic in implication since it indicates that the emotional life is not to be explained in terms of cause and purpose and hence is not to be controlled.

The former handling of the emotional life in education was relatively simple; one met the child's emotions with one's own feelings, that is, emotionally, without bothering about the origin and significance of the feeling itself, indeed without always accounting for its purpose and aim. This primitive method has succeeded fairly well these thousands of years, because feeling reacts most of all to feeling, and is influenced by it. For in the moment when one wants to influence the child's emotional development intelligently and not temper-

amentally, there results for the educator not only the obvious demand to control his own affects, but also the impossible demand to be able to measure out his emotions in doses. This homeopathic dosing is, however, impossible in the emotional life and something foreign to its very nature, hence it would unfavourably influence the child's emotional life, even if the educator could measure out his emotions. Generally the parents and educators give free rein to *their* emotional expressions towards the child, and this in and for itself would serve the purpose not only of unburdening their own but also of developing the child's emotional life, if just as free an expression were allowed the child. The contrary however is the case, and this suppression of the emotions compels the child to seek other means of expression, which are then considered by adults as childish naughtiness or faults, since their real source, the emotional development itself, is not understood. Children thus brought up will, when adult, either continue to suppress their emotions and, on this account, will refuse to tolerate any expression of emotion in their children, much less arouse it; or as a reaction to this suppression in childhood they will later exceed all bounds in emotional outbursts, but will allow no direct emotional reaction in the child to these. But if emotional suppression in the educator himself is just as harmful as an excess of emotion, and if measuring out the emotions in doses is impossible, the question is, then, what

shall the adult's emotional life be in order to make possible a sound emotional training in the child?

This cardinal question of pedagogy seems to me answerable only in an unpedagogic way. Let the adult's emotional life be what it will, his task as educator would be to accept the child's emotional life as it develops from the individual and as a reaction to the parental emotional life. Certainly this does not mean that the child's emotional life shall be completely free from control, but its true nature should be respected. The child cannot express affects of a definite kind and definite quantity at definite times, just to please the parents or educator, and these latter should know from their own experience how unreasonable such a demand would be. If it were not so, there would be no educational problem, just as there would be no adult neurotic problems such as have recently made the question of education so urgent. As long as the child's emotional expressions are felt by adults as disturbances (of their own emotional life) or in so far as they are provoked in the child only for the gratification of adults, there can be no free unfolding or development of emotion in the child. The essence of emotion consists in its *spontaneity*, that is, however, in its qualitative, quantitative and temporal *indeterminableness*, and every educational attempt to influence it in one of these directions must fail, if its success is not to be at the cost of the whole emotional development. The emotions

cannot be educated, they can, however, be formed and influenced, but only by the model emotional life of the parents, using the term "model" not in the sense of an ideal but of an example. In other words, one ought not to pay too much attention to isolated emotions and their affective manifestation, which certainly cannot always be worthy of the child's imitation. But it is a question rather of the *adult's whole attitude to his emotional life as such*, which the child senses and imitates in reacting to it. This attitude, evinced in a free expression of the emotions, should serve as a model irrespective of whether the emotional manifestations are quantitatively, qualitatively or temporally desirable or undesirable. In a word, a free natural expression of emotion in the educator will also most easily stimulate such emotions in the child. One ought not therefore to fear an occasional unpedagogic manifestation of affect, since with it one serves the higher educational aim—the formation of the human being. We cannot beget only good, beautiful, noble and moderate emotions in the child; if the child is to have a human emotional life, then it will always be capable also of the ugly, ignoble and immoderate affects, and even these will always be more valuable from a human standpoint, than complete suppression of the affect, which would then find some outlet in other, not always beautiful ways.

This leads us to the much discussed dictum that the

educator shall be consistent, a dictum that we can only support from the psychological viewpoint. But this consistency, however good it may be as a principle of education, ought not to be artificially acquired if it is not to lose much of its pedagogic value. It should rather correspond to a spontaneous expression of one's own personality which is consistent in *being just that*. If parents and educators are *themselves* as much as possible in general, and also towards the child, then this will better enable the child to accept, develop, and express its own self as it sees the parents also doing. This kind of personality-demonstration, however paradoxical it may sound, will be the least likely to rob the child of its individuality because it least of all forces on the child the individuality of the parents or educator. The parents need not learn much for this, at most only to become a little freer themselves in their own emotional expression, without fearing that this would set the child a bad example. We do not yet know very much about the inheritance of physical dispositions and peculiarities, and the inheritance of peculiarities of character in the child is still more problematical. Psychoanalysis has again clearly warned us that a large amount of compensation and counter-formation occurs in the building of the character, so that for example, a child may develop particularly well a peculiarity of character just because the father was weak in this respect, even though the child had inherited the disposition to



this weakness but had been able to overcome it by compensation (Adler).

How important is the parents' whole attitude to the emotional life as such (above all to their own), apart from isolated displays, is clearly shown in the essential difficulties we encounter in the early training of infants. These begin with the physical training of the suckling in cleanliness and regularity in its physical functions, in a word, with impulse education, which soon passes over into the training of the will in the narrower sense. But we already know from little experience in sex education that it is not enough to be merely less prudish here, and not to suppress all manifestations of the sexual impulse, unless the educator's whole attitude to *all* the child's impulse manifestations is a freer one. For we have learnt that the child so reacts to the suppression of an impulse in a particular sphere as if every kind of impulse manifestation were forbidden; so that, for example, the restrictions which may be necessary in relation to his physical functions can very easily be automatically transferred to manifestations of the sexual impulse; and indeed not merely because they are linked up with the same organ, but also because the child gets the impression that every kind of free impulse activity is forbidden or undesirable. A further difficulty arises in the fact that the child very soon identifies the manifestations of impulse and the suppression of impulse with manifesta-

tions of the will and suppression of the will; as later on the child transfers the same conflict to the sphere of the emotions and there too allows only such manifestations as are pleasing to the parents, suppressing others. Certainly the suppression of feeling begins with the suppression of *bad feelings*, or such as are felt to be bad, and then encroaches upon the whole life of the emotions.

Since we have not yet a theory of the emotional life, without which any real understanding of educational problems is impossible, we can here only attempt to estimate the *complicated relation between impulse, will, and feeling*, in its significance for the understanding of early childhood's problems of education. In our cultural milieu the necessary regulation of childish impulse manifestations is a phase preceding education in the narrower sense, to be followed by the real training of the will as a direct groundwork for school or formal instruction. The emotional life finds no place at all in this educational scheme; perhaps rightly so, because the community is primarily not interested in the individual's possibilities of happiness but is only interested in the individual's usefulness and fitness for the community. If the individual, besides fulfilling his social functions, can still be *personally* happy, so much the better! But *this* possibility of happiness depends on his emotional life and like this, it is so to say, his private concern. Hence the natural educators of the emotional

life are the parents, as the emotional life in general is essentially a matter of the home, in a word, is a private concern. I believe it is this fact above all that parents should first comprehend and accept, rather than seek for specific advice in this or that difficult situation, which in turn may be more a matter for the professional educator, psychologist, and therapist. Even with this changed attitude on the part of the parents, which is the first step towards the improvement of conditions, the emotional education will always be difficult enough. It will be so primarily because the education of the emotions is not education in the real sense of the word, as for example is the training of the impulses and the will, which consists mainly of guiding and forming given forces. The child brings into the world relatively strong impulses and develops them in the course of its natural growth; these fundamentally need only to be tamed and domesticated. On the other hand there develops with the impulse life and from its restrictions, the child's own will which later contributes to the formation of his personality. The parents are mainly occupied with the training of this automatically developing will which seems to afford them the greatest difficulties and hence they neglect the *formation of the emotions*. This however is fundamentally a *new creation*, for the child brings into the world a relatively rudimentary emotional life, which it cannot further develop alone, out of itself, but only in relation to the

persons near to it.

There is a very close psychological relation between the manifestation of the will and the emotions, the complete understanding of which has not yet been made quite accessible to us. It seems to me, however, that the training of the will cannot alone result by means of the parental counter-will, but takes place also by means of the emotional life or formation of the emotions. The simplest and best known example for this is the overcoming of childish stubbornness through love. I do not mean that only feelings can and should be used for the training of the will, but *that the child's emotional life must be developed first from the sphere of will by influencing it in a certain way*. As the love of the educator, for example, can overcome the child's will, so the emotional life *in the child itself must* modify the too aggressive manifestations of its own will, or, as we say, the child overcomes its own will out of love for the educator and gives up its will of its own accord without first being compelled to it. The psychological understanding of this process was hidden as long as we had only in mind the relation of the child to the educator and the duel of wills between the two. A worse or better attitude of the child will depend, however, *on its own ability to produce in itself an emotional manifestation instead of an expression of will*. In the ideal case this is love, but also from reactions of regret, penitence, or guilt-feeling, good pedagogic effects may

be obtained.

As to how this conversion of will into feeling takes place in the child itself, we know very little; it seems only that the child strives against the formation of feeling because it prefers impulse and will reactions as the simpler and more pleasurable. That this conversion is stimulated in the child by the influence of the parental emotional life and by means of their emotional manifestations, seems to me beyond question, for the emotional life must, as we said, first be aroused, then developed. But it seems to me just as certain that sex is not the only source of the emotional life, as Freud has assumed, indeed in general it might be considered less as a source than as an outlet for emotions, but at least it has both functions. Sex can arouse feeling in an individual, as well as serve as a diversion and an outlet for feelings aroused in the individual from other sources. Only when it fulfils this latter function, namely that of discharging emotion, is it complete and satisfying also in the emotional sense, for the essence of feeling, as I have already elsewhere mentioned,<sup>1</sup> consists of the union of the ego with the Thou, of the individual with his fellow men, in the broadest sense, with the community. But since in the child, sexual expression can naturally be only autoerotic, so in his case the sexual sphere is more favourable for the formation of emotion than

<sup>1</sup> *Entwicklung und Ausdruck der Persönlichkeit* (Chapter, Fühlen, und Verleugnung). Leipzig and Wien, 1928, p. 75 ff.

for an outlet for emotion, because the sexual tension remains in the ego and is transformed there into emotion. Only in so far as the sexual impulse is an expression of will, can it be as such also a direct source of emotion, especially when this manifestation of will is inhibited.

We cannot here avoid touching upon the *psychology of the emotions*, without the understanding of which we cannot otherwise proceed. The primitive impulse life itself, according to its very nature, tends to motor discharge, which results in the feeling of gratification. Every impulse excitation naturally passes through the two phases of tension and discharge, which the ego on the whole experiences as pain and pleasure. But only at a further stage of development do we speak of the emotional life in the real sense of the word. Here again we find the two characteristics of pain-tension and pleasure-discharge, but yet the accentuation is different from that in the impulse life. Whereas the impulse according to its nature compels an outlet and passes through the stage of tension, so to say, only unwillingly, the essence of the emotion consists of just the reverse, namely, in wanting to preserve the tension, to prolong the pleasure phase, and hence emotion forces a relaxation of tension only as an expedient, when the tension becomes unbearable. Certainly this distinction concerns only the extreme types of impulsive and emotional individuals, whereas the degree in which they are

combined in the individual varies in different cases. There are people, the so-called impulsive types, whose emotional life is regulated according to the impulse life, that is, presses towards immediate discharge; whereas another type's reactions in his impulse manifestations will again be too emotional, that is, delayed. In any case from this theoretical discrimination we conclude that the *emotional life corresponds, so to say, to an inhibited or dammed-up impulse life*. The damming up, however, does not necessarily follow by reason of external inhibition of the impulse; it may also result from an inner pressure,<sup>1</sup> since the blocking of the impulse into emotion under certain conditions is more pleasurable than motor discharge or at least is preferred by one part of the ego. The foundation for this experience may be laid in an external impulse-inhibition in childhood, but the individual soon learns to make use of this impulse inhibition for the ego, which leads to the formation of emotion.

The factor in our psychical life that makes this possible for the child is the will, which in this way turns the forced impulse inhibition into a willed formation of emotion and so out of pain gains pleasure. The real *emotional life, as a subjective impulse life independent of external outlet*, is thus possible only at the stage of the formation of will which we must now consider

<sup>1</sup> This viewpoint of inner impulse inhibition, I have already expressed in "Der Künstler" (1905).

more closely. Since this is one of the most difficult problems of the whole of psychology, we cannot expect a full explanation within the compass of these arguments. But so much may yet be said, that the will, which is manifested in the child as an expression of his individuality, originates in the impulse sphere. Only, in contrast to the emotional life, the will as we understand it must also have another genesis and function. Now it seems to me that *the will* is an impulse, *positively and actively placed in the service of the ego*, and *not a blocked impulse, as is the emotion*. In other words, the development of the will proceeds parallel to the subjection of the impulse life originally dominating the individual, but now under the dominance of the ego. The beginning of this process is clearly manifested in the ability of the child to control its bodily functions at will. This necessary physical training thus proves to be not only the individual's restriction of the impulse through education, but also the strongest factor of early childhood's formation of will, the result of which represents for the child a pleasurable victory over the racial impulse life, in so far as he is in the position to value it as his own achievement, and not consider it as a compulsion of education. The will thus corresponds to an ego-impulse strengthened through education. Hence we might designate the will as *individual impulse* because it strives for the control of the whole impulse life by one's own self; an aim which also the



impulse forms the motive of action. In the extreme case, this is the already mentioned impulsive type, who acts, however, not according to the need of the impulse but according to the need of the emotion, which he desires to gratify impulsively, that is, without delay. The community expects, however, that a well-adjusted adult will act neither purely impulsively nor purely emotionally, but intelligently. But since conduct or action must naturally make use of physical means of expression one might designate the desired result of will training which includes impulse domination and suppression of the emotions as a process opposed to the instinctive forces; the aim of education is thus opposed to the natural way of the individual's action, in that it aims at the individual's action being motivated by thought, which should first stimulate the will and then mobilize the impulse to carry it out. In this utilitarian method the emotional sphere seems almost excluded, whereas in the love life, on the other hand, we expect purely emotional behaviour and condemn both the utilitarian attitude and the purely impulsive action. Here again it is clearly evident, that the two spheres of the individual's inner life, divided in childhood between the home and the school, are necessarily forced to remain more or less separated throughout the individual's entire life. In the adult we see this resulting in the conflict popularly known as the struggle between love and career, which fundamentally is again the conflict between the im-

pulsive-emotional self and the moral-intellectual self, ordinarily represented in the family life and the work respectively.

But the love life with its mixture of impulsive, willed, emotional, and purposeful action, shows us only too clearly how impossible is the one-sided motivation of our actions, toward which all education fundamentally aims. We have also experienced how difficult it is to investigate the motives of a definite action, since the same action may spring from different kinds of stimuli and hence may also have the most varied psychical effects. Let us take for example the sex act itself; it may be a substitute for emotional expression as well as an expression of the same, just as it may serve the achievement of will or the submission of will (surrender). In the ideal case it signifies all these, but we know very well that the ideal case—here as elsewhere—is not the rule, and that the predominance of one or other component may lead to all kinds of difficulties and conflicts. This sufficiently complicated state of affairs becomes still more intricate when we consider that the human emotional life not only arises from the *impulsive ego*, but is fed also from another source which we might designate the *moral ego*. Psychoanalysis in its endeavour to derive all feelings from the sexual impulse, has neglected this source, although *Freud* was later on compelled to a partial recognition of it, whereas *Adler* now includes it in his concept of "social feeling." In the

morally educated and ethically adjusted human being, not only are *individual* impulses operative as motives of action, feeling and thought, but the *collective* element also is operative as manifested religiously or socially. This pedagogically important source of the emotional life has hitherto been studied still less than its impulse side, so that our educational understanding shows great gaps from the standpoint of collective psychology.

A greater pedagogic understanding cannot alone result from a deeper insight into the nature, abilities and needs of the child as an individual, but it must also lead to a clearer formulation of the real task of education and to a keener knowledge of its limitations. Often enough we find that a better understanding of the child or of a definite situation makes the task of the educator more difficult if not impossible; similarly as the criminologist is more confused than helped when he learns to understand the psychical motives in the criminal. For all understanding leads rather to tolerance than to action and without action we cannot proceed in the education of the child or in dealing with anti-social individuals. The new psychological understanding of the child's emotional life presents the educator with new difficult tasks which formerly did not exist at all in pedagogy. The educator may have a very clear understanding of an undesirable action of the child's and yet be obliged to act from a purely pedagogic point of view as if he understood nothing of the psychological

motivation. In a certain sense this is only right; for the educator is not concerned with the psychological motivation of good or desirable actions. If he were, he would often find to his astonishment, that good actions arise from motives which he must condemn and on the other hand that an evil act can spring from very good, in themselves praiseworthy, motives. In a word, since pedagogy must have as its aim a definite mode of action, the motivation is left to the individual, and is questioned only in the case of an undesirable action. The motivation by the impulse, will, or emotion, that is behind the action is, so to say, the private concern of the individual, and the increasing separation of these two spheres has to a large extent also become the source of our conflicts. If modern psychology and especially Psychoanalysis, now investigates not only the mental attitude, as the church has done, but also the impulsive and emotional motivation (the so-called Unconscious), it will naturally incline to a radical revaluation of all educational values, which fundamentally is the same thing as substituting psychological understanding for education, instead of applying it within the confines of education. This use, however, can, after what we have said, be only a very limited one since a further application would necessarily lead to the psychology of motives which would be anti-pedagogic in effect.

Here we must allude to a general principle of cognition, which recently has become of great importance

in the whole field of mental science and in psychology in particular. This is the concept that a real understanding is possible only from a valuation of the total situation and not by observation of isolated phenomena, however correct they may be. This principle, however, does not seem to be valid for practical action, which is more likely to succeed when one restricts oneself to a detail. In any case we know also from the history of science, that technical inventions of great practical bearing have been made on the foundation of inadequate theories. However that may be, in the handling of people, especially in education, a total comprehension—in so far as it is possible for us today—can doubtless further *understanding*, but will necessarily inhibit the *action* of the pedagogues. This again should only emphasize the fundamental difference between the ideal of knowledge and that of practicability and warn us against applying a principle from one of these spheres to the other. This may sound pessimistic, if one expects from psychology a solution of all difficulties as one had hitherto expected from religion. Psychology, differing from religion, is individualistic, and hence can be of use only indirectly in all matters of social welfare, especially in education. We can apply psychology and psychological insight directly only to ourselves; this is difficult enough but it may become indirectly effective in our social life with others and in our relation to our nearest. But what we want to do, especially with

our children, is to apply our psychology directly to them instead of to ourselves. This fault of projection is inherent in education for in its striving to establish one uniform type alone it aims at immortality through the preservation of that type, but at the same time the educator involuntarily and unconsciously brings about an increasing individualization and idealization in the sense of his personal interests. So education will always remain training of the will, that is, restriction of the personal and individual in favour of the race with its unchanging collectivity and its changing ideals—irrespective of what community ideology is at the moment in power, or of the prevailing rationalization of this educational task, whether religious, as it formerly was, or psychological, as it is today.

## Chapter Four

# THE COMMUNITY IDEOLOGY AND INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

*It is now our task to put the  
Community in place of the Deity.*

DURKHEIM<sup>1</sup>

WHEN WE SAID that all education is fundamentally a training of the will, this obviously relates only to the purely psychological side of the problem such as we have just described. For the means that are used in this training of the will change according to the age and civilization, in other words, according to the prevailing ideologies at different times. At one time it may be a spiritual ideology as among the primitives, or a religious one as among the Eastern civilizations, or a humanistic, as among the Greeks, or a political ideology as most clearly represented by the Roman Empire, or finally, a mechanistic-economic ideology as that of our own age. Naturally, all these ideologies are more or less dependent on real factors as manifested in different forms

<sup>1</sup> *Education et Sociologie*, Paris, 1922, p. 120.

of society determined by environment and historical development. How that which we call an ideology arises out of all these elements cannot be discussed here, although some light <sup>1</sup> may be thrown on the problem in the course of the following discussions, but, briefly, we may say that an ideology arises from the absorption of all the given elements by the individuals living under their influence. Among these individuals there are some who elaborate and work up these factors enforced by the community into a freely accepted development. An ideology thus seems to arise from the combination and intermingling of a few natural collective elements with individually determined aspirations and ideals; it is, so to speak, the individual's answer to that which is given, simultaneously admitted, accepted, modified and idealized. But it is not an answer that is given once and for ever, but one that has to be continually renewed and altered since the ideology in its practical effects, again in its turn, constantly influences and modifies that which is given. In spite of the significant individual influence on the development of the ideology, yet we may rightly speak of community ideologies, for it is only by taking over the collective elements—however primitive they may be—on the one hand, and only by the reciprocal absorption of the individually modified collectivity by society, on the other hand, that

<sup>1</sup> Compare with this the thorough-going study of Karl Mannheim, "Ideologie und Utopie," Bonn, 1929.



constitutes the real essence of the ideological in the sense we are dealing with here.

In spite of the permeation of the collective and the individual in every ideology, yet there are ideologists who have more of the collective character and others in whom the individual element predominates. We can already see here in what decisive way the prevailing ideology must influence education, the very nature of which consists of inculcating the individual with collective ideas and values. This is best illustrated by taking the two extreme methods of education used by primitive and modern pedagogues and comparing them in relation to their respective ideologies. It would then seem that *religion*, the educational means of primitive civilization, is almost an entirely collective ideology, whereas the essential educational means of our time, psychology, is a fundamentally individual ideology. The two-sidedness of every ideology that mutually elaborates the collective and the individual, manifests itself in the predominance of the one or the other factor respectively. Religion, according to the agreement of recent investigators, having arisen fundamentally as a collective ideology, almost as a symbol of social structure, finally reaches its climax in the idea of God who in this sense becomes an individual representative of the community, so to speak, a personification of the same. On the other hand, psychology, the most individual ideology that we know, tends in our time more and

more towards a "community-psychology" as manifested in the application of individual psychological viewpoints to collective phenomena like masses, groups and so forth (social psychology). Thus we see this process of the intermingling of the collective and the individual, not only co-operating in the origin of every ideology, but continuing in its development and indeed in such a way that the more collective ideologies, which characterize the more primitive ages, tend towards individualization, whereas the more individual ideologies of the higher civilizations tend to communization.

This balancing tendency, however, goes parallel to a phenomenon that relates to *the abstract and concrete aspects of the ideology*. The increasing individualization of the collective ideologies at the same time also corresponds to an increasing concretion of the original abstract ideology; whilst the increasing communization of an individual ideology inclines to abstraction. Again we see this most clearly in religion on the one hand, and in psychology on the other. Religion was originally collective and abstract, that is, purely spiritual. This is shown in the earliest stage of the totemistic belief in a soul-spirit, and only in its further development was God represented in concrete individual form in sculpture and carving, till finally it has become pictured in our children's idea of God as a humanized St. Nicholas. On the other hand, psychology which began as concrete natural science of the individual has today

again become entangled in philosophic speculation concerning the group soul and collective consciousness which is no less abstract than the primitives' spiritualistic belief in the soul.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, however, the application of individual psychological viewpoints to ethno-psychological problems has thrown much new light on these, although sociologists and ethnologists have recently objected to seeing collective phenomena of social and racial psychology reduced to the psychology of the individual.<sup>2</sup> But also the psychology of the individual has been enriched by interest in collective viewpoints, and this has been the chief merit of the Zurich psychoanalytic school under the leadership of *Jung*. This phase of the mutual application of individual and collective psychology seems to give way today again to a more rigid separation of the two spheres, as precisely through their mutual influence on one another, also their differences have more sharply developed. For the collective is indeed more primitive than the individual, yet does not seem quite to coincide with the primitive *in* the individual (as *Le Bon* and also *Freud* assume), but is essentially different from it as particularly *Jung* has recently maintained. Hence one cannot explain collective phenomena—as *Freud*

<sup>1</sup> See the critical survey by *Gerhard Lehmann*. *Das Kollektivbewusstsein* (Berlin, 1928).

<sup>2</sup> The best critical survey of the present situation of this problem which is ripe for a new orientation of social psychology, is given by *A. E. W. Burgess*, Prof. of Sociology at the University of Chicago, in his article entitled "The Cultural Approach to the Study of Personality (*Mental Hygiene*. April 1930).

for example has attempted to do—from the primitive mind of the individual and causally trace them back only to reality; just as little as one can understand irrational characteristics in the individual of today simply as the remains of old collective ideologies, as Jung has done. In both cases there must appear in the place of a schematic application of the one principle to the other sphere, a consideration of the mutual permeation of the two spheres, of which now the one, now the other predominates and yet somehow fundamentally remain incompatible.

If we now return to our actual theme, namely the part which the ideology plays as means of education, we must first of all be aware of the fact that the different ideologies are of different value in relation to their pedagogic significance. Experience seems to give clear evidence of the fact that an ideology possesses greater pedagogic value the more collective qualities it contains. The paradox in this is only, that these collective ideologies are also more abstract and in spite of it seem to possess greater pedagogic value than the concrete individual ideologies. If we again compare the two extremes, religion and psychology, there is no doubt that religion for thousands of years has supplied the most powerful and effective, even at times the only means of education, although in its ideology it has been purely abstract, though in its rites rather concrete. On the other hand, at least according to experience

hitherto, it seems certain that psychology has relatively little ideological value to offer as a means of education. This is not only a consequence of its relative newness (in contrast to religion), but is fundamental to its nature as a concrete individualistic ideology.

In discussing the educational problem, we have sharply defined its aim already dealt with, from the means given in its ideology and from the content of education itself. If we now turn to the content which is equally determined by the naturally given and ideologically created factors, we shall notice that a close, although diversified relationship exists between the ideology as a means of education and the content of education. Again it is the case, that the collective ideologies, the prototype for which we have taken to be religion, have supplied much more material for the content of education than the more individual ideologies like psychology which is essentially structural. Thus religion, as we have already shown in the primitive initiation rites of the boys, was not only the means of education but at the same time it supplied its most essential content. We already notice the same tendency today in regard to the psychological educational ideology, namely, that it is used not only as a means for education but gradually it is becoming the content of the same; not only in the particular form of sexual education whereby—as stated—the sexual instinct is trained and at the same time sexual instruction is given;

but also with regard to the whole psychological ideology itself, that not only guides the educator but also is already given to the child as a subject to be learned.<sup>1</sup> Thus psychology appears in the educational system in place of religion or must be made into an ideology of equal value with religion since the very essence of any effective ideology consists in being believed in by all.

Whereas at the beginning we asked ourselves from the therapeutic view-point what was wrong with education, now in view of the religious education which after all has created our civilization, we must ask how was this achievement possible? With regard to the above mentioned collective value of religion, we can answer this question satisfactorily. However strange it may sound to us today *the child is fundamentally a collective being* and indeed to a far greater degree than is the case with the adult who, in spite of social ties, strengthens his individuality in the course of his life and also protects himself against social influences. This individuality develops in the child partly by reason of his natural growth, partly as a reaction against the unifying pressure of the community, whereas that which is collective in the child, or, better, the child as a collective being, would be stunted if collective ideolo-

<sup>1</sup> The well known American child Psychiatrist *Lawson G. Lowry* describes as one of his most impressive experiences the participation in a meeting of 13-year-old boys in a Viennese school. The boys explained their own behaviour and that of others in psychological terminology in order to find ways and means of making it socially acceptable and at the same time individually gratifying. (*Mental Hygiene*, July 1929).

gies were not given to him from without. This ideological nourishment is just as necessary for the construction and development of the collective element in the child as the physical nourishment is to the construction and development of the physical ego. This, and not religious dogmatism or fanaticism, is the reason why in civilizations with religious ideologies, the child's nurturing in the faith begins so early. Certainly this is valid only for civilized races of a higher culture among whom this early religious training has to paralyse collectively precisely the later influence of the more individualistic professional training. In simple words, the Jew or the Christ had first to become Jew or Christ and also remain so, before he could be craftsman, farmer, civil-servant, or whatever else he was in his profession. In civilizations with more individualistic and concrete ideologies, as ours of the present day, it is seemingly the reverse; the individual's social value is estimated above all according to his professional ability to achieve, although differences of creed or nationality, however, are now only used as a means of depreciating the value of professional competitors.

Also where religion coincided—as it did in all pre-Christian civilizations—with the nation and the state (or whatever else may have been the collective standard), yet the individual, through being received into the religious community, became a member of a bigger and higher union than just the purely social one.

Christianity for the first time materialized this hyper-collective character of the religious, in that it created *a world religion* which embraced many nationalities without demanding the renunciation of their characteristics. This was possible, however, only by straining the religious ideology beyond its capacity. For religion under primitive conditions, as also under national civilizations, had the one purpose of making the individual the soul-bearer to the community and thereby guaranteeing the immortality of the tribe or race and with it that of individuals as such. A world religion such as Christianity, is, however, not permanently able to fulfil the national ideal of religion, as shown in the religious wars of the Middle Ages, as well as in the World War also, where those professing the same creed fought against each other for their national preservation.

From this it follows that the individual is not only socially restricted, but that also the collective element has its limits beyond which it cannot be expanded without again provoking individual reactions against an exaggerated collectivity. These reactions may start from separate individuals or also from small groups which may be likened to individuals, in comparison to larger groups. Hence these reactions are also concrete—often enough too concrete—but this is quite comprehensible in view of their individual character on the one hand, and the all-embracing abstraction of



hyper-collectivity on the other hand. The religious ideology thus cannot be expanded beyond a certain limit, because then the abstraction becomes incomprehensible for individuals and hence insignificant. At this juncture, humanism springs up to replace the super-ideology of a world religion no longer equal to its task. Here lies the reason why the humanistic ideal of education could and must follow the religious, national ideal. But also this world ideology of Humanism that blossomed in the eighteenth century, was soon supplanted by smaller group interests that finally developed into a class war within the different nationalities, a state of affairs characteristic of the nineteenth century. The World War may be comprehended as a reaction to this, for at least it temporarily united the different nations—indeed even produced larger coalitions—and in its after effects there is even a tendency towards the humanistic ideal of the brotherhood of man. Besides, this International Struggle has highly intensified the previously existing individualism which had been submerged during the War. The result of this begins to be felt at the present time in the psychological educational ideology.

When we said before that the child is fundamentally a collective being, in so far as he is the representative of the species and guarantees its continuity, yet we see that modern education emphasizes in him more and more the personal, the individual—which, moreover,

expands with growth and maturity—instead of cultivating the collective in him, as religious education in the best sense of the word had done. The psychological ideology of education more and more isolates the child first from his family, then from the group, in that it emphasizes the child's own personality and considers and values his individual problems from his own point of view. One may, like *Adler* in his *Individual Psychology*, preach as the ideal, the adjustment to the community, yet one preaches to deaf ears, for according to its very nature the psychological ideology is individualistic, and cannot become collective by mere catch words. As already mentioned, the only collective force that I can see in the modern program of education is the sexual education, although paradoxically only its individualistic factor has been emphasized, and not the collective one. We now understand better how this might have happened, and why it had to happen. According to its very nature, the sexual ideology includes the two spheres of the individual and the collective, but its ideological development (presented by me elsewhere) <sup>1</sup> leads away from the spiritual soul-belief of collective communities to the materialistic sensuality of the modern individual. Sexual education is now, as already stated, an attack of the community on the individual in the sense of utilizing the collective forces lying in sexuality, as

<sup>1</sup> "Seelenglaube und Psychologie."

against the individual forces. Thus unfortunately, it turns out that the only collective factor in modern education is so conditioned that the individual has to defend himself to the utmost against the exploitation of sexuality for racial purposes by the community.

But here another point of view gains prevalence and one that concerns the gradual decay or dying away of ideologies, in a word, their destiny in the sense of their ascendancy or descendancy, respectively. From the study of folklore and legends, the idea is familiar to us that the depreciated forms of religious belief and thought are gradually given up by adults and—like obsolete tools and weapons—are banished to the nurseries for playthings. Indeed the children get things that are also still in use for toys, but this forms a part of education as a preparation for actual life. But actual play and joy, psychologically speaking, emotional gratification, are given to the children by the old superstitious traditions and the objects that we call playthings associated with them. It seems perhaps to be the same with already stated ideologies, that is, they serve in the nurseries for educational purposes when they have lost their value for adults or at least when they can no longer be fully appreciated. The child's systematic religious education seems historically to begin with the collapse of the Jewish state, where we see a wandering, homeless Nation compelled to preserve its ideology without the corresponding social

structure. Since this collective ideology has nothing concrete on which it rests and in which the individuals can actually "feel" themselves members of a whole, the ideology itself has to be built up all the stronger in each individual. This process corresponds to an attempt to *build up a collectivity from the individual* whereas generally it is the reverse, the individuals objectify their own collectivity into ideologies and make them concrete. As a counter-balance to these lacking facts of a homeland and a national state, the Jews seem to be the first to produce a very concrete sexual ideology. With other civilized races the sexual ideology only gradually forced its way against the resistance to giving up the original abstract soul-ideology<sup>1</sup> which never existed among the Jews. But at the same time for the purpose of the religious education of the individual who had to support the abstract collective ideology the Jews produced a very concrete institution, namely the school, which for them, so to say, replaced the state and not only, as among ourselves, prepared for it. And although our schools too have presumably sprung from the Jewish temple teaching and have got other functions, yet *the essence of the school* has remained fundamentally the same. It

<sup>1</sup> Ernst Krieck has elaborated in a masterly way, in his profound work entitled "Die Bildungssysteme der Kulturvölker" (Leipzig, 1927) (see especially page 97 ff.), the idea of the development of schooling from the duty implied in Deuteronomy to teach. He traced the development of the elementary school from the old Rabbinical instruction in the synagogues, where elementary schools were formed as lower grades of the synagogues, to the first century B. C.

consists, namely, of the establishment—or rather re-establishment—of a small, easily surveyed community with a strong feeling of fellowship among the pupils, and a twofold attitude to the teacher corresponding to that of their loved and feared God.

If we compare this original function of the school with the change it has since undergone, it would appear as if the most important difference between the Jewish Temple school and our teaching is that the former was a substitute for a social ideology which in reality was missing, the latter is a *preparation* for the social ideology prevailing at the time. This also explains why the Jewish instruction was soon lost in abstract speculation, whereas our school education took on more and more concrete features and practical aims. But at the moment when we introduce the psychological ideology into our school system, the picture changes. For it is not a question of psychology being taught along with many other subjects, but rather of the psychological attitude of teachers and parents who are compelled to transmit this, their psychological attitude, to the child in order to inoculate him with their own psychological ideology. But at the same time we are confronted with the same difficulty that we have previously mentioned in reference to a too abstract religious ideology; only in the case of the psychological ideology this difficulty cannot be removed by the same means as with the religious ideol-

ogy. First of all because, in religion it is a matter of a collective ideology, in Psychology it is a matter of an individual ideology. Hence, psychology, which has replaced religion individually, has proved to be unsuitable as a collective ideology, and the psychological program of education represents an attempt on the part of the community to make psychology a collective ideology, when it is an individual one. This attempt, however, cannot succeed here even as far as it did in religion. For the mere fact that each individual "learns" the psychological ideology which he can only absorb individually does not produce a collective ideology; this is something other than the sum total of Individual-Ideologies, even when these are similar to one another; just as the individuals themselves remain different in spite of many similarities. But since the psycho-ideology according to its nature is individual, the individual differences can never disappear in it and consequently it can also never become a collective ideology in the sense of an educational ideal, even if every individual has to acquire it. Hence it is interesting to see how the psychological ideology of education must resort to sex education as to a concrete and collective ideology, in order to bring in the requisite educational value which is not in psychology as such. But also this does not prove to be a workable educational ideology, for the sexual enlightenment of the child seems rather a symptom of the decline of our whole sexual ideology

just as the beginning of religious education in the child was shown above to be a symptom of the decline of the religious ideology.

In the primitive age of the belief in the soul, the child was chiefly a collective being that passed from the mother to the community and had little to do with individual sexuality. The initiation rites made what little individuality the boy may have possessed again into a collective part, as it had been previously when a little child. Among the primitives this rudimentary individual development ceases just with puberty, whereas with us it begins then; on the other hand with the primitives, sexual development begins much earlier and indeed does not cease with puberty but is much restricted after the initiation rites, whereas formerly it was free. All this is intelligible only from the belief in the soul which separates sexuality and procreation in order to be able to preserve the individual belief in immortality. With the recognition of the sexual ideology, that is, of the man's rôle of begetting in procreation, the individual ideology of immortality began to swerve, and through the individual recognition of fatherhood is transferred from the ego to the race whose representative the child is. At this stage of the sexual age, however, the child must belong to the father and not to the community, for otherwise he would lose his claim to immortality. So the child for thousands of years has been the last refuge of the in-

dividually shattered belief in immortality. In the new age of individualism also this last position of the belief in the soul seems to be endangered, in that the adult has to renounce his individual immortality in accepting the sexual ideology. On the other hand, not only does the state reclaim the child as a counter-possession but also the child himself as he grows, does not want to fulfil either the father's or the state's idea of immortality, but is mainly concerned in fulfilling his own individual immortality, in life and work. Herewith, sexuality has again become individual for the adult, but he cannot accept it as such since only its collective aspect guarantees immortality. And this collective significance is supposed to be given to sexuality through the enlightenment of the child, who in its turn must again rebel against it with his individualism.

Here the recently much discussed question of sexual repression, which has hitherto seemed insoluble to Psychoanalysis, appears in a new light. One cannot understand it, if one starts from the primitives' free sexual life and the socially restricted sexuality of the civilized being, for these are presuppositions that, moreover, are contradicted most clearly by the facts themselves. In comparison to the sexual freedom of modern man who can at least privately permit everything, the primitives' sexual life seems like a chain of restrictions which, however, he does not experience as such because they support his ideology of immortality, this



being far more important to him. Moreover one can only speak of a sexual repression at the stage of the sexual age, that is, after recognizing the man's part in procreation against which the father defends himself before and also after, by means of sexual repression. This arises from within and serves the purpose of maintaining the ego's ideology of immortality and manifests itself only later in social restrictions which have to justify the inner sexual resistance. *This sexual resistance, according to the social and individual stage of development, is at one time directed against the collective side of sexuality and at another against its individual side.* In our present cultural strife about the sexual ideology, which operates in education, we see on the side of the adult the resistance against the purely individual function of sexuality, the release of which we do not want because it would rob us of the advantages of the collective ideology of immortality (the possession of children). On the other hand the child resists the sexual enlightenment that communizes sexuality, in his individualistic rebellion against the collective control of this personal source of pleasure. The child's idea of sexuality is different from that of the adult, and what the psychologist deduces from the latter's sexual ideology as desirable is not therefore necessarily good for the child. The concept of sexual freedom in particular differs according to whether it is that of an adjusted person of society or of the child who first

has to be adjusted. Whereas the educator might believe in giving sexual freedom as he conceives it to the child, he does this in communizing sexuality, in making it a subject for enlightenment, and precisely in this way he makes it unfree. The adult needs a collective sexual ideology for the maintenance of the biological ego continuity, whereas the growing child rightly insists on an individualistic sexual ideology.

This brings us back again to the question as to what effect our psychological ideology of education may have on the child; that is, what sort of product of education might we expect if we cannot give a more positive aim than the avoidance of neuroses, nor yet provide a less dualistic ideology than sexuality is? This prematurely emphasizes for the child the collective aspect of sexuality, whereas the psychological attitude on which the whole of education rests, is too individualistic to serve as a pedagogic ideology. We naturally cannot foretell the result of so extensive a revaluation of pedagogic values; only so much is already evident today that the linking up of these new viewpoints with the old pedagogy seems wellnigh impossible because they work with quite different means and pursue opposed aims. For the new pedagogy has neither a *positive* educational aim, nor a productive collective ideology corresponding to this, nor yet a sufficiently developed method that would be suitable to the psychological pedagogy. So the principal question is

whether an education with a psychological ideology is possible at all, since its collective vitality, after all that has been said, seems doubtful.

For apart from the fact that the psychological world-concept according to its nature is too individualistic to serve as a collective ideology of education, it had almost collapsed before it could enter the realms of pedagogy. For with the appearance of the different psychoanalytic schools, psychology seems exhausted, to have arrived at its end rather than at the beginning of a new development. One might use this idea itself to support the psychological educational ideology; for what could be better than that one should first have a finished psychology, before it is applied to pedagogy! But this argument does not hold good; first because if an ideology is to be effective, and particularly effective educationally, it must be alive, indeed in its full prime of life, which is not so with psychology in spite of appearances to the contrary. For the psychological ideology has never been alive, it came into the world, so to say, with an old mind which at the present time is almost senile. In so far as it still operates it is neurotic and not educational, for it is an ideology that was produced from the neurotic type and corresponds to it. Hence the psychological ideology in and for itself is destructive, is besides too individualistic for an educational value; furthermore it cannot produce the collective type of genius necessary for every individually

created ideology to become collective. For every individual has a psychology, indeed, everyone a different consciousness, and so to a certain extent everyone becomes a "genius" in his way, a development which is obstructive to the formation of collective genius. To the communizing of an ideology which is achieved in the genius and indeed in a process we know as hero formation, there is nothing more unfavourable than psychology. For psychology reveals this very process in the individual, analyses it and so prevents its actual realization. Whereas formerly the genius produced a new ideology as a reaction to a positive, existing one, the individual now protests purely negatively against the existing ideology, in that he brags about his individuality, reinforced by the psychological ideology.

Here would be the place to say something about *art* as one of the highest forms of community ideology; yet I should like to reserve this for another volume<sup>1</sup> on account of the complicated intertwining of art with all spheres of civilization engendering it. Generally speaking, one might say only that the creative artist unites in his work both spheres, the individual and the collective, thereby producing something beyond the two which in its turn influences the formation of new collective ideologies in individuals. In his most pronounced character the artist is the type who almost absorbs and formulates individually for the

<sup>1</sup> See "Art and the Artist."

first time, the collectivity of the times, and so he has the most active share in the creation of the prevailing collective ideologies. Out of this rich problem sphere, I can here only touch upon the relation of art to one of the other collective ideologies, namely education, without taking in the much more interesting reference to religion. As I have already remarked it seems to me that the Greek artist type who in his art gave expression to those individual and collective aspirations for which the educational ideal left no room in daily life is a by-product of the Hellenic ideal of wisdom and virtue striven for at that time. Hence, what was characteristic to the Greek art was first of all a primitive realism, which was not only an expression of insufficient technique but rather a necessity in order to liberate the ideal aspirations (in the meaning of Nietzsche's "Birth of Tragedy"). At its height the Greek art with its ideal of beauty was an expression of the victorious "Apollonian" tendencies that glorified the ideal of wisdom and virtue. So the style-development within a definite cultural period reflects the educational ideal of the times and the gradual approach to it; but at the same time the finished works of art contribute to the education of the community and make this easier in that they individualize the collective through personal form.<sup>1</sup> In this sense the

<sup>1</sup> It would be tempting to go into the psychology of æsthetics which I would like to consider as the collective ideology of the artist, because it gives him the

present-day art is manifestly psychological, not only in literature but also in plastic art, in that its ideal is no longer adornment and refinement as it was among the Greeks, it is also no longer the ideal of truth-to-reality as in realism, but is an ideal of *the inner truth of the artist himself rather than of the art he expresses*.<sup>1</sup>

philosophic justification for his style of art, that springs from quite other demands of an individual and cultural kind (see my book about the relation of "Art and the Artist").

<sup>1</sup> See "Art and the Artist."

## Chapter Five

# THE RÔLE OF THE LEADER AND THE ENVIRONMENT

*My son could not replace me;  
I myself could not replace myself:  
I am the creature of circumstances.*

NAPOLEON

THE INDIVIDUAL IDEOLOGY that now hinders, now hastens the collective ideas, seems at all times to be personified in the form of the leader. The question whether the idea of the leader is as old as that of the community cannot simply be answered in the affirmative. For the most primitive communities that we know, seem to be guided by a community spirit rather than by the ideal of an individual leader, as is the case in all our civilized organizations. Hence *Freud* came to his hypothesis of the human primal horde, that stood under the tyranny of the mightiest male by correlating two situations that are too far removed from one another to permit of a conclusion about the kind of primal society that existed between them. He did this, on the one hand, by projecting back the patriar-

chal family organization into a primeval period where it could not have existed at all, and on the other hand by adopting *Darwin's* idea of a horde of apes which—even if their existence is not doubted<sup>1</sup>—yet proves nothing for a correspondingly primeval form of co-existence amongst human beings. But apart from such considerations, the little we do know about primitive forms of society indicates that in the original community *the collective ideology had the leadership* and not a single outstanding personality or a group of such personalities. Where guiding or leading groups are found it is a matter of an equality among groups which only oppose other similar groups within the same community.<sup>2</sup> Hence the leading group does not consist of the strongest—of which there may be only a few or actually only one—but of the oldest, most experienced, the wise in ideologies, who are teachers rather than leaders.<sup>3</sup>

This concept is supported by the discoveries of modern social psychology and individual psychology. The French school of modern sociologists starting from *Durkheim* and in the present day represented in particular by *Levy-Bruhl*, assumes that the spiritual collective phenomena, as manifested in the primitive com-

<sup>1</sup> This doubt is expressed by Fr. Alverdes in his "Tierssoziologie," Leipzig, 1925.

<sup>2</sup> See "Altersklassen und Männerbünde. Eine Darstellung der Grundformen der Gesellschaft" by Heinr. Schurtz, Berlin, 1902.

<sup>3</sup> Even in Rome, the age of 65 years, which is old according to our ideas, was the requirement for a seat in the Senate.



munity are not to be explained or understood from an individual psychological standpoint; they are different in kind and also older and more authentic. The individual psychological findings, especially in the child, seem to confirm that the individual—as represented by the personality of the leader—develops only later from collectivity. At the beginning of the human development—similarly as in the animal kingdom—there is a community, it may be biological-tribal, it may be ideological-racial, from which individuality gradually developed with its psychology, that is, simply psychology developed.<sup>1</sup> The first psychology of man was a mass psychology, or better, group psychology;<sup>2</sup> that is, however, no psychology in the meaning of our scientific individual psychology which naturally could develop only with and from the individual. Thus the leader coincides with individuality that has lifted itself from the community through some kind of particular talent, as even today he comes under this definition, the only difference being, that he possesses a more differentiated specialized talent. Only this original individuality is not an “originality” in

<sup>1</sup> See my work “Seelenglaube und Psychologie.”

<sup>2</sup> Freud also inclined to such an assumption in his work “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego” (translated by James Strachey, London, 1922), although it contradicts his own theory of the primeval horde, that somehow presupposes an individual leader psychology. This contradiction comes from Freud’s restriction to the masses, which demand a leader, so to say, as head, whereas the group (as it existed in primitive relations) has a different psychology from the masses.

our present-day meaning of the word, but rather a personification of collective ideas and ideals in one person, thus precisely that which still today marks out the leader from other individualities.

We already see here, similarly as in the collective ideologies, that also among the leader-individualities there are those with a greater or less amount of collective or individual qualities respectively; just as irrespective of the individual psychology of the personality, a preponderance of the collective elements are characteristic of the leader. But we shall have to pass through a long development, or at least survey one, starting from the extreme point of the collective individuality, as for example seems to be manifested in the hero, before we arrive at the other extreme of the individualistic personality, as for example represented in the present-day neurotic. Naturally any concrete sociological foundation is lacking as an historical manifestation of the beginning of this development, but for it we possess today living traditions that permit a conclusion as to the original conditions. This is an indirect method, however, not only a stop-gap, but it proves to be a better psychological entrance to the whole problem of the leader—and also to other problems—than a survey over concrete historical material. I mean *religion*, in the ethnological, not in the theological sense. In the forms of religion we have before us a truer because more spontaneous reflection of the

social and psychological development of mankind, than in the pictures of history distorted by the crude material of reality.

Now the earliest form of religion was no ideology of God but a soul-belief, that is, an ideology of immortality that touched the collective interest and not the individual who did not exist as such in primitive communities. Indeed the development of the individual himself proved to be a turning towards another kind of soul solace become necessary through the collapse of the collective ideology of immortality represented in the belief in the soul. This new soul solace from that time on has been sought for in ever increasing measure in the individual himself, because it could no longer be found in the community. How far the sexual ideology, that is, the recognition of the biological facts of procreation and death, entered into this I have dealt with in another connexion.<sup>1</sup> Here I want only to bring up the religious aspect of this crisis, which made out of the collective soul-religion the individualistic religion of God. In other words, leadership became a possibility only with the development of the individual, and this is reflected religiously in the gradual change of the collective soul-belief into the belief in immortality with characteristics of the personal god-concept. Thus in God, *collectivity seems personified individualis-*

<sup>1</sup> "Seelenglaube und Psychologie," see especially Chapter II, "Sexualzeitalter und Psychologie."

*tically* as vice versa at the beginning of the development of the individual belief in immortality it became communized in the soul-belief.

The history of the leader thus psychologically begins with the creation of God, or more correctly, the emergence of the individualistic ideology of the leader is first reflected in and with the emergence and development of the idea of God. But this is more than a mere parallel; the leader, still understood today as the personification of an idea, was and is the humanized concrete god in whatever form and in whatever sphere he manifests himself. One should not argue that with such an assumption nothing could be gained for the understanding of the leader-psychology, for it would be a matter of changing one unknown factor for a still greater unknown. But the above mentioned advantage of the religious tradition here comes to our help as a relatively naïve psychological projection, which—if we understand how to interpret it—affords us a deeper insight into the psychical structure and the spiritual significance of the phenomena in question than would a concrete analysis of the personality of a leader. Also a further objection that could be raised from our own argument, I will discuss presently. One might point out that Freud explained the concept of God as an exalted father image which he actually identified with the concept of leader-father.<sup>1</sup> But a

<sup>1</sup> Freud has in his "Group Psychology" referred in the appendix to the hero

deepened understanding has since led us beyond the father-son relationship that belongs to a relatively late development, to a purely psychological comprehension of the idea of God which lies beyond the sociological phase of family structure. It is first individuality, and later on, personality—as opposed to the community—which is personified in the idea of God, in the hero ideal and finally in the form of the leader. In all these personifications whether they appear unreal as the God, ideal as the hero or social as the leader, we find fundamentally the same *individualization* of the *collective*, whether it is a matter of a tribe with its god, or national hero, or of a king and his kingdom, or ultimately of a democratic state and its leader.

Thus the mere objection that the understanding of the history of religion or of the concept of god, reveals nothing of the psychology of the leader, can easily be disproved, and yet it is true in a deeper sense which we shall now consider. The fundamental problem here dealt with is, namely, not at all the individual psychology of the leader as a personality, but only his rôle, that is, his relationship to those who are led, the group, the mass, etc. In this sense, however, the leader has (at least it seems so to us) the same part that has fallen to

problem raised by me, which is still the clearest personification, not only of the leader concept, but also of the individualistic God, and cannot be explained from the father psychology but rather from that of the rebellious son.

the lot of God in religion. Only the traditional concept of God has, so to say, given us the ideal picture of the symbol of leadership, a picture darkened by no disturbing sense of reality, and one that is valid for a definite group under definite conditions. If there had been no concept of God and if in our investigation we were dependent on the historical leader personalities, then a psychological understanding of the part of the leader would have to begin with a reduction to the fundamental scheme common to all leadership, such as is actually presented to us in the concept of God. Before we descend from this abstract but psychologically pure symbol of God to all its worldly incarnations and manifestations, there comes to mind, as a by-product of the above discussion, a general psychological problem which I will here formulate. When we said, that here we are not dealing with the psychology of the leader but only with his rôle, yet the problem still remains as to what the psychology of the leader himself is. From my own experience as well as from the literature dealing with the subject (which by the way is not voluminous), no light can be thrown on this purely psychological question. The idea presents itself that the problem may be falsely stated and that perhaps there is no psychology of the leader, that is, no other than that which is obvious in his rôle; at any rate it seems that there is no psychology to be deducted from his ego. Without fully elaborating the psychological sig-

nificance of this idea, I can only briefly elucidate what I mean. For it is not a matter, as one would think, of merely a change of viewpoint or of the way of consideration, but it is far more a matter of principle. I may for instance in analysis, understand the psychology of an individual genetically and dynamically, but that does not mean that any light is thrown on the question why he is a poet, or a leader, or a merchant. As a matter of fact all psychological, including psychoanalytic, biographies of creative personalities have made intelligible much in the individual as such, only not that which is specific to the personality. This is true not only for people of the past but also for the analysis of the living, a fact, the further discussion of which we must postpone for the chapter "Talent and Occupation." Also here it is naturally a question of the more or less, that is, of cases whose choice of occupation is clearly determined, or at least made explicable, through disposition, inclination and circumstances, of other cases in which we have to assign to chance a larger part than is agreeable to our scientific ambition. The leader seems to me to belong to that extreme boundary case, indeed to represent precisely the type of the same, in which there are almost no connecting lines to be seen or even to be drawn between the psychology of the individual and his rôle in society.

As a matter of fact the authors from Le Bon to

Freud (whom Lehmann reviews critically<sup>1</sup>) have given no psychology of the leader, but only a description of his rôle from the viewpoint of the mass and in connexion to the same. Freud, who restricts himself to the psychology of the mass, defines the leader from the mass, which he characterizes as "a number of individuals who have substituted one and the same object for their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego" (p. 80).<sup>2</sup> In the leadership psychology proper, however, Freud does not go beyond the comparison with the infantile leader the father, which one might be able to accept if there was anything like a "father psychology." But this is just as impossible as a leadership psychology. For the individual is not only father to begin with, but this being father is nothing individually psychological in himself but is only something in *relation* to the child. One becomes a father by chance often as one becomes a leader, without having the corresponding father psychology which one either acquires or not. One becomes a leader also, first through the masses, as one becomes a father through the child; only the leader is in far greater degree the representative of the masses, of the collective whole and their

<sup>1</sup> "Das Kollektivbewusstsein," 1928, especially on p. 152 and ff. Later still, Georg Stier: *Person und Masse* (Leipzig 1929, esp. 2nd. Part, Chap. 4, *Führer und Masse*).

<sup>2</sup> Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.



ideology and this is precisely his very psychology though not individualistic.

In this sense God is the prototype of the leader created by the group, an ideal prototype whose materialization in reality is determined through the individual psychology of the personality of the leader apart from the cultural and social influences of the time. For the living and willing individual does not permit himself merely to be made into something, even if this aim seems to be desirable, but he himself also wants to be and to do something, and this will is just the expression of his individuality. But how the leader comes at all to take on the almost enforced rôle of a collective representative, is again to be explained only from the purely psychological understanding of the idea of God which however can be understood only from the psychology of the group, because God himself has no psychology, just as little as the leader has. The concept of God has proved sociologically to be the symbol of the individual representing the masses, and psychologically the expression of the will representing this individuality.<sup>1</sup> When the worldly leader arises there is ascribed to him by the masses above everything these godly qualities of omnipotence or strength of will and this is the only psychical quality which the leader himself as an individual must possess if he is to play this godly rôle and it is by reason of this strong will that he can

<sup>1</sup> "Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit" and "Seelenglaube und Psychologie."

undertake and carry through this part. Thus the leader must be a strong-willed man, at least under given conditions he must be stronger than the average, but this does not say that all strong-willed men or stronger-willed than the average, will also be leaders. That will depend on conditions of time as well as on chance and finally on this will itself. For this self-will of a strong individuality can either seize upon the opportunity offered, can affirm, as it were, the part of leader, or can deny it within himself and refuse it. In a word, to disposition, conditions of time, and to chance, there is added the individual aim of the personality that finally decides not only over the acceptance or refusal of the part or task, but also over its better or worse achievement.

Thus we have found two characteristics that qualify the individual for the rôle of leader, although they do not necessarily lead to it. The first is a preponderance of the collective ideology, which seems, as it were, to be something beyond or above the individual; the second is a purely individual characteristic, namely, a strong will that is appropriate for the acceptance of the godlike rôle of leader; appropriate from the standpoint of the masses as well as from the standpoint of his own psychology. And this is in fact the only point in which the two spheres, the collective and the individual, come into contact. Indeed it almost has the appearance as if these two spheres coincided

in the rôle of the leader and took effect in a strong will. For the leader always personifies a strong will, just as God does, and in times when the people are looking for a leader the common ideology is concentrated in the desire for a strong will which precisely the leader has and by means of which he is able to personify the requisite collective ideology prevailing at the time. But the leader does not only represent a strong will that introduces the necessary energy in times of hardship, but just as much he is the bearer of responsibility involved in acting upon the will. This is the third and by no means least important characteristic of the rôle of leader. From this point of view one might say that the collective will of the people which at times becomes the need of the masses, and the individual will of the leader meet or coincide in *the sense of responsibility*. It is as if the masses needed someone to bear their responsibility, just as the individuality of the leader needs the mass as representative of his will. For the problem of responsibility is only the negative or moral side of the problem of will and only in this sense are the following arguments to be understood.<sup>1</sup>

If we consider the three factors that characterize the leader we shall find that a difference in the distribution or mixture of collective ideology, individual will, and sense of responsibility can produce different types

<sup>1</sup> See "Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit."

which specify still more narrowly the rôle of leader without definitely determining it. *The type of leader* is characterized by a strong individual will that takes possession of and also represents the collective will-ideology of the group, whereby the crowd carries most of the responsibility. A strong individual will with a correspondingly strong individual ideology for which the personality alone is responsible, are characteristics that *typify the artist*. Finally a strong collective ideology that subjects the individual will to that of the community which carries the responsibility for it, is the characteristic that *typifies the pedagogue or educator*. In the leader and the pedagogue the material is the same, namely the human being or a group of persons, but the attitude or approach is different, in fact opposed. The leader himself either springs directly from the masses or is raised by the mass to the position of representative of its will, thus he can be understood only from the momentary or prevailing need of the mass. The educator on the other hand is superimposed on the group and with his personal need to help he approaches the group in the individuals. He has without doubt an individual psychology, that of the helper, the moulder. In the case of the artist the material is different, here it is a matter of inanimate material which he creates and gives life to according to his will manifested in his individual ideology formed from it. Hence the artist's psychology in regard to strength of will is

that of the leader; in regard to creation it is similar to that of the educator although the educator creates in the name of the community, the artist autocratically in his own name. Thus in a certain sense the mass is only the chance material that the individual Will makes use of at one time, just as at another time paint or clay is used for the formation of men, a formation which fundamentally aims at immortalizing the self. Only the leader is much more the creature than creator, the artist is far more creator than creature, finally the educator is both equally as the official representative of the collective ideology which he then imprints on others. All these however are equally representatives of God on earth.

And yet they are not a complete representative of God on earth. For the rôles of helper and ruler that are united in the God-concept are divided in his earthly representatives among different individuals who are then crystallized into types and are differentiated into occupations. The one, *the type of ruler*, as seen in chief, king, leader, raises himself as an individual above the others only through a particularly strong will; otherwise he is exclusively the representative of the group, advocate and executor of the politics of the community, essentially he is a war-leader who in times of peace develops into a state leader. The other, *the type of helper* known as the priest, teacher, doctor (therapist), is characterized in an individual by a definite drift

or direction of will, namely, that of helping; the collective is inherent in him as an influential part of his personality without being a mere symbol of it as it is for instance in the king; he is fundamentally a leader of souls, ultimately developing into the therapist. The historical development of these attitudes of the individual to the community, into definite types and further into definite occupations or professions, depends naturally on social factors and is determined by psychical elements that are reflected in religion with its rites and myths. The first type, that we can characterize as leader in the narrower sense, has less individual talent and only the ability to represent the group or people's will in his active manifestations. The second type, that might be considered as educator in the broadest sense of the word, presupposes a quite specific individual attitude that is expressed in a strong collective ideology and in an attitude of will that operates in its sense. Roughly stated one might formulate it thus: the first is more egoistic, the second more altruistic.

Ethnologically, chief and priest, king and teacher, leader and therapist, belong together as complements; the first pair correspond to the collective stage of the belief in the soul, the second to the social stage of the sex age (the patriarchy), the third to the individual stage of the psychological ideology. We see here again from an entirely different angle that the teacher does

not fit into the psychological ideology, at the climax of which we are at present and the utilization of which makes such difficulties for us in education. The therapist, on the other hand, who organically belongs to this stage, hence even today performs better service in educational matters than the teacher. If we turn retrogressively to the earlier patriarchal stage, we see that the teacher has somehow grown up out of the father, who however did not exist as such at the first stage of the belief in soul. But even for the teacher of the patriarchal stage the simple Freudian formula that makes him of equal value with the father is not valid as it also places the king and God on a level with him. This is already shown in the old Jewish idea that represents the prototype of the patriarchal ideology and at the same time the prototype of the school. *Kriek* (*Bildungssysteme der Kulturvölker*, p. 96 f.), who indeed has penetrated deepest into the educational problem of peoples, says concerning this Jewish concept, "For the pupil, the teacher is superior to the father, although his authority rests on the transference of the paternal rights and duties of education; yet with his complete knowledge of the law he offers higher things to the pupil than the father can give, hence his authority is correspondingly greater." "He who instructs his neighbour in the *Mischna* is credited by God as if he had reared him, formed him and brought him into the world!" "The teacher's activity

thus approaches that of the *creator of men*, and his authority shall correspond to that." Thus the teacher in the creative sense is put much more on a level with God, than for example is the king who serves only as God's earthly governor. Therefore the helper type himself has, so to say, godly qualities, whereas the leader type symbolizes them only externally. Hence the leadership, particularly in its purest patriarchal manifestation as kingship, is inheritable, which cannot hold good for a specific talent of whatever kind of special qualities. So even at the earliest stage in pre-patriarchal times, the chief or captain is chosen, the priest (Schamana, medicine man) is born.

Here we are again faced with the problem as to what is talent and what is heritage, not in the medical sense, but in the social psychological sense. Kingship was not only inheritable because it represented the symbol of the patriarchal power, but it could also be inherited because power can be inherited, at least in external symbols, although not power of will which as a rule is lacking in the one who *inherits* a kingdom. Talent is something individual, at least acquired and developed (even when it is inherited), and cannot be transferred to a definite successor. It is possible only with the development of the individual which was a rarity in primitive times and hence was valued so much more highly than later on where it was manifested in widely differentiated occupations of life each with its



own competitors. Personal talents and inherited power also have a purely spiritual aspect, that is related to the belief in immortality. The essence of the patriarchal ideology, as I have stated in "Seelenglaube und Psychologie," is the acceptance of the personal mortality of the ego and the acceptance of the son as the individual bearer of collective immortality. Hence kingship must be inheritable in order to fulfil the meaning of the patriarchal ideology, that is, to guarantee to the father who is mortal, a continuance of life in the children. Talent, on the other hand, is again opposed to this, for it guarantees immortality in achievement and not in the child.

Now there is in the human development a phase of deification and of perpetuating the individual striving for immortality, which according to its highly individualistic prerequisite occurs relatively late, although naturally, like everything else, it has its precursor. One might call it *the age of the genius*, because it is most closely connected with the appearance and the development of the concept of genius. For also genius, or, better, the concept of genius, has a history. *Lange-Eichbaum* says in a recent thoroughgoing study of the problem of genius and insanity,<sup>1</sup> "The idea

<sup>1</sup> *Wilhelm Lange-Eichbaum*: "Genie, Irrsinn, und Ruhm" (München 1918). Cabot in a work entitled "Zur Kritik des Geniebegriffes" (Studien zur Philos. und ihrer Geschichte, Vol. 73, 1911) was the first to carry into effect this idea and then *E. Zilsel* elaborated the same more thoroughly with regard to the influence of circumstances: "Die Geniereligion. Ein kritischer Versuch über das

of genius clearly arises from mythological, religious experience, and indeed, as the word indicates, from antiquity. The word genius is traced by some scholars back to 'ingenium' (gignere, to beget), by others to guardian spirit, genius. The two do not necessarily contradict each other. For in the old Italic religion genius was the godly personification of the masculine procreative power. . . . 'Generally, genius was a supernatural being that stood half way between the deity and men, who had an influence on the life of men; a kind of half deity, restricted in godly power but possessing superhuman power. . . . This belief naturally was not restricted to the Greek and Roman antiquity; it is to be found over the whole globe and in nearly all religions. . . . The concept of genius as half-god accordingly has its root in the general religious consciousness of mankind. . . . In late antiquity and in the Middle Ages there was everywhere an abundance of such 'half-way beings' . . . as inheritors of the ancient genii that had died off. . . . These celebrated their resurrection at the time of the Renaissance . . . genius was thus a personification of spiritual and ethical values, forces and attributes form-

moderne Persönlichkeitsideal mit einer historischen Begründung. Vol. I Kritik des Geniegegriffes (Wien 1918).—The same, "Die Entstehung des Geniebegriffes. Ein Beitrag zur Ideengeschichte der Antike und des Frühkapitalismus (Tübingen 1926).—Whilst writing this work, I read the announcement of a book by E. Kretschmer, "Geniale Menschen" (Verlag Springer, Berlin), which I was unable then to obtain.

ing at the same time a kind of religious cult. This is the first clearly visible root of our present-day concept of genius. No longer is it genius as guardian spirit of the *whole* of mankind, but is *more specific* in its qualifications particularly of the spiritual. Later it became a personification of the intellectual creative power of a man. But not even in the Renaissance does the idea of genius lose the aspect of the religious, of the godly.”<sup>1</sup>

The assumption of a *godly* creative force in the poets (such as for instance *Scaliger* teaches in his “Poetics,” 1561) is, however, in no way of equal significance with our present-day demand for *originality*. For the Middle Ages and early Renaissance yet cling to the ideal of *imitation*, for even in it the creative force could manifest itself. Only quite gradually in the sixteenth century, as *Zilsel* shows in particular, the imitation ideal of the humanistic writers came into conflict with the independence ideal of the painter (engineers). The ideal of the Renaissance was much more that of the fame or glory of individuals than of surpassing talent (*ingenium*). First “in *Scaliger* does *the God*, who inspires the superior man with his *inborn* not *acquirable* characteristics, pass over into the concept of genius. . . . So our concept of genius has

<sup>1</sup> This latter idea, according to Herm Wolf; Versuch einer Geschichte des Geniebegriffs in der deutschen Aesthetik des 18. Jahrhunderts. Vol. I (Heidelberg, 1923). What follows is again a quotation from *Lange-Eichbaum*, pp. 27 ff.

two parents; the doctrine of the one possessed with God (enthusiasm) and that of the inborn talent (ingenium). . . . Only quite slowly does the concept genius, as the personification of individual peculiarity, pass into the use of language (around 1550). . . . The Baroque period around 1650 first coins the concept and the word in the present-day meaning, namely, a human being with an incomprehensible, mystic, godly creative power. . . . Previously the ideal of personality had been, in antiquity, the wise man, in the Middle Ages, the holy man, in the Renaissance the courtier, the statesman, the *bel esprit*. Now as *Zilsel* formulates, the personality-ideal of the literary middle-class stratum came to be the genius having originated in the world of literary people and of the fine arts in Italy, France and Spain."

But to this religious ideal of the divinely inspired creator, was added, as *Zilsel* has shown, the *ideal of originality*, which sprung up from the circles of the inventors, discoverers, organizers, engineers, like Leonardo, Vasari, Aretino, and implied a striving after material aims (knowledge, art, human culture). Yet in the eighteenth century, the real florescence period of genius, with its culmination in the period of stress and storm, we see again forcefully breaking through by the side of the advancing æstheticism of the "over-rated genius," its original religious power. Into the darkness of Rationalism "the concept of genius taken

from ancient art, spread in its entire splendour and power of deliverance and became the consoling, guiding-star of the time" (Cahan), the genius-movement here became, "so to say, a religion of the emancipated, free spirits" (Lange-Eichbaum). From the rationalistic, materialistic and medical endeavours to deprive the genius of his godly attributes, that began in the eighteenth century ending in modern Psychiatry, I should like here to mention for later discussion, the concept of genius as a result of self-education as represented by *Helvétius*, who made ready for the so called milieu-theorists for whom the genius is simply the result of the social constellation, a chance point of juncture in which the inventor and the needs of the masses meet.

In postponing for the next chapter this fundamental educational problem of the reciprocal influence of milieu and talent, I should like only to emphasize here the significance of the collective ideology for the training and development of the individual in order to supplement from the ideological side the milieu-theory which hitherto has been considered purely sociologically. Although there have been at all times specially gifted men, yet the genius age which introduced modern times, can be comprehended only from the great collapse of religious belief occurring at the end of the Middle Ages; and demanding something else as a substitute for this loss. This substitute in the

worldly age of the Renaissance with its fever for invention and discovery, that is, the seeking after new earthly sources of deliverance became the genius, whose mythical forerunner had been the national hero of antiquity. Only the hero was much more the man of action, the leader-type, in the sense of a group's ideal of will, whereas the genius with his worldwide universality aspires far beyond the national interests towards a general education of mankind. Yet the genius is differentiated from ancient heroes and all other earthly representatives of God by yet one other characteristic that Zilsel has clearly brought out. This characteristic of the genius, however paradoxical it may sound, is a bourgeois trait, that makes him the "personality-ideal of the literary, middle-class stratum." The distance that exists between all humanized gods (such as heroes, priests, king) and the ordinary "mortals" exists for the genius in much less degree. He frequently is descended from middle-class circles but seldom remains bound by them; he can however be reclaimed by them as one of their kind and so can become their personality ideal on the one hand, and an object of criticism on the other hand.<sup>1</sup> One knew him, so to say, when he was still small, and hence one

<sup>1</sup> The instructive history of this critical depreciation of the plebeian god, from the time of the French Materialist Helvétius, and Lombroso's theory of insanity to the psychoanalysis of the genius in the Freudian school, has been lucidly surveyed by *Lange-Eichbaum* (l.c.). Its most recent phase is the kind of biography that has become popular in America under the slogan "debunking."

does not allow him to become a "prophet" in his own fatherland, so that he has to resort to the world at large. The significant and consequential part of this plebeian aspect of the genius is, however, his increasing tendency towards democracy which today in the age of individualism, where there are numbers of discovered and undiscovered geniuses, has reached its climax, but also shows clearly the dark side of it.

For the manifest neurotic age in which we live today is only the consistent result of this thousands of years' long development beginning with the religious concept of God, passing through stages where it gradually became humanized, concrete and democratic in earthly representatives, up to its absolute counterpart in the *neurotic type*. This neurotic type is not to be understood as a medical case, but is democratized genius, that is, the same leader type without the collective ideology supporting him and hence also without the belief in himself. But if one takes away these two factors there remains nothing but the feeling of inferiority; of his own human littleness and weakness, from which today not only the manifest neurotic suffers, but also the artist or creative individual in any sphere. The neurotic, who destroys his own life and that of his circle, is in this sense no more ill than the Renaissance genius who sacrificed all life's happiness to his work or the war leaders in the Middle Ages who ruined all their land and people. The neurotic,

is only less creative,—not in disposition, but in action—and hence society values him less, a valuation that conforms to a purely social, not individual concept of illness. The neurotic himself also suffers, but this suffering is a suffering from his type, from the lack of an ideology that might give him a belief in himself or might replace it. Thus the neurotic type who is also more or less aware of his inner deficiencies, is a living example of the disintegration of the genius and God concept which with the cessation of constructive collective ideology is reduced to the natural feeling of human insufficiency. The neurotic is, so to say, the first human type who lacks the support of an ideology of God of whatever kind, and is thrown entirely on his human qualities on which he tries to live and cannot. He may be designated as the man simply thrown on himself, whereas the men of earlier epochs were the real “supermen”; that is, individuals raised above themselves and living beyond their psychical capacity by virtue of their heavenly or earthly ideology of God. *Nietzsche* who projected the supermen into the future was rather the last of the superman type who, however, had to perish neurotically from his “human-all-too-human” qualities.

This explains why the human type of our generation whom we call “neurotic” on account of his sub-humanity in comparison to the earlier super-humanity, had to create the therapist of any kind. For only by



living in close union with a god-ideal that has been erected outside one's own ego is one able to live at all. When I say therapists of any kind, I mean at least psychotherapists in the proper sense, although these are characteristic of our time and are, so to say, the neurotic's product due to his illness. Above all I mean the spiritual and moral dependence which has developed in the love life and in marriage, whereby the partner becomes God, but just as easily may also become the devil, on earth because these ideologies no longer exist outside of ourselves and yet are apparently needed just because they do exist within us. But I also mean the narrower educational problem as such into which we have brought the same yearning for the helper that has made the pedagogue almost a therapist. Almost, I say, for it cannot be completely so, not only on account of the practical impossibility but also because the specialization, that we saw as a consequence of the first humanization of the God idea (chief, priests), has in the meantime increased beyond bounds. Hence we see the co-operation of teacher, psychiatrist, psychologist and social worker puzzling over the psychological problems of one single child. But even if they should succeed in solving them, not much will have been gained. For we must make it quite clear to ourselves that it is impossible to attain the aim of our modern educational program, which is, namely, to avoid neurotics, as long as the collective ideology is a

"neurotic" one. That means, as long as the type which has remained since the downfall of every ideology of God (not only of the religious) still exists, indeed is constantly increasing. But the idea of bringing to extinction this neurotic type through a better education of our children leads still deeper in the vicious circle. For a positive, constructive ideology must be brought into education from an austere collective tradition and cannot be developed as a result of education.

In the neurotic in whom one sees the collapse of the whole human ideology of God it has also become obvious what this signifies psychologically. This was not explained by Freud's Psychoanalysis which only comprehended the destructive process in the patient from his personal history without considering the cultural development which bred this type. Probably this type has always existed just as some kind of genius did; and yet there is a special genius-period in which this type flourished whereas our age seems to culminate in the neurotic type. This type is characterized by a negative attitude of will that one might designate fear of responsibility or as guilt-feeling, according to whether the reaction sets in before or after action; at the same time the neurotic type shows a hyper-consciousness which as self-consciousness interferes with the spontaneous course of all psychical processes, especially the sphere of the emotions and the will. But this state of affairs proves to be the negative of that which dis-

tinguishes every type of leader personality, namely strength of will and spontaneity. Thus in the case of the neurotic it is a matter of hyper-individualization, of the extreme manifestation of the process of individualization, the commencement of which brought about the creation of the concept of God. The energetic and creative individuals on earth have always lived in one way or another on this primal source of personified force of will, and only through participation in this collective will, have been capable and efficient. Now in the neurotic we see the individual weak and helpless when deprived of this nourishment, whilst the shreds of worn-out collective ideologies only scantily protect him. This seems to be the so-called collective element that *Jung* found in the analyses of neurotics and particularly of the psychotics, but which we are gradually losing more and more. But the psychotic no longer succeeds, and the neurotic only seldom, in compensating his individual feeling of inferiority by super-achievement, with the aim of re-establishing in himself a belief corresponding to a belief in God. Hence, how futile to treat this intricate problem pedagogically in *Adler's* sense as "masculine protest" against childish inferiority.

But to trace in the child this feeling of inferiority—from which we all suffer in consequence of the collapse of the collective ideology and of the impossibility to set up a sound individual ideology—in order where

possible to prevent its being there "already" in childhood, or to correct it, is foolish as long as the child lives in a neurotic atmosphere. One can easily understand that we want to save our children suffering from what we ourselves suffer, but in all these pedagogic prophylactic ideals is too much of the longing for deliverance that refers more to ourselves than to our children. In other words, we want not only to prevent our malady in them, but also to cure our own evil, and thereby we inflict on the child not only more therapy than he can bear, but perhaps also more ills than he anyway has. In leaving the further discussion of this "magical" method of education for the final chapter, let us turn here in concluding our exposition of the rôle of leader, to *the positive* significance that the child has for us in our time. For also the rôle of the child has gone through different stages of development, and without understanding them we cannot approach the present problems of education. When we look at earlier epochs, still not far remote, then the term "idolization" suggests itself for our present-day valuation of the child. This *age of the child*, such as the present epoch has been called, began however much earlier, although there seems now to be again a culmination of this process of development.

Christianity, as the first religion of the individual, introduced the worship of *the Son as God*, whereas the preceding hero-age of the ancients persecuted the son,

because the father resisted giving up his individual immortality.<sup>1</sup> Christianity, indeed one of the most revolutionary of reactions against the patriarchal sexual-age, had to compromise with its still powerful influence, by idolizing the son, as the bearer of the collective soul-ideology. But in recent times, the son-age has developed into the child-age. One connects its emergence with Rousseau's name, although only the Revolution actually overthrowing the Patriarchate was the first to establish the recognition of equality for all. This idea of equality, tacitly included in it the equality of the sexes, shown by the rôle of the women in the French Revolution (as in the Russian revolution). With this idea of equality of all human beings and with Rousseau's ideas of education, the child-age was made possible. In it the two sexes are equally valued at least pedagogically, and hence authority is again granted to the woman, the mother, in questions of education, an authority that originally she naturally possessed but had lost in the hypertrophied development of the patriarchal ideology. The recognition of the pedagogic equality of children meant however, at first, that both sexes were equally badly treated by education. Only in recent times can one speak of idolizing the child, since the child has become not only the centre of the family, but also education is beginning to be focussed on the

<sup>1</sup> "The Myth of the Birth of the Hero," also its supplement "Seelenglaube und Psychologie."

child, as in progressive schools which adjust themselves to the child, whereas formerly the child had to adjust itself to the collective ideology.<sup>1</sup>

Thus it almost seems in the meaning of our pedagogic ideas of reform, that the child itself must be left to construct a new educational ideology, must be forced, so to say, *into the rôle of leader*, which has been already implied in the deification of the child. Certainly this rôle of the child as leader, would again have its specific characteristics, the elaboration of which may help us to understand the present pedagogic situation. The idolization of the child does not go much further back than to Christianity, in which we have to recognize the commencement of the individualization of the son. Before that, the worship of the child had a collective significance as already it had in the totemistic belief in the soul; there the child was the manifestation of the collective spirit, indeed the only true revelation of the same, if one takes no account of the totem animals that only symbolize the unity of the tribe, but do not make it concrete. Thus here as also in the later distinct monotheism, the child came *from* God, now the child *is* God. In other words the ideology of the child as leader, was collective, now it is individualistic, just as we showed to be the case with all other ideologies. The child in the age of the

<sup>1</sup> Harold Rugg and Ann Shumaker: *The Child-Centered School. An Appraisal of the New Education.* New York 1928.

belief in the Soul and in a still narrower sense in the patriarchal sex-age, was important as the one who *continues our life*, now he is the *leader to a better life*. This is indicated by the fact that formerly the child was referred to and prepared for the adult life, for being grown up, as to a Paradise, whereas we today are inclined to see in childhood our lost Paradise. Although with a certain justification we prize in the child the ideal of unimpaired forces, yet on the other hand, influenced by the psychoanalytic ideology, we endeavour to overcome what is termed "infantile" not only in ourselves, but to uproot it already in the child.

Not only does a conservative majority of educators oppose this eccentricity of prophylactic ambition, but first among them stand the parents themselves, from whom indeed proceeds the deification of the child and precisely of the childish in the child. In the new formation of modern educational ideology, there seems to fall to the mother an important rôle. She owes this influence, however, not to a better pedagogic understanding but to her natural attitude towards the child who today plays in her personal life certainly a much more important part than ever before. We have already hinted how the woman, borne upward by the waves of equal right, of the great revolutions, profited not only socially and politically but also in the family in her position as mother. The patriarchal ownership of the children had already previously been under-

mined by the growing power of the state-ideology, so that the way was paved for the mother to regain her position in education which she had already had in smaller units with collective ideologies of the child (for example, among the primitives). The woman again begins to assume her natural educational rights within the family but also actively to take part (especially in America) in social problems of education to an extent hitherto undreamt of. By bearing in mind the psychological motivation, one might see in this, a parallel, if one likes, a direct continuance of her fight for political equality for which today she no longer has to fight. But this fight for the child, namely, who shall educate it, almost one might say in whose name shall it be educated, is much more radical in its vital effects for the community-ideology of the future generation. What Freud has designated as neurotic "mother complex" seems to me to be a symptom of the present-day sex war in which Psychoanalysis itself is ensnared. I see in this famous "mother complex" not so much the fixation of the child on the mother but rather a sign of the growing influence of the mother ideology in the education of the child.

Just at this point where it is more a matter of the ideological than of the natural influence of the mother on the child, the battle now seems to be raging. Simultaneously with the growing influence of the mother on later education, the man reaches back to an ever



earlier stage in the child's life to exert his pedagogic influence in order to regain his lost ground in the later phase of education. He does this not necessarily as father, but as psychiatrist, psychologist, educational counsellor. But the woman fights for more. Whilst the man tries to save at any price the collapsed patriarchal ideology, for the woman it is a question of gaining a new sphere of life, in which the child is no longer temporarily left to her influence but becomes the vital interest, almost, the occupation of her whole life. For this purpose however, she must step out of her narrow milieu of family, that is, she must exchange her maternal vocation for that of the educator, just as the man has exchanged his paternal vocation for that of pedagogic therapist. In a word the paternal struggle for the child within the family seems to be projected into and magnified in the social strife for the pedagogic ideology of the future.

## Chapter Six

# VOCATION AND TALENT

*Whether his work prospers does not depend on the good or bad character of the one producing it, but on whether he is in a position to be faithful to the work.*

JOSEPH BREUER

IN THE ARGUMENTS of the previous chapter we have repeatedly emphasized the problem of the so-called "choice of vocation" and finally have approached this theme from an angle that seems most easily accessible, but yet proved to be insufficient as a solution of the problem. We have comprehended the educational fever that has spread in our civilization as a symptom of a conflict brought into the community from the family; a conflict between the matriarchal and patriarchal ideologies. With this explanation we have also accounted for the general war-cry of the professional pedagogues, who have sent out the warning that education is something that not everyone can do, particularly not every parent, but that it is a profession that must be learnt like any other. With this password the

educators only seem to cover up a similar state of affairs to that which we found in the leader, in whose psychological structure we could find no special talent or gift. For his psychology solely consists of his relation to the masses, that is, in his identification with the collective ideology which with regard to the leader is a matter of strength of will. And although we could verify in the educator at least one other psychologically less simple attitude of will, namely that of helper, yet beyond this there seems to exist, even in the educator, no special talent or gift. The pedagogues are, so to say, officially authorized, that is, are collective or communized parents, from whose hands education has been taken because the parents not only lack certain specialized knowledge, but because they would make education too individualistic, which would not be useful for the community. But simply to deny that the parents have the capacity to bring up their children as most pedagogues do today, can only be understood either as a weapon used in the struggle for the child's soul, or—in so far as it holds good—it must be considered a symptom of a degenerate type of human being whose natural instinct has been spoilt by psychological ideologies. For not only are the parents in the animal kingdom qualified to rear their young till they are self-sufficient, but even among the primitives neither the mother's ability to educate the child up to puberty is doubted, nor is the father's competency

doubted to initiate the youth afterwards into the secrets of maturity. With them actually every mother and every father is at the same time the naturally born educator of the children who in his or her turn moulds the child by example and trains him by instruction.

Certainly with the primitives it is a matter of relatively simple conditions with a homogeneous social and religious structure in which the natural collective ideology also rears collective human beings and does not produce individuals with specialized talents. But there has been a long process of development from the time of the natural educators and teachers such as are given in the groups of men and women among the primitives, to the time of the specialized teacher such as master of handcraft, of technical, artistic, or scientific skill. The parents in the meaning of our family organization form the connecting link in this process of development if we here disregard all wider social influences. But the rôle of the parents has in the course of time changed so much that they become, in different epochs, representatives of different ideologies, which more or less opposed the prevailing collective ideologies. All these changing attitudes of the parents towards the children are only to be understood in the light of the prevailing soul-ideology, the development of which is reflected in the changing systems of religion.<sup>1</sup> The primitives' division of sexuality and

<sup>1</sup> See "Seelenglaube und Psychologie."

procreation that ascribed one function to the man, another to the woman, is also reflected in primitive education where the child up to the time of puberty remains in the care of the women, and only later on becomes of value to the men. This primitive educational system thus stands, as might be expected, in complete harmony with their whole world-concept, that is, with their social and religious organization. For both the educational system and the religious organization value the individual only as the bearer of the collective soul and hence recognize the child only at puberty, when he is no longer a child. Then he is, so to speak, taken away by force from the women, who have treated him still as an individual, and in the initiation rites he is, as it were, made a collective being. We cannot here pursue the gradual change of this educational ideology from the phase of the matriarchal to the patriarchal family organization of the sexual age: but it might be remarked that originally the women (mother) represented the individual educational ideology and the men, the collective ideology. At a later stage of the family organization, when the man acknowledged the individual paternal rôle, he then also represented the same or even a stronger individual ideology than the mother. Finally the collective forces that became more and more concrete in state and religion oppose the individual ideology of both parents united in marriage. Today, where the general educa-

tion tends towards individualization, the parents still involved in religious belief, representing the founding collective ideology, yet cling to it because this is the one sphere of influence which the specialized system of education has left them. In this sense the parents are still the representatives of an ideology suitable for a general education although their function in the course of time has changed.

Special talent for a definite vocation is however not only bound up with the existence of specialized teachers, but also depends on a special gift in the child. But we must first separate this individual talent from certain social and ideological factors in order to get back to the problem of the individual and his education. First, let us go back to our arguments in the previous chapter, that have shown that there are certain epochs that are favourable to definite professions or, more correctly, definite activities. Generally we can see that in times of hardship and confusion such as characterize the revolutionary epochs, there will be a greater need for leaders of the people, of the army, leaders who in more peaceful times have to seek other activities. More specifically, we recognized in the Renaissance the age of the genius, that owes its origin to two needs, the one collective and the other individual; the collective, was the need to find for the collapsing religious ideology an earthly substitute for God; the other was the individual's need to help himself and others by creating

newer ideologies. But the leader type assumes different forms corresponding to the prevailing ideological constellation; in the Renaissance he becomes the discoverer, inventor, creator of new values, a type which first springs up sporadically from the concurrence of social and individual needs and, if he holds good, develops into a profession or professional class, among artists called "schools." In this way the creator of the type, the master, seeks to immortalize himself not only ideally in the work, but also materially in his pupils. A comparison between the genius type of the Renaissance and the pedagogue type in the present time, leads to the same conclusion reached in the previous chapter with regard to the leader rôle. It is, namely, that in the community there is always a number of gifted individuals who are distinguished just through the lack of any special gift. Hence their talent essentially consists of "sensing" the prevailing collective needs and tendencies, comprehending them through the mobilization of their own collective self and finally, through the activation of their own individual power, materializing them in a new ideological type. Thus their special gift consists in their ability to utilize their latent leadership talent for the solution of the crisis in the prevailing ideology. That means, in other words, their ability lies in their power to produce the priest type, the king, the artist, or the pedagogue type according to whatever type is most in demand at the time.

If one such temporary solution of the collective crisis is initiated by the individuality of the leader, then the necessary stabilization of the same is achieved through the breeding of a more or less large number of types as much as possible like the leader, for the professional development and maintenance of this new ideology. These miniature leaders are naturally no longer such strong individualities, also they do not have to be, since they no longer function creatively but only didactically. One might describe this process also as a renewed communization of the individual ideology, since the professional class arises in such a way that the master educates disciples and these train an increasing number of pupils. This process embraces today in our modern democracies all intellectual and free professions of the so-called intellectual worker. On the other hand, the second large mass of handcrafts men (mechanics, manufacturers, day-labourers) likewise presupposes no special talent but is governed by purely economic conditions. Above all, this class of men is educated into good citizens with national and religious ideals and they gratify their ideological needs also in this sphere (politics, class war, etc.). In the third large group of the population, namely, the peasants, there is also no particular specialized talent noticeable. Indeed the peasants of all classes seem to have best preserved the collective traditions manifested in patriarchal family organization. The modern farmer,



however, with machinery and speculation in crops, has to a large extent already become industrialized and commercialized.

All these considerations, however interesting they may be, yet do not answer the burning question of parents and pedagogues concerning the specialized talent of their children and the pedagogic methods necessary for its promotion and development in the interest of the individual as well as for the good of the community. This practical demand is intelligible from the human and pedagogic point of view, and I only wanted to indicate that one must not over-simplify the problem. Without considering the collective ideologies and their social crises, one can never answer the purely pedagogic question of the development of childish talents. Therefore it is good, although not always easy, to bear in mind the influence of the age on the professional opportunities and needs. This means we have not only to consider the particular disposition that the child is born with or early develops, but we must also consider in what special line the individual must be trained in order to fit into the varying demands of the community at different times. In the present-day necessity for mass production and quick progress there is in the ordinary business life only seldom a similar concurrence of talent and activity such as we had to assume for the development of the leader. The present-day type of man, in the psycho-

logical and sociological analysis of his personality turns out to be a highly complicated being, who not only unites, as does primitive man, individual and collective characteristics, but also possesses within himself several layers of more subtle differentiations; otherwise how could he bear the burden of all the demands put on him by family, occupation, state, religion, society, etc.? As the situation demands, he has to place in the foreground one or other ego side almost to such exclusiveness that the other sides necessarily become stunted. His talent should lie in the ease with which he adjusts to various situations brought about not only by the social life in itself but also by its critical changes and emotional upheavals. A special talent, if such is present, plays a relatively small part in this entire picture. (The individualistic type of man of the democratic age again must be almost a universal genius since democracy in principle opens up all possibilities for anybody.) How this inner conflict of the individualistic man must lead to neurosis, when he also has to be a collective normal type, we have already indicated at the conclusion of the previous chapter.

If we now turn to the child himself with his individual disposition and gifts, we have a similar impression; namely,—leaving out of consideration the exceptional cases—that in the complexity which is already shown in infancy it is pretty difficult to determine wherein his special gift lies and it is still more

difficult to judge whether it will continue in later life and whether it can be utilized professionally. If we have previously emphasized how difficult it is for parents and educators to recognize the drift of the times, yet here we face the complementary difficulty of determining in the individual the obvious talent and making use of it pedagogically. Already here one might draw the practical conclusion from this state of affairs, that it will be necessary to take a certain risk in education and also to admit to chance (which we seem to fear like the devil) a part in the choice of occupation, which as a matter of fact is no choice at all. With this I do not mean to say that we have already reached the point in our discussion of the factors determining the choice of occupation, where our scientific ambition has to yield to the recognition of indeterminable factors. On the contrary, precisely now after having discussed the educational influence of the social milieu and of the collective ideologies, we should like to turn our attention to those individual factors in the choice of occupation and in the development of talents that are psychologically determinable. The different psychoanalytic schools have been able to shed some new light on this problem from the dynamic viewpoint held in common. The essential advance in this direction beyond the purely descriptive psychology is characterized by the Freudian concepts of "*fate of an instinct*" (Tribschicksal), "sublimation" and "identification."

*Hermann*, who has made a special study of the question of talent, and has shrewdly seen many connexions,<sup>1</sup> yet remains dispassionate enough to admit the inadequacy of these concepts for the satisfactory explanation of the development of a definite talent and its occupational utilization. But he constantly refers back to the principle of psychical economy, that is, to the factors of intensity and volume of displacement, quantitative factors which even *post festum* would be immeasurable, much less predeterminable. Such qualifications, however, are indispensable to any effective education.

Modern psychologists first had to encounter the problem of talent in the fully developed adult, and inferred from the study of neurotically inhibited ability, its genesis in the child; their motivating interest was a therapeutic one which led them retrospectively from the study of the causes of inhibition to the origin of the talent. But also in this particular problem, analysis has not been able to avoid the same methodological faults that characterize its attitude towards the whole problem of education which it ought to understand and to solve from its apparent failures in the neurosis. But the recognition of the cause why, for instance, an artist *cannot* produce, throws no light on the problem how he came to be able to produce or

<sup>1</sup> "Organlibido und Begabung" (Internat. Zeitschr. f. Psa, IX, 1923) and "Beiträge zur Psychogenese der zeichnerischen Begabung" (Imago, VIII, ----)

what enabled him to do so. For this simple reason, because life—and particularly its disturbances, illness—can sometimes be *explained* causally; for causality is a category of thought or thinking and hence every explanation contains a causal understanding. But life does not permit of being *built up causally*, neither therapeutically, nor even educationally, because the individual's willed aspirations stand outside the explicable range of causality. We have however, besides this, the other principle of finality for the explanation of the individual's aspirations; but this is only valid *post festum*, that is, for the understanding of the aspirations already in force, thus it is only another kind of causal explanation of effects that have already occurred. On this account it is so difficult to apply the causally traceable connections in psychical mechanisms to education, in which it is precisely a matter of foreseeing and predetermining the individual reactions, the essential factors of which, the willed aims and aspirations according to their very nature, are indeterminable. Hence when ambitious educators boast of being able to foretell the reaction of a child to some pedagogic measure or in some general situation, it signifies little; for first of all it would be a matter of a chance guess and not of scientific knowledge; secondly, the child coming under a prolonged pedagogic influence such as education signifies, will continually change his tactics just in order to escape from prede-

termination, and so maintain his individuality.<sup>1</sup>

If then it is difficult to foretell the individual's reaction in an isolated situation it becomes impossible where it is a matter of the whole personality or at least of so integral a part of the same such as a special talent is. Hence dynamic psychology leaves out of the question the assumption of inborn special dispositions and as an ultimate principle of explanation refers to the economic-dynamic factors in the psychical establishment of the whole personality. In the beginning one indeed looked for a specific disposition, which however in most cases is only demonstrable *post festum*. But scarcely is this achieved by the *Freudian* theory of organ-libido or the *Adlerian* theory of organ inferiority, both fundamentally representing the same principle. The actual artistic sublimation (Freud) or the successful over-compensation (Adler), cannot be understood unless one also takes into consideration besides the organ and the impulse force (whether in a positive or negative sense) the whole individual and his prevailing attitude to this organ in question. To all this there is added a social and ideological viewpoint that leaves further scope for the choice of occupation. Even supposing the psychology of a surgeon is to be comprehended causally from a sublimation of sadism

<sup>1</sup> In this respect the Adlerian school omitted applying their psychological viewpoints to their own methods of education. Hence in his practical instruction in therapy and education, Adler speaks of the "*Art of reading a Life's history*" (1st Part of a *Technik der Individual Psychologie*, München, 1928).

(the hand) in the first place, this does not explain why the same hand sadism does not express itself, as clearly it does at other times, in a gift for drawing or for sculpture. Secondly, it certainly does not explain the profession of surgery that first must exist ideologically and be socially accepted before the individual can use it as a "sublimation" for his sadistic disposition or inclination. The same holds good for the over-compensation of an inferior eye (in Adler's sense) in the profession of painter or marksman. In other words, sublimation itself may take place in the individual, but its constructive utilization no longer depends on the individual alone, but on collective factors of a social and ideological kind that we have already mentioned and of whose determining influence we want again to remind ourselves.

If we now turn to the inner process of sublimation or of over-compensation in the individual, it must be said that here Adler has not seen more than Freud but only differently. For *Freud*, sublimation resulted in a kind of negative way from inhibited impulse, hence appeared to him as something weakened, diluted, faded, in comparison to the original impulse. *Adler* on the other hand starts from a weak inferior fundamental attitude and finds the powerful, overwrought exaggeration in the compensation tendency. But both concepts have in common the dynamic viewpoint, which comprehends *talent proper not as a given dispo-*

*sition but as dynamic expression.* This in turn results from the dynamic interaction between factors of quantity and intensity, that one describes either as sublimation (weakening) or as over-compensation (strengthening). But the course and result of this process in every case will depend on a further factor that one might designate as the attitude of the individual to himself. That means, it depends on what extent and whether or not the individual utilizes a given talent for himself in the meaning of his own willed aspiration. Indeed, is it not likely that the individual first develops his talent for a definite purpose, whereby this purpose is the decisive factor? The mechanisms thereby coming into play would be only the means for attaining the individual's purpose and the social ideology would be the justification for it. Furthermore we must remember that apparently there are different means of accomplishment, or, better, different types of ability to achieve, that arise sometimes from a superfluity of energy by means of sublimation, sometimes from a feeling of inferiority by means of compensation and sometimes from a need for justification by means of identification. Also we shall have to acknowledge different mixtures of motive, mechanism, and aspiration. Sometimes sexuality (Freud's libido) will be the effective impulse force, another time it will be the striving for power (Adler), yet another the so-called guilt-feeling (that I have described as the



creative guilt),<sup>1</sup> or again it will be a mixture of all of these. But also achievement itself, creation, can have as its effect the same reactions that we have just described as the cause; productivity may lead to sexual stimulation, can give to the individual a feeling of power, but also can evoke a feeling of inferiority or guilt.

All these various aspects of productivity into which the problem of talent has been resolved for us can, however, be considered from a broader viewpoint if one has learnt to understand that the feeling of inferiority is as little an ultimate fact as is the sense of guilt. I have tried to show that these latter arise as a reaction to the fact of being different, psychologically expressed, from being individual, and that the individual feels blameworthy towards the species and inferior towards the community, because and in so far as he is different from the others. So the pedagogic question of talent proves to be a psychologically inadequate objective, the history of which is characteristic for the complexity of the problem here dealt with. The tracing and constructive furthering of talent was postulated as an educational aspiration derived from the therapeutic study of the individual incapable of achievement. Then came descriptive psychology that determined certain inherited dispositions

<sup>1</sup> See the chapter "Schaffen und Schuld" in "Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit"

of a physical and psychical nature, that should be cultivated and developed or at least not inhibited by education, in order to yield the desired result of a specific surplus of achievement. Finally from the standpoint of dynamic psychology, all these factors of inherited disposition, of prevailing ideology, and of social milieu prove to us to be of a secondary nature in so far as ultimately it depends on the attitude of the individual to himself and to the surrounding world. These are the two fundamental factors that certainly influence the ego, but also from which the ego makes something. (This latter conclusion which we can draw from the dynamic psychology of personality does away with the educational significance of the concept of talent and the idea of pedagogically influencing it. What we see before us is the fact that *the individual has to vindicate his separate existence in the community through achievement, super-achievement, or special achievement*, according to whether the individual is different from the other, feels himself to be so and accepts it or not.

This tendency on the part of the individual to justify himself has become a strong motive for productivity only at particular times such as ours when increasing individualization or individualism is rampant. The present-day education which is individualistically inclined, goes back to the concept of talent inferred *post festum*, in order to find in the child itself an in-

dividual aim of education which shall then justify the individualistic ideology of education. In other words, since the child cannot be trained to be a mere individual, which is the tendency of modern ideology, one wants at least to train it to be a specially gifted individual. From this the newer ideology of talent has arisen which rationalizes pedagogically the parental wish for the preservation of the individuality of their child. But the practical results do not go beyond an occasional production of a prodigy. For the child's wish as a rule is not for the development of a special talent but for the expansion and enforcement of his whole individuality, an aspiration that from the very beginning certainly encounters the most varied outer and inner obstacles. The search for, and the cultivation of, a special talent in the child by parents and educators may be accepted by the child as a means to individualization but it may just as often be felt as an obstacle to the same, like anything imposed on the child from without. For the child not only needs external influences for the utilization of its aptitudes but he also requires inner motives and these emerge from a dynamic interplay of forces. Their productive operation indeed may be provoked but cannot be forced, may be prepared for but cannot be artificially initiated at a definite time nor arbitrarily placed in the service of super-individual purposes.

Vocation is a product of the collective ideology, that

which the community needs and values; talent is a symbol of an individual ideology, that which the individual knows and wills; and in the ideal case, these two tendencies coincide in the choice of occupation. The choice of vocation, determined by social and collective ideological factors, faces the individual at a time when often enough he is forced to decide from practical reasons and not from inner necessity. One often discovers one's real vocation very late, although it can in favourable circumstances lie within the already chosen circle of interests; just as one can later fall in love with the woman whom one married for other reasons. But in general the present-day occupations are too widely differentiated for the individual to determine beforehand his choice; on the other hand, they are again so specialized that one must begin in them early in order to master them. Hence, the ever increasing tendency of the schools, even the higher ones, to prepare for everything only in a general and more theoretic way; the practical side must be gradually acquired through experience as in every profession. In this sense, the vocational education, particularly that of the so-called free lance, really never ends; indeed it begins only with the entrance into the professional life. If one can really make any child into anything, as the present-day psychology supposes, and modern education would like to believe, so much the worse; for what we lack is precisely the goal. If we are not satis-

fied with the negative aim of education, namely, to prevent neurotics, the question then is for what purpose shall the child be educated after the religious ideology has made room for the humanistic, but this again is restricted by national and democratic (individualistic) ideologies. We have already seen how in this difficulty the cultivation and development of talent has followed as an educational aim gained from the individual himself, an aim that in the most favourable case coincides with the collective claims of the choice of occupation. The occupation or profession is then a kind of preservation of the individual elements in the form of a miniature collectivity as represented by the professional classes.

On the other hand the vocational psychology forms an essential part of the character in man, in being accepted by the individual, and in the course of time being made a part of his own Self. It is not only that we thus preserve our Ego in the occupation, but through the occupation we also first unfold and develop our individual ego, our whole personality. Hence Psychoanalysis with its return to the impulse and instincts has given no consideration to vocational psychology and has contributed little to the understanding of the choice of occupation. And yet in certain cases the whole psychology of the individual can be contained in and completely absorbed by the vocation. Naturally there are different types and degrees of pro-

fessional men; from the artist whose ego has, as it were, been absorbed one hundred per cent by his work, up to the manual worker or clerk whose vocation plays practically no rôle in his psychology. These two extreme cases also show how, with the significance of the vocational psychology, the significance of the personal or private life changes. The artist type lives for his work, namely in the sense of self-development and self-expression, and his personal relations must be subordinate to his work, often enough to the detriment of the purely human side of life. The other type has to find all his gratification and happiness in life and experience, for which he exists, whilst he considers work as a necessary evil.

But there is yet another type of person besides these, the understanding of whom leads us deeper into the problem of vocational psychology; this is the typical average *woman*, the wife of her husband and the mother of her children. If one comprehends this as her vocation, as she herself does, then one can say also with her as with the artist that the psychology of vocation and of the ego coincide, become one. Only she creates concretely and really, whereas the artist type creates ideally and abstractly. The man must first create work and occupation ideologically; and often enough the justification for it, because it is no longer a natural expression. On the success of this justification—no matter what his occupation may be—depends his future

instinct on his family and friends, when his occupation does not provide him with any outlet for it. The analysis of such mixed types (a good example is the artistically gifted architect) again raises the whole problematic of human psychology beyond Psychoanalysis; for one has to ask oneself how far does the occupational psychology of these people influence their individual psychology, indeed, even produce it. Certainly this type has often chosen his occupation from some strong impulse disposition and its "sublimation"; but the choice itself (for instance, of surgeon or architect) is collectively and socially determined, which again affects the original impulse disposition and the whole personality. The individual then either does in his occupation what he cannot do in life, or he would be happy only if he could do the same in his life as in his occupation. In other words he reacts to life, not with his individual psychology but with his vocational psychology. This leads to conflicts, although it seems to be for him the only way of gratification. In this respect it is easier for the artist for he can materialize his ideal in his work, whereas the material is given to the creative business man, and he can only impress his individuality on reality by making a compromise with it. We shall try to show in the last chapter, which is dedicated to self-education, how far this whole creative tendency in the individual arises from a non-acceptance of his own Self. This, his own Self, he

then wants to alter by projecting it, as it were, into the other or into the world at large.

In conclusion of our discussion of the choice of vocation, I should only like to say that the present-day man in spite of—or on account of—the increasing individualization again becomes more collective particularly in his business. Indeed, I believe that in the vocational life of today there is to be found the strongest, perhaps even the only collective force which *directly* influences the individual ego. It does not seem to me even improbable that the present high wave of individualism is at least in part also a reaction against the increasing occupational communization. However that may be, at any rate I see in the constantly growing interest for psychology, which is occupied more and more with our individual ego, an obvious attempt to rescue this Self from collective absorption. One of the dangers that threaten our individual ego is, however, the one springing from vocation, or, better, from vocational psychology. As a protection against this danger the theory of talent has been again introduced into pedagogy, which shall give the individual the psychological upperhand over the vocation. Whether and how far this can actually succeed we have shown above and will return to the question in the last chapter. But first, however, we must discuss one other collective ideology that threatens the individual in his personal claims even before the choice of occupation, and this



is the *family* that sees in the child only the vocation of the son or daughter, that is, a rôle of the species with which the childish ego very soon comes into conflict.

## Chapter Seven

# FORMS OF KINSHIP AND THE INDIVIDUAL'S RÔLE IN THE FAMILY

*Education is love to the Offspring.*

NIETZSCHE

IN THE COURSE of our discussion we have repeatedly touched upon the child's attitude to the parents and to the family, but now we must discuss in greater detail the different relationships within the family. For as long as childhood lasts, the child is very closely, in part exclusively, attached to the house and modern education has again placed the chief accent on the education of the child in the family. And rightly so! The child is indeed brought into a family of already educated—or in so far as brothers or sisters are concerned—of partly educated individuals, who also have a psychology, whereas the child brings with it neither education nor psychology, and somehow gets both from adults or develops both through them.

In the analysis of adult neurotics *Freud*, above all, has studied the influence that the parents exercise on the child partly through their mere existence, partly through their particular psychology or characterology. Under the concept of the "Œdipus Complex" he has described the effects engendered by the parents in the child in the form of love, anxiety, hatred, jealousy, obstinacy, etc. But these effects are of different values, that is, they are partly unavoidable, partly avoidable, partly bring out of the child only what is latent; on the other hand, they partly provoke new reactions to these unfamiliar stimulations. A closer study has at any rate taught us to understand that the parents cannot be made responsible for many of the child's reactions, because the child possesses them potentially when it is born into the world. This is particularly so with *anxiety*, which has not the same significance for the child as it has, according to the psychoanalytic theory, for the adult neurotic. The child, at the birth process,<sup>1</sup> seems to bring into the world anxiety, which is then attached to the parents; on the other hand, this anxiety determines from the beginning the dependency of the child on the parents (especially on the mother) and often extends far beyond the time of the child's physical helplessness. The adult may have fear of death or fear of sex, the child has a fear of life

<sup>1</sup> *The Trauma of Birth* (1929).

itself,<sup>1</sup> which it changes forthwith, even when there is no objective reason for it, into fear or anxiety of certain people or things.

Let us now return to the Œdipus complex with which a definite phase of the child's relation to the parents, or better, one aspect of this relationship, is circumscribed. The sexual element in it emphasized by Freud, as the attraction to the parent of the opposite sex and the jealousy of the parent of the same sex, is not so clearly to be found in practice as mythology represents it and as Freud first believed. This purely biological scheme may indeed exist in the human child to a certain extent; but it is permeated, indeed, even sometimes completely dominated by other tendencies emerging from the unfolding ego, so that it was difficult even for Psychoanalysis to maintain the original Œdipus concept. They speak of a reversed Œdipus relationship, of a rudimentary, even negative one, which at least devaluates, not to say contradicts, the purely biological viewpoint. I myself have on one occasion<sup>2</sup> referred to the fact that besides the reverse of the Œdipus complex which contains a greater love to the parent of the same sex, there is also in the child a tendency that one might designate "anti-Œdipœan" be-

<sup>1</sup> See the third Volume of my "Technik," *Die Analyse der Analytiker und seiner Rolle in der Gesamtsituation* (Wien and Leipzig, 1931).

<sup>2</sup> The Relation of parental Attitudes to Success and Failure: a Lecture given at the One Day's Conference on Parental Education in New York, Nov. 2, 1927.

cause in contrast to the Oedipus complex it aims at a bringing together of the parents instead of a separation of them. Certainly this occurs because the child also expects some kind of advantages for itself from it, that is, it gratifies egoistic motives, but this shows that these often enough far outweigh the biological tendencies. The child reacts not only with the innate biological impulses, but it also reacts according to the given situation. I found these tendencies of the child to bring the parents together or to hold them together particularly in those marital situations, the instability of which the child experiences as a dangerous threat to his well-being. This attitude of the child which can easily be noticed in situations of that kind, was overlooked by Psychoanalysis because the attitude mostly does not manifest itself in altruistic ways, but in neurotic reactions, with which the child wants to attain the same result.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I wrote in the lecture mentioned, "I surmise that in Freud's 'Analysis of a Phobia of a five-year-old Boy' (1909) the fact of the parental disharmony played a similar part as in those cases observed by me. I do not know whether the obvious conflicts of his parents, who later separated, go back so far into his childhood. But I should suppose from similar experiences that the father's excessive interest in the boy's problems was already an expression of his marital guilt consciousness, to which the children as we know so react as if they understood it."

The parents had moreover "agreed," as Freud remarks in the Introduction to the Case History, "to educate their first child with as little compulsion as would be requisite for the maintenance of good manners."

Thus they had apparently also projected the "freedom" which they wished for themselves, on to the child, nevertheless without success as his neurosis shows, a neurosis which also arose from a wish for his absent father and not only as a reaction against his father.

But if in a situation where the child experiences the conflicts of the parents with one another as a danger to itself, he can react in a way contrary to the biological presuppositions, then we may assume that he perhaps also reacts with the real Œdipus Complex (where this is to be found) only to a situation of better understanding between the parents and not with his biological innate impulses. Actually not only critics of analysis, such as *Malinowski* by reason of ethnological material,<sup>1</sup> but also practising child analysts who, contrary to Freud, worked with the child itself<sup>2</sup> have leaned towards this same viewpoint; namely that the Œdipus Complex may be a reaction acquired by the child in our family organization, and not a biological inheritance brought with it into the world. If this were confirmed, the paradox would follow that Freud would have considered the anxiety present at birth as acquired through later influences (threat) and the Œdipus attitude acquired in the family situation as innate.<sup>3</sup> However that may be, we cannot here go further into this problem and can only refer readers to the psychoanalytic literature<sup>4</sup> which moreover has dealt with the influence of the parents on the child

<sup>1</sup> *Sex and Repression in Savage Society* (London & New York, 1927). -

<sup>2</sup> Mary Chadwick: "Difficulties in Child Development" (London, 1929) especially Chap. XII, "Both Sides of the Œdipus Complex."

<sup>3</sup> There are still other fundamental paradoxes in Psychoanalysis. See concerning these especially my work entitled "Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit" (Leipzig and Vienna 1929).

<sup>4</sup> J. C. Flügel: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Family* (London, 1921).

almost exhaustively although one-sidedly and uncritically. At any rate the therapeutic or psychological aspects of the family situation do not interest us here but only the pedagogical, and for this, one other side of the problem seems to me of greater significance.

The question is, *what does the child signify for the parents ideologically?* In other words, in what light do the parents see the child, and what do they want the child to be and for what do they want to use it? But since the ideological attitude of the parents to the child changes in different times and under different conditions, a cultural psychological study of the theme "child" would be necessary for this, similar to that given by Ploss from the ethnological standpoint.<sup>1</sup> But this task would go far beyond the realm of this work where we are interested from pedagogic reasons only in the *present* parental ideology. Furthermore, the ethnological material is so manifold and so contradictory—especially the more that is collected—that one has to bring into it psychological viewpoints obtained from other sources in order to shape it into something more than a mere collection of material. I have already elaborated elsewhere<sup>2</sup> the essential viewpoint that considers the child as the collective soul-bearer and it can

<sup>1</sup> "Das Kind in Brauch und Sitte der Völker. Völkerkundliche Studien": by Dr. Heinr. Ploss, third completely revised and enlarged Edition. Published after the death of the Author by B. Renz. Ph.D. Leipzig, 1911-12.

<sup>2</sup> "Seelenglaube und Psychologie," 1930.

be well brought into harmony with the ethnological material. The collective significance of the child is expressed in the custom of "child community" preserved relatively late (Ploss, Chap. L.) in which the children belong in common to all the mothers and sometimes—not always—when they are bigger are assigned to a father of choice (according to similarity). This primeval custom has practically nothing at all of the fatherhood-ideology, but gives rather the impression of a tutorship, in which the child participates at a definite age for the purpose of further training. This naturally is far from being an education in our sense even today among most primitives. The child among them has not only more collective significance but with it goes also more religious significance, that is, the child guarantees the continuation of existence to the community, not only in the social sense, but also in the meaning of the original belief in immortality.

The primal family, according to the newer views of sociology, was a kind of herd or group formation, that did not embrace a monogamous form of marriage in our meaning (although it did not make it impossible), nor did it include "promiscuity" in the meaning that we today attach to that concept. For there were definite restrictions (exogamous and others) which were very strictly adhered to. One might designate this primal family best, as a kind of "group marriage" in the broadest sense of the word, "in which



whole generations of each half of the race lived in community marriage.”<sup>1</sup> The regulation of the sexual life is closely connected with the religious ideas (belief in the soul) and these also determine the prevailing attitude to the child. This development cannot here be followed in detail, but only the most important transitional stage to our present ideology of the family can be revealed. The transition from the primitive group-family (kinsfolk) to our present-day small family is characterized by the acceptance of the father’s individual rôle of begetter of his children; this rôle was formerly denied from religious reasons of the belief in immortality. This turn of development changed the child from a collective being into a personal representative of the patriarchal individual-ideology. The transition phase was the Matriarchy, with the “heritance from the uncle” (avunculus), that is, the mother’s brother who was the male head of the family in place of the father; this seems to correspond to a relic of the old group marriage between brothers and sisters. Today with the enfeeblement of the patrias potestas and the strengthening of the individualistic tendency, the child is an individual for himself although he is lawfully the father’s successor and is claimed as a collective being by the State. Thus the three chief stages in the ideological development of the

<sup>1</sup> See Alfred Vierkandt’s article “Ehe” in the *Handwörterbuch der Sexualwissenschaft* (edited by Max Marcuse), 2nd. Edition, Bonn, 1926.

child are: a collective being (mother), heir (of the father), private being (Self).

We have now to investigate the different ideologies in relation to the child, how they have on the one hand, influenced the educational systems, on the other hand influenced the child itself, and, finally, how the child as an individual has reacted to these at different times. For this we shall have to bear in mind the existing antitheses, between the ideology of the parents (family), that of the teacher (community), and that of the child (individual). From the history of the family we know that earlier forms of kinship survive even when the actually existing family organization no longer shows this, indeed even when their origin is no longer understood. But this does not seem to be merely a useless survival as *Morgan*, its discoverer, thought, but these earlier forms of wider kinship obviously remain because they correspond to the spiritual need to preserve collective elements which become more and more individualized with the advancing family organization. But with the small family and its lawful ideology, all earlier forms of kinship finally fall apart. Hence the school replaces within the clan this earlier collective unity in the child community. So the actual school education springs up from the original child-community not to replace "the family" but to preserve the old group community (clan) in process of disappearing.

Here we already see, how the school plays a double rôle towards the parents; it replaces for them the lost collective ideology of the belief in the soul, but robs them at a later stage of the individual claim in the child. So the parents have really never fully possessed the child, because originally they willingly surrender the child to the clan or tribe for the belief in the soul, but later on they can no longer snatch the child away from the collective claims of the group. The mother alone in the primitive time of her natural supremacy had real possession of the child (Bachofen's "Mother Right"), and later on the father alone in the period of the lawfully and religiously supported patriarchal ideology of the family.<sup>1</sup> In our small family (of marriage) the parents possess the child in common only in so far as the mother trains it in the early period and the father claims it later, when, however, he has to compete for it with the community (the State). Here the child, especially the son, was trained exclusively in the paternal ideology, as the father's heir and successor who also had to care for the religious cult of the ancestors. This paternal tendency was, however, not only opposed by the son through his natural attachment to the mother (the psychoanalytic Oedipus Complex) but also by his individuality, a double conflict, the climax of which we find presented in Hamlet.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The concept and the word "family" is related to the Latin "formulus," that is, servant, slave.

<sup>2</sup> "Seelenglaube und Psychologie," pp. 67 ff.

Here is established the third, and for the time being last phase of the parental ideology which, however, springs up neither from the collectivity nor from the paternal need for immortality. But on the contrary, it has been forced, through the child's own individual development, first on the parents, and finally on the community. Today the child is made not only a social but also an individual vindication of marriage, whereas formerly as long as he was a collective being, he made marriage unnecessary. With this is connected the fact that today many marital conflicts are projected on to the child, a fact which detrimentally influences the collective education, as also the individual development, of the child. But one must not forget that this is nothing new, but only one other manifestation of the age-old fact that the child has always been used for something, at times by the community, at times by the parents, or one of the parents. At any rate the primitive civilizations are much more sincere in this utilization of the child than we. For we today psychically misuse and exploit the children under the mask of individualistic education. Indeed, perhaps the acceptance of children as independent individuals, which completely contradicts the whole parental ideology, is a kind of guilt reaction on the part of the parents towards exploiting the child on the other hand. At any rate we can observe that many children are more or less conscious of this guilt feeling of their parents

towards themselves, and take advantage of this situation for themselves. A difficult marriage situation may be in this sense a good school for the child to early develop individuality and self-reliance, or it may also be the beginning of a lifelong neurosis, according to the child's disposition and reactions. Experience shows both possibilities, although analysts from their study of the neurotic drew the premature conclusion that it could have only harmful effects, because they never see those children who benefited from a maladjustment between the parents. Such a situation can be for the child not only a stimulus for thinking and so promote his intellectual development, but it also develops his emotional life and his will and he can in this way, if he does not find sufficient *security* in the family, become prematurely self-reliant just as he can become completely dependent (neurotic).

At any rate it seems that much more depends on what family situation the child finds and how it reacts to it than on the inherited biological elements such as are given in the libido tendencies and in the manifestations of anxiety. Analysis has indeed shown in the neurotic, the harmful after-effects of the parental influence in childhood, but likewise has taught us to see in the analytic situation not only (with Freud) a repetition of the infantile but also a new creation of the ego. The analytic situation makes it obvious that the individual can so easily recreate every situation in his

meaning because fundamentally he always finds only himself, or better, a part of himself in the other, or creates it by means of projection. Simultaneously there is also the opposite process of identification, that is, the individual also tries to be like the other and to a certain extent actually becomes like him (psychologically or characterologically). This tendency to "imitate" is so preponderant that the other side has hitherto been neglected. Certainly it must be admitted that in the infantile situation at first the child identifies more than projects, but at least in the analytic situation projection should have been more valued (by Freud). I have already elsewhere<sup>1</sup> comprehended the so-called Œdipus situation, which is supposed to repeat itself in the analysis, as the child's first clear achievement of projection, in which he recreates a given situation in the meaning of his needs and wishes. The relation to the parents—as we better call the Œdipus situation—is thus in a varying degree a creation of the child's, as the transference situation is clearly a creation of the patient's. This creation, however, does not only correspond to the biological tendencies in the meaning of the Œdipus complex but to the whole characterological development of the child, who can only identify itself with the parents, in that it simultaneously recreates them in a varying degree according to its own will

<sup>1</sup> "Gestaltung und Ausdruck der Persönlichkeit," 1928, pp. 64 ff., 2nd Vol. of *Genetische Psychologie* (the whole chapter "Erziehen und Beherrschen").

or ego ideal. Paradoxically, one might say, the child has to discover or create the parents as he needs them, which indeed is actually realized in the idea of God, who hence betrays rather our own self than the actual parental characteristics.

But the parents project on to the child as much or even more, that is, they try to recreate the child according to their own wishes. We have briefly described the different stages of this parental ideology and have designated the employment of the child as "heir" as the decisive turning point from the original concept of the child as a collective being, to its present position as an individual. At this stage of the patriarchal ideology the child is no longer important as the bearer of the collective soul of the race in the meaning of the original belief in the soul, but as the individual successor of the personal immortality of the father. Here, the child is no longer exclusively a collective being, yet is less of an individual being than at the primitive stage, because he has a quite definite and narrowly restricted task to fulfil. Against this designation of being only a son, which is the same as being robbed of one's own individuality, the child has rebelled from the moment when the man accepted fatherhood—although unwillingly—as a means of salvation for his soul. From then on, we see in the history of mankind the imposing duel of these two principles, which is manifested in folklore, myths, and poetic traditions as

the duel between father and son.<sup>1</sup> In the strife between Christianity and ancient Rome, it has clearly become a conflict between two ideological principles, the patriarchal and the filial. This conflict continues through the whole of the Middle Ages in the strife between the worldly and the spiritual spheres (Emperor and Pope) apparently as a strife for authority, but in truth as a battle for the soul. But modern times alone have brought a temporary solution of this conflict with the discovery of America which became a new land of democracy formed by the fugitives driven from Europe through religious intolerance. In this way they got rid of both the Emperor and Pope although they were gradually forced into an inner bondage. In Europe itself it needed the World War to overthrow the last external representatives of the father dominance, who sought, and also for the moment found in Psychoanalysis, appearing at the same time, an ideological solace. But this could be neither lasting nor of constructive value although it has a transitory therapeutic effect in that it replaces for a while the dying father ideology that mankind still needs. In this sense Psychoanalysis is as conservative as it appeared revolutionary; for its founder is a rebellious son who defends the paternal authority, a revolutionary who, from fear of his own rebellious son-ego, took refuge in the security

<sup>1</sup> "Das Inzest Motiv in Dichtung und Sage," 2nd Edition, 1926, especially Chapter V.



of the father position, which however was already ideologically disintegrated.

Having briefly surveyed the collapse of the father ideology under the increasing pressure of the individual claims of the son, from the time of the world dominance of patriarchal Rome to the last ideological attempt to save it in Psychoanalysis, we must remind ourselves of the difficulties that had preceded the erection of the father dominance. These were not of an external but of an inner nature. As I have elsewhere stated the patriarchal ideology was preceded by a long period of development in which the personal fatherhood was not only unknown but was denied, in order to maintain the individual ideology of immortality. Following the primitive systems of religion and social organizations which seemed to be created as a protection to individual immortality, we see the strife of man against the rôle of father enforced on him, at its highest in the Greek hero mythology.<sup>1</sup> Indeed the *Œdipus Saga* itself, which Freud would like to understand simply as an expression of the individual psychology of the son, proves to be from a sociological viewpoint a heroic defence of the man against the rôle of father. The father of *Œdipus*, *Laïos*, represents the type of man rejecting

<sup>1</sup> The love adventures of Jove in his various animalistic disguises (snake, swan, bull) correspond to the last traces of the totemistic impregnation of the soul, which the father god of the sexual age had taken over, till gradually he accepted the form of the purely human husband (*Amphytrion Saga*).

the sexual ideology, as I have described him in "Seelenglaube und Psychologie." On account of the prophecy that the son would be his successor, he abstains for years from sexual intercourse with his wife, with whom he cohabited only once in drunkenness or when seduced by her and so accidentally begot Œdipus. The boy was immediately exposed after birth, because the father wanted no successor, but wanted to be his own immortal successor, a desire which the myth presents in the incest of Œdipus with his mother. This concept makes Œdipus himself a representative of the father who wants to have no children, yet tries to preserve himself indefinitely. The incest with the mother from which also children sprang up, proves to be, as I stated elsewhere (l.c., p. 126 ff.), a compromise between the wish to have no children at all (Laios) and the necessity to renounce one's own immortality in favour of the children. This compromise to beget oneself as the mother's son and to be reborn from her, must naturally fail tragically. This is the veritable guilt of Œdipus, not that he slew the father and took his place with the mother. For as little as the father wants to continue to exist only in his sons, just as little has the son an inclination to play only the part of a successor to the father. In this sense Œdipus rebels likewise against the rôle of son as against that of father and not as son against his father. This double conflict in the individual himself who wants

to be neither father nor son, but simply Self, is portrayed in the myth in all its features which one cannot understand from the individual psychological viewpoint but only when one regards it as a sediment of sociological development. In this sense the resistance against the begetting of a son signifies also one's own resistance to come into the world as son; the exposure signifies the son's wish not to be brought up in the parental home as son but to grow up a free man in the wilderness. In this sense finally the fate or destiny that compels him to slay the father and to marry the mother signifies not only the son's individual wish as Freud has it, but also the coercion of the species that prescribes marriage and fatherhood against the individual's will.

Thus in the *CEdipus* myth we see the struggle of the individual represented as a strife between the ego believing itself immortal and the racial ego manifested in the sexual ideology (marriage, children). This inner resistance of the man against any kind of a racial rôle, whether that of the father or that of the son, is presented in the *CEdipus* Saga as an external strife between father and son. We now also understand why this conflict emerged so relatively late in history; first, the full development of individuality as Hellenism represented it was necessary in order to permit the ego to revolt against every kind of racial compulsion. Hence we shall not concern ourselves with the histori-

cal analysis of the *Cedipus* tradition and the various interpretations based on the same,<sup>1</sup> since we are here interested just in the most recent traditions as portrayed in literature, because only they can show us what the myth signifies to fully developed Hellenism. Now we find the material in its complete human elaboration first among the tragic poets, at its climax in Sophocles' presentation. There the hero is married a long time,<sup>2</sup> according to other sources 19 years, before he discovers that he is the husband of his mother. This and similar characteristics do not permit of being disposed of simply as late unessential elaborations, as it may seem from purely psychological interpretations. But for a sociological understanding of the Saga one must equally evaluate all the manifest details of the whole tradition since the end-product tells more than does its genesis. This statement still holds good for the poetic creation of Sophocles, who perhaps had an *Cedipus* complex himself,<sup>3</sup> but in his presentation of the same he was just as much influenced by the old traditions as by the contemporary attitude to it.

With these reservations I am inclined to recognize in the ultimate form of the saga as it appears in the Greek tragic poets, one other application of the

<sup>1</sup> See Carl Roberts: *Cedipus. Geschichte eines poetischen Stoffes im Altertum*. 2nd. Vol., Berlin 1915.

<sup>2</sup> *Lexikon der griech. und roem. Mythologie*, published by W. H. Roscher.

<sup>3</sup> See my "Inzestmotiv," 2nd. Edition, pp. 175 ff.

Œdipus material. Although this corresponds to the mythological significance set forth yet it is altered in the meaning of a later stage of development. Whereas the mythical Œdipus, as Homer still pictures him, continues to rule in Thebes after the death of his mother-spouse and so—although blinded—somehow saves himself from the catastrophe, yet in the poetic presentation the hero tragically collapses as soon as his deed is revealed. But he provokes this revelation himself in the play the essential characteristic of which lies just in the obstinate insistence of Œdipus to reveal his crime. Even if this is to be understood as the result of his bad conscience—now spoken of as “self-punishment”—yet we must ask ourselves why this awakened only after so many years and why just at that particular moment. We cannot be content with the explanation that may be derived from the tradition itself, namely, that originally the discovery directly followed the deed and hence the dramatic author placed the revelation into a later age of the hero for a mere sensational effect. For as we said we are not interested here in establishing the original form of the tradition, but only in understanding the formation it has assumed in the poem. And since the revelation in the drama would be just as thrilling if it followed the unconsciously begun deed, the poet could scarcely have had technical reasons for presupposing Œdipus had been long and happily married and that the mar-

riage had also been blessed by now grown-up children.<sup>1</sup> The age of the Sophoclean hero and the tragic fate of his sons<sup>2</sup> described in "Œdipus at Kolonnos" suggests that the reason for the displacement of the revelation originally following the deed, to the hero's old age, is connected with the growing up of his sons.

In other words, Œdipus of the tragic poets no longer represents the ego defending its individual immortality against the racial rôle (as father and son), but he represents the man already forced into the part of father and into matrimonial laws. In fact the man at a critical age which is nearer to death than to life, the man who is reminded of his mortal ego and in a crisis that one might call neurotic today, revolts against the sexual immortality in the children. In this racial tragedy of the individual we see a man who is forced into the acceptance of the rôle of father and the matrimonial law through the destiny of development. Deprived of his individual immortality, and with the approach of age and of death he tries to abandon his fatherhood in order to regain his individual immortality. In the play the hero does this in a "neurotic" way not only by recalling his own childhood (mother) but also the mythical hero Œdipus, whose successful incest with the mother he wants to imitate. Only in

<sup>1</sup> In the ancient epic, the marriage with the mother was childless and the children were ascribed to the second marriage with Euryganeia.

<sup>2</sup> Œdipus expresses the wish (curse) that they might kill one another.

this moment when the hero tries to justify his break with the prevailing sexual ideology by reference to the old myth <sup>1</sup> he then becomes *an* Œdipus, not *the* Œdipus of the tradition, whereas before he was anyone, that is, the Greek father wrestling with his conflict.<sup>2</sup> Here also the poet's individual psychology may be called in; because Sophocles was supposed to have written this play when he was an old man pursued by his sons, indeed according to one tradition, when he had to defend himself against the accusation of his sons that he was senile. He read his play before the tribunal, thus proving his superiority, and was acquitted. But this strife between the generations was no rarity even in ancient Greece, and Sophocles in the cursing of the sons by Œdipus has described only a general motive of the above mentioned conflict; in the father who will not be replaced by his son and in the son who will not be the father's successor.

This concept of the tragic Œdipus tradition first explains why the hero insists on the discovery, had, so to say, set himself the task (like an analyst) of proving that he has slain his father and married his mother. He needs this motivation—not the deed itself—for the

<sup>1</sup> See Jocasta's justification in Sophocles that many men in their dreams cohabit with the mother; she could almost recall here the old mythical hero Œdipus whom her husband the king of Thebes would like to imitate.

<sup>2</sup> In this sense is to be understood J. Burckhardt's famous quotation: "Corresponding to the Œdipus saga, every Greek had an Œdipus fibre which was capable of being directly touched and vibrated."

overthrowing of the undesirable patriarchal ideology, thus is not a son who wants to replace the father, but the man who will not accept the rôle of father. Thus the hero, so to say, accuses himself of Œdipus' crime in order thereby to gain the latter's immortality in being reborn by the mother. This understanding of the Saga is however not to be obtained from its psychoanalytic interpretation (in Freud's meaning) but only from the sociological significance. To the extent that our present-day child is still an Œdipus, yet it is only *an* Œdipus in the meaning of our interpretation of the hero; that is, the individual who does not want to be only a child. But the fact that Freud, in order to understand this childish reaction, had to recur to the Œdipus Saga shows that it was not explicable from a purely psychological viewpoint. Freud—like the hero of the drama itself—recalled opportunely this old tradition which he *now* interprets as the son's wish, whereas formerly it had signified exactly the opposite, namely, the conflict of the individual ego with the racial ego, that is, in the meaning of a resistance against the Œdipus complex. Through the dominance for centuries, of the father principle and the family organization, there exists in the individual a desire for the same, which perhaps may already be latent in the child; but it has nothing to do with the old Œdipus tradition, which represents the opposite, namely the resistance against the foundation and continuance of the family organi-



zation. In this sense also the Œdipus complex of the present-day child, no matter in what form it manifests itself, may ultimately be a protest of the individual ego against every kind of the collective family rôle (son, daughter, etc.). When, therefore, analysts emphasize the biological strength of the Œdipus wish in the present-day child, this seems to me, however, only therapeutically justifiable as a strengthening of the patient's individual ego. But this is not their intention for the patient is simultaneously led on to overcome this attitude conceived of as "primitive" by the patriarchal ideology of the Freudian theory.

It would seem then, that the incest motive had originally served the purpose of an attempt to achieve one's own immortality in the sense of the sexual ideology and indeed in the transitional period from the collective belief in the soul to belief in immortality in the children. The father principle was not yet fully accepted by the man, he was only father of the son begotten of the mother, thus he was father of himself, who wanted to continue to exist in the son. This also shows that incest as such was no primitive form of the sexual life or of marriage, moreover was not at all valid as an institution but was only a favour granted to exceptional individuals, who had made themselves immortal in their work (heroes). At the stage of the sexual ideology enforced on the man and its social materialization in the family organization, we see the

rebellious father enviously grasping back at the successful Œdipus of the ancient myth, in order himself to become such *an* Œdipus, which at this stage of development naturally can no longer succeed and hence must end tragically. For the collective ideology has already given place to the family organization with immortality in the children and the individual ego can no longer free itself from this racial fetter. Finally, in the present-day individual who with his victorious individualism has precipitated the downfall of the father's rule and of the family organization, we find the same motive interpreted as a wish for the father rôle, a motive which originally gave expression to the horror of it. Thus the Freudian theory does not prove to be a psychological *explanation* of the Œdipus motive, which it pretends to be, but only a new *interpretation* of the same in the meaning of the present-day individual and his present *collective* ideology. So the poet proves to be the successor of the hero, in that he narrates the heroic deed as a recollection of the good old times; and the psychologist proves to be the poet's successor in that he interprets it anew for us today.

But these three stages of the heroic, poetic, and psychological presentation correspond not only to the historical stages of development but also to the individual. Thus a young poet is likely to be heroic, the ageing writer more psychological, the one represents the attitude of the independent ego, the other ac-

knowledges the necessary adjustment and submission to law. So for example the young Schiller wrote the revolutionary "Robbers" and the ageing poet "William Tell," who no longer turns against every kind of dominance, but only more against the arrogance of tyranny. Likewise the Œdipus complex in the average individual will also have another significance in childhood as in puberty or in maturity, for the artist another significance than for the neurotic. Besides, one must still separate the incest wish as such from the father ideology, for the relation between the two is not so simple as it seems from the individual psychological standpoint of the son; namely, that he will kill the father in order to possess the mother. The incest desire is a symbol of individual immortality to which the ego clings in order to escape the compulsion of the racial immortality in sex. Simultaneously the individual in the meaning of the old belief in the soul defends itself against the acceptance of the new father rôle. So actually the mother incest and the slaying of the father are not at all individual expressions of biological tendencies, but typify the individual's racial conflicts. The hero does not kill *his father* but *the father* as representative of the new sexual ideology; he does not marry *his mother*, but he makes the woman into *the mother* of his children whom he thus accepts. Hence the two aspects of the Œdipus complex express the same resistance of the individual against the new

family ideology; the mother relationship expresses it from the standpoint of the racial sexual ego, the father relationship from the standpoint of the individual self.

But the *Cedipus* complex also has a different meaning according to whether it is simply considered from the standpoint of the individual or from the standpoint of the son or from that of the father. As an individual one does not want to put oneself in the father's place and to become father, that is, the husband of the mother. As son, one may desire it but only to deny with it the rôle of the son; that is to say, if one must have a racial function then at least to have that of the father. Finally with the complete acceptance of the father rôle, the man will naturally love the son more (and not according to the *Cedipus* scheme, the daughter) because he sees in him his direct successor and heir. If the father prefers the daughter, it shows less willingness to accept the rôle of father, as particularly shown in the incest motive between father and daughter.<sup>1</sup> For this represents on the father's part a similar desire to be re-born now in the daughter, instead of in the mother. The biological *Cedipus* tendency is thus complemented by a psychical one of the ego which feels attracted to the child of the same sex and not to that of the opposite sex. The child reacts to this double-sided family constellation also in ambivalent, conflicting ways. The

<sup>1</sup> See *Incest Motive*, Chap. XI, and its supplement "Seelenglaube und Psychologie," pp. 54 ff.

son takes refuge in the mother not only from fear of the father but just as much from a fear of too great a love from the father, he develops a "mother fixation" in order not to be made completely into the son by the father and not to be engulfed as an individual. For the same reason the girl often leans to the father in order to withdraw from the mother's influence, for whom she is only daughter, that is, a continuation of the ego. That means the child is forced through ego motives to protect his individuality against parental egoism, and hence is pushed into another collective dependency, namely, the biological. The parents fight openly or tacitly for the child's soul, whether in the biological (opposite sex) or in the egoistic sense (the same sex), and the child uses the parents correspondingly, and plays them one against the other, in order to save his own individuality.

At any rate we see that the purely egoistic standpoint of the child does not only aim at the disintegration of the family, in that the child eliminates the rival and wants to replace him with himself, but the already mentioned anti-Cedipoean tendency is operative to keep the parents together, because this guarantees to the child a protection against the all-devouring claim of *one* of the parents. So the child appears as a representative of the family ideology when it needs it for a protection. The same tendency we already see however in the ancient Cedipus Saga if we understand it in

its ethnological significance. Œdipus acquires his "complex" outside the family since he is exposed directly after his birth; rather he founds his own family on the basis of the Œdipus complex, that is, after the completed deed. But this is not an expression of an eternal human longing, but it reflects only a definite historical transition of the family organization from the father rebellion to the acceptance of marriage. Œdipus, in contrast to his father, acknowledges his sons, he wants to be the father of a family, but the old Adam springs up towards the end of his life and urges him to seek his own immortality as once the mythical hero Œdipus had sought it in the incest with the mother and had found it in his heroic destiny. The Œdipus of the poet being sacrificed to the family ideology finally finds consolation in his daughters after he had cast out the wife and cursed the sons, a destiny that is similarly repeated in *Shakespeare* and other great men, who, so to say, need no sons in order to be immortal and so in age, turn to the daughter who symbolizes for them a less hazardous youth.

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## Chapter Eight

# SELF DISCIPLINE AND SELF GUIDANCE

*There is a luxury in self-reproach.  
When we blame ourselves we feel  
that no one else has a right to blame  
us. It is the confession not the priest,  
that gives us absolution.*

OSCAR WILDE

I SPEAK HERE of Self discipline not in the sense of a pedagogic ideal,<sup>1</sup> or even of a therapeutic hope, but in the meaning of a tendency inherent in the individual, the origin and significance of which we shall investigate. Psychoanalysis has described one aspect of this attitude of the individual to himself (in the adult neurotic) as "self-punishment," and has then also found it operative in the child. But in order to understand this tendency in its full significance we must compare this self-criticism (which can sometimes go to the length of self-punishment) with a second tendency operative in every individual and this is "self-

<sup>1</sup> More concerning this in "Genetische Psychologie," 2nd. Part, "Gestaltung und Ausdruck der Persönlichkeit" (esp. pp. 65 ff.).

over-estimation" (or idealization). We then recognize that both these attitudes arise from a non-acceptance of one's own self, that originally seems mostly to relate to the impulse ego and later extends to its derivatives the life of the will and of the emotions. Before we go closer into the origin of this division of ego and its causes, I should like to point out that the emphasis on the need for punishment stressed by the Freudian school concerns the therapeutic aspect of this ego conflict; whereas the emphasis on the over-estimation (particularly stressed by *Adler*) takes into account, rather, the educational aspect. The concept of self-punishment presupposes a kind of subjective continuance of the punishment, threatened or accomplished from without, whereas the concept of self-idealization contains rather an inner striving for improvement or perfection.

But the real question is, whence arise these tendencies such as we see not only in the adult but also find performed in the child? The analysis of the neurotic suggested that both tendencies, that of self-criticism and that of self-improvement, have been awakened in the individual through training and education and then have been adopted by him through identification. *Freud*, from his ideology, has actually wanted to ascribe this educational influence, in so far as it existed, only to the father and has also theoretically formulated it in his concept of the "castration threat" as "super-



ego formation." Now we know, however, that this influence starts not only earlier, but also in a much greater extent from the mother in the first training of the instincts. Actually child analysts (like Melanie Klein and others) have been able to verify the appearance of reactions of that kind, in an early phase of the child's development, where there could be no talk of a super-ego formation (in Freud's sense). But irrespective of the question from whom does this influence on the child emanate, there are two other problems of greater importance, that arise from it. First, the purely pedagogic question as to whether this influence is good or bad. That is, by reducing the claims on the child, could we not and should we not decrease its tendency to self-criticism, which can lead to all kinds of inhibitions? This is a question that cannot be affirmed off-hand, because it seems that this self-criticism also occasions self-idealization in the sense of self-improvement, which from an educational point of view we cannot dispense with. Secondly there is the purely psychological question, what moves the child to adopt as his own even very strict demands; a question which has been answered by referring to the child's fear (of punishment) and to the child's love (of the person with whom he identifies himself).

Elsewhere, I have added to these two motives, a third and as I think decisive factor which we recognize in the individual himself as independent of ex-

ternal influences; this is one's own will which uses the conventional moral standards in order to control one's inner instincts, especially the sexual instinct.<sup>1</sup> Having achieved this inner victory the individual thus becomes able to make punishment and praise independent of the approval and disapproval of others. In this, in my opinion, we see before us the beginning of and the motive for self-discipline. This, namely, self-discipline first turns against the impulsive Self not only because this has been restricted by the early training, but also because this inner compulsion opposes the growing will-ego as a compulsion of the species. Especially in the strife against the powerful sexual impulse, this part of the ego is then considered as "bad" and as a consequence a personal ideal with a personal morality is built up. This, one's own moral code and ethical ideal, may or may not agree with that of the prevailing education; but at any rate the ego must individualize it and subsequently projects it on to the parents and educator. Thus, we recognize in this attitude to one's own self a method by which the individual makes a compromise with the collective ideologies as manifested in morality and ideal formation. The individual makes them his own and in this way becomes his own educator.

Here we do not have to occupy ourselves with the question whence do these tendencies originally arise?

<sup>1</sup> See "Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit" (1929), p. 63.

I have in earlier works dealing with the psychology of civilization<sup>1</sup> attempted to show that the history of the development of the inner life suggests the greater probability of a purely inner origin of these tendencies in the individual himself than one is likely to believe from the analysis of the present-day child. In the modern child, however, these tendencies manifest themselves at such an early stage and in such forms that there can be no doubt of their inner pre-existence. In this sense an early impulse training of the child has become almost superfluous today, since the child seems to bring with it into the world a strong inclination to repression, and one has rather to help him to decrease this. This is actually the constructive aspect of the psychological education (including sexual enlightenment); only hitherto it had the one disadvantage of making the child's world-picture incoherent. Formerly, at least, the external demand for repression corresponded to the child's inner inclination to repress, whereas now an insuperable contradiction exists between the latter and educational freedom, a state of affairs which constitutes a new source of conflict in the child. Indeed this whole concept of an inner compulsion to repress has become possible on the ground of experiments (certainly not very numerous, though highly instructive) made by applying the modern principles of education to the child. Thereby one found

<sup>1</sup> Der Künstler (1907), "Seelenglaube und Psychologie" (1930).

that the child often criticizes and encourages itself more than the parents could do; similarly as the artist also frequently judges himself much more harshly than do his critics, and from this he gets the incentive to newer and better creative work.

Only one ought not to apply directly to the child what has been found in the productive type (artist) and unproductive type (neurotic). For although the constructive kind of self-education is the ideal aim of pedagogy, yet one ought not to forget that the child is occupied first with the building up of his will-ego, which the artist can already place in the service of his self-control, and which the neurotic misuses for self-inhibition. On the other hand, the child cannot yet accept himself as can the normal average person, because he is in a process of continual development and still does not possess any formed or polished attitudes, much less a complete personality which he could accept or reject. Certainly even in the adult the acceptance or rejection of one's own self will always be only temporary; but certainly in the child it can be only momentary according to his very nature, and hence the educator should not expect it to be permanent. The child finds itself here to a certain extent in the position of the primitive who first has to project his inner conflicts, and so creates religion and morality, society and law. Only at a certain stage of cultural, as of individual, development this process reverses, in turning the con-

flict again within. The civilized adult finally is faced with a double task in that he has to solve his inner problem by partly objectifying it, on the other hand he struggles constantly against the outer world created by himself.

Whereas the analytic therapy, as I understand it has the task of throwing all the patient's externalized conflicts back on to himself, a psychologically oriented education has the opposite task of procuring for the child external possibilities for projection and unburdening. In this sense the parents ought to consider themselves much more as objects of the child's self-educational tendency and—to a certain extent—let themselves be used as such by the child. Instead of wanting to change the child according to their own ideal, they should let themselves—within certain limits—be idealized and criticized by the child (the acceptance by the child of their own ideal formation follows automatically, by way of identification). In this way the child's self-criticism and idealization are first diverted towards external objects (to the parents) and, on the one hand, prevent a premature feeling of inferiority, on the other hand, give to the creative idealizing tendency arising from a desire to be better, a temporary object. But if the child is thrown back on itself with these tendencies, there must necessarily follow a disappointment in the self-idealization which subsequently brings with it increased self-criticism.

And since the child cannot make himself better than he is, he will then have to justify this by proving himself to be as bad as he is. Here is to be sought the origin of the anti-social tendencies, such as lying, stealing, etc., which may plant the seed of later criminal tendencies, but need not necessarily, because here also the result cannot be causally predicted but will depend on the dynamic action on the ideological super-structure, and vice versa.

From wherever this tendency to self-criticism may arise, the most important question for the individual's destiny, a problem in which alone education should be interested, is how the individual Self reacts to his inner needs. If self-criticism remains in the ego, then also the tendency for improvement following from it will be applied only to one's self and must—since hyperimprovement is unattainable—lead to the strengthening of self-criticism in the form of the feeling of inferiority and in the tendency to self-punishment. Self-idealization in that it can be only measured according to the given self, thus necessarily leads to the feeling of inferiority or of guilt, whereas in the form of idealization of objects it will lead to creative achievement (art) or to the love completion. Naturally this can also be exaggerated and will lead sooner or later to disappointment when, or to the extent that, the hyperidealization is sensed or seen through.

Before we discuss further this fundamental problem

of all education on which the individual's character formation, ethics, and ability to achieve, seem to rest, we should like to remind ourselves of our description of the type of educator. In him we see the ideal case materialized, where the individual projects on to the other, namely, the pupil, in a constructive way, self-criticism and the tendency to self-improvement. In that, from purely psychological reasons, we have reclaimed a certain amount of this projection for the child himself, we have already characterized it in a certain sense as educator, which implies the concept of self-discipline. The difference between the child projecting on to the parents, and the educator projecting on to the pupil, is to be found in the educator's social function. For him who has developed with a certain maturity, a definite attitude, it is a matter of a stabilization of this projection which has become permanent, that is, has been justified professionally. For the child, on the other hand, it is a matter of only a temporary and, so to say, secret unburdening of inner conflict in order to get a necessary diversion of these tendencies endangering his weak ego. Hence in the teacher this process occurs more or less voluntarily, for the child it is quite automatic. Also we must not forget that the above described type of educator who criticizes and wants to improve (idealize) himself in the pupil, represents the formerly existing pedagogue whom Psychoanalysis charges to a great extent with the short-

comings of present-day education and its failure.

But precisely in order to avoid these projections which somehow seem to be part of the educator's nature, psychoanalytic pedagogy proposes the analysis of the educator. What happens now with these tendencies to project when the teacher is analysed? Much certainly will depend upon how he is analysed; almost upon whether he is treated as an individual or as a pedagogue. Now the individually oriented technique of Psychoanalysis can hardly treat him other than an individual, that is, with the purpose of freeing him from self-criticism, self-punishment tendencies, feelings of inferiority and guilt. But what happens with his tendencies to self-idealization and self-improvement? The justified doubt arises as to whether these tendencies can be further applied to others in creative educational ways if their presupposition, the self-criticism, "is analysed away" or is decreased. Indeed the further question arises whether even under these conditions they remain in the ego at all? For the analytic task which coincides with the therapeutic, must be considered as achieved when the individual is in the position to accept himself. And this acceptance of one's own self follows in the analysis not through a change of the individual in the sense of his own criticism and idealization, but just beyond that, through an acceptance of the Self as it is, which brings about the greatest possible change in his whole attitude.



If the psychoanalytic result of a better education of the teacher for the task of pedagogy seems at least problematical, we must consider the second means of help which Psychoanalysis has to offer the educator. This is the expectation that through the investigation of his own childhood in the analysis he will gain a better understanding of the psychical life of the pupils entrusted to him. From theoretical reasons as well as also from reasons of the analytic technique one may doubt whether this will prove correct in the specific sense in which it is meant. He may indeed obtain a better understanding of his present psychical life and to a certain degree, also, of the general psychology of his fellow men; but for his own childhood this can no longer prove correct, since he can interpret and understand it only indirectly, that is, through the medium of the analysis on the one hand, through the medium of his adult personality on the other hand. But even if he could obtain from the analysis, an objective picture of his childhood's development, this would mean anything but an understanding of the childish psychical life in itself, which remains inaccessible and incomprehensible for the adult. One has ironically charged the parents with the fact that they obviously feel themselves fitted for the education of their children because they themselves were once children; the same objection is right however for the teacher who would imagine he could better understand the chil-

dren entrusted to him because he understands his own childhood better or at least believes he does.

This leads us to the last means which analysis has to offer the educator, and that is the psychological handling of the child itself. This is one of the most disputed claims of Psychoanalysis which is resisted even by those parents and teachers who are not unfriendly towards the analysis of pedagogues for the purpose of their better instruction. Also here one must first ask oneself in what way is this child analysis accomplished? It is characteristic that within the orthodox school of analysts there exist already just as many differences of opinion with regard to child analysis as there are different opinions in Psychoanalysis itself. Without being able to enter here into the details of these differences of opinion, yet it must be said that they have *one* point of view in common and that is the psychological in the broadest sense of the word. But according to its nature this contains just the opposite of what we have found as the projective unburdening necessary for the development of the child. In whatever way the educator may gain the child's confidence and give him moral support yet the fundamental attitude in the "transference situation" always remains, namely to lead the child himself to recognize the motives for his action or faulty action. If one does not do that or if one denies that this is the case, then one has left the psychoanalytic ground and has repaired to a purely pedagogic

position which comes very close to the one we found before desirable for the parents. For then one would allow the child to project much more than the parents would normally allow, but one must also be ready to ascribe the final therapeutic success to this projective unburdening and not to the psychological insight.

Every psychological explanation, analytically speaking, every showing up of the motives in the ego—however much one may coat them over with love—comes to the same thing as a demand for improvement for alteration, is the same as a reproach and blame. In this sense it is the exact opposite of an unburdening which every child needs very much and the neurotic still more. Hence if the child turns openly or in secret against the psychological explanation, that is, frankly refuses it or accepts it only apparently, this cannot be understood merely as "resistance" but as an expression of a correct instinct which resists a further burden. Even if there could be no doubt that the child himself were to blame for all his difficulties, then a therapy resting on psychological understanding must aim at freeing the child from this blame in that it creates for him possibilities for projection. Humanity, in so far as we can survey its development, has done this at all times in its systems of religion and it does not seem to me justified to demand of the child that degree of self-responsibility which hitherto every adult human being could not live up to. Here we see a projection of such

enormous dimensions on the part of the adults, that one can only meet all these attempts with the greatest scepticism no matter how progressive and idealistic they may be presented. Such an exaggerated demand seems however all the less appropriate since we know that the child cannot be to blame at all, hence pointing out his motives within him puts on him blame for which he cannot be held responsible at all. Here is again an unburdening attempt on the part of the adult of such enormous bearing that one is forced to the conclusion—although unwillingly—that the modern psychological ideology is to be suspected at least as much as the former pedagogic ideology. In this latter the pedagogue has been accused of projecting his self-criticism and his self-correction on to the pupil. In the psychological ideology the teacher runs the other risk of burdening the child with his own new ideal of self-responsibility and thus unburdens himself exactly as the teacher of old style did in his way.

After having shown in what form self-criticism and idealization is expressed by the psychologically oriented educator we shall now give an account of what this signifies ideologically. When criticism and idealization are recognized by the modern educator as tendencies inherent in himself which he tries to project on to the child, then this implies a tendency on the part of the educator to lead the child to the recognition of these motives dwelling in itself instead of offering it

the possibility of disposing of and objectifying them. In a word, from being the ideal of projection the educator has become an ideal of introspection, from representing reality he has become a symbol of the ideology of truth. For the whole therapeutic and pedagogic ideology of Psychoanalysis rests on the presupposition that truth (about one's own self) makes one free. Now this, as I have already elsewhere stated,<sup>1</sup> is an ideal of cognition which need not necessarily have a therapeutic emancipating effect. For it very easily tends to "Know thyself" instead of "Be thyself" and not to a "Know thyself" in order that "Thou can't be what Thou art" (in the sense of the Kantian ethic). I believe that the (psychological) truth is as little therapeutically effective as it is pedagogically as the basis of education; for it depends on what is believed to be the truth at a certain time and not on an eternal concept of truth such as psychology pretends to possess or to have found. In therapy and still more in education, it does not depend on scientific truth but on reality of life. Where do we now find this reality of life?

In seeking for it we must give a new turn to the problem. What we can learn from Psychoanalysis that is positive and constructive for education is to be found neither in the personal analysis of the educator nor in the analysis of the child, but simply by using the under-

<sup>1</sup> Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit.

standing gained from the analysis of the analytic situation as such. Its essence is briefly a *relationship between two human beings*, in which the one learns, receives, accepts from the other. Here it is a matter of a part of reality and indeed of the essential part of reality, namely, the relation to one's fellow men, whereas everything else is only subjective, that is, represents individual psychological knowledge. From the analytic situation one can gain a deeper understanding of every educational, indeed of every human, relationship, if one rightly understands it and does not narrow it down simply to a "transference situation" in the Freudian sense. We can study in the analytic situation the entire mechanism of projection and unburdening that not only is fundamental to the love relationship in the narrower sense, but also to every religious, moral and social attachment, and valuation. But we also recognize the will-guilt problem lying at the base of these phenomena as the central problem of every human relationship, the foundation stone of which is laid in and through education.

What does the analytic situation now teach us in regard to the educational task? In order to be able to define this more precisely I should like first briefly to recapitulate the differences discussed elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> "We immediately see the fundamental difference between the infantile situation, the symbol of which is the

<sup>1</sup> "Gestaltung und Ausdruck der Persönlichkeit," 1928, pp. 64 ff.

Œdipus complex, the pedagogic situation as whose symbol we have introduced the Prometheus complex, and the analytic situation, which should represent a combination of both, and at the same time a something beyond. The fundamental difference is briefly the following: in the infantile situation the child identifies, and the parents predominantly project on to the child. In the analytic situation we allow the patients to project in order to let them find and recognize themselves, whereas the analyst has to restrict himself to a degree of identification necessary for understanding. The pedagogic situation as mentioned is as a rule a continuance of the infantile situation, only that instead of the parents, the teacher appears who plays or should play more the rôle of leader. What we can learn pedagogically from the analytic situation which, as one easily sees, should be rather a correction than a repetition of the infantile situation, is the following. In the pedagogic situation the pupil should be educated from the Œdipus complex, by way of the Prometheus complex, to self-guidance. I should like to discuss this purely psychological and schematic formulation more closely. The Prometheus complex is an emotional reaction to the Œdipus situation, by means of which the individual attempts to transfer the same force which was meted out to him by his parents, to his children, his creations, his subordinates. Perhaps it is necessary that the individual has to go through

this phase of exerting power at which most people remain even if they ever get beyond the Œdipus complex. The ideal aim of education such as we can deduce from the constructive understanding of the analytic situation, includes not only the overcoming of the Œdipus complex in the Prometheus complex, but also the overcoming of the Prometheus complex in that of the formation of one's own personality which we might designate as *self-guidance*."

This brings us back again to the theme of self-education, on which the later self-guidance of the individual is based. If the self-education tendency is the inherent inclination of the individual automatically to improve and perfect himself by reason of self-criticism, then the self-guidance tendency can be understood as an ideal result of education. This means it can be conceived as the *conscious and willed* further guidance and elaboration of this process in the sense of its constructive evaluation. Thus the self-education tendency such as we can observe in the child, is more of a negative critical attitude towards its own weaknesses, whereas self-guidance relates more to a positive idealizing aspect of personality-formation. Furthermore this latter constructive tendency develops in the child automatically as a reaction to the external influence of education, from which it tries to make itself independent through self-discipline. On the other hand, the willed self-guidance makes use of external



prototypes or symbols in order to further its own ideal-formation and justify its elaboration in the personality.

Between the automatic self-discipline of the child and the conscious self-guidance of the personality there is the individual's whole will-formation. His later attitude to himself as sponsor of his conscious Will, depends on how this whole process is carried out. We have already spoken of the formation of will and the guilt reactions accompanying it in an earlier chapter, and I should like here further to refer to what I have stated elsewhere concerning it.<sup>1</sup> Briefly stated it might be defined as a *training of the will through content*. These contents, which are determined by the prevailing ideology of the time, the child has to accept, but not merely as something forced on him from without, but he must find means and ways of making the varying and given collective contents, actually his own. This should be achieved not so much by the pedagogic system but by the personality of the pedagogue who has to show the child the ways and means of doing this, or rather has to avoid any interference with the child's own doing it. For the child will make these ideologies which give his will purpose and content automatically his own if one will allow him to do this in the way alone possible for him. But this is not achieved by mere identification, against which no teacher could object; but in

<sup>1</sup> Die analytische Reaktion in ihren Konstruktiven Elementen (Technik II, 1929), pp. 84 f. 120.

so far as the will is in question, the acceptance of the community ideology will be accomplished by the child under constant protest which should be used by the teacher in its constructive significance and not be interpreted as an obstinate resistance. If parents and pedagogues have the right attitude, then the child will of itself be eager for these ideologies (which one tries to force on him in vain) because supplying the will with *universally* acknowledged ideologies is the greatest unburdening of responsibility, attainable for the individual.

In this respect the teacher has the advantage over the parents at the very outset because he is the authorized representative of the collective ideology, whereas the parents are inclined to present to their child these general claims in a more personal form. The way in which this happens and how the child reacts to it, will—as may be easily seen—decisively influence his later *private life*, whereas the general influence of education will make itself felt more in his occupational and *social life*. The personal way in which the parents have instilled in the child the conventional ideologies, can be more easily comprehended as criticism than the demands of the teacher supported by the community. The parents' advantage over the teacher, on the other hand, consists of the fact that the purely personal contact makes it possible to influence the child more easily; thus it gives to the child the possibility for identification

based on a close emotional relationship which the child needs especially in its younger years for the foundation of the collective ideologies before he can make them his own. If the parents could put their demands to the child less personally and more generally, and if the educators and teachers could allow the personal element to appear by the side of the general in relation to the pupil, then not only the tension—which today exists between the school and the home—would be essentially reduced, but the whole pedagogic situation would be improved! Both parties, however, parents and educators, could better and more easily fulfil their task, if they would draw conclusions from the observation and study of the child and apply them to their own behaviour to the child, instead of wanting coercively to change the child's behaviour to fit their own personal needs. As the child takes the adult for his pattern, to form his own ego ideal, this task would succeed much better for the child's development if the parents and teachers would adjust themselves more to the ego ideal arising in the child itself. Such an attitude would closely correspond to the rôle of leader which the child plays in the formation of present-day ideologies of education.

It is much the same here as with the analytic situation in which the therapist whether he likes or not must allow the patient the leadership even when the analyst imagines that he is directing the whole situation.

The same holds good for all psychological understanding of the child, by means of which the adults are enabled to adjust themselves better to the child, whereas they think they have forced on the child their gospel of psychology. But as little as the neurotic patient has to be trained to be an analyst, the child also need as little be made a psychologist. Certainly this "magical" method of education is easier than the elaboration of a constructive ideology and technique, but it is in any case destructive whether we cure our own evils in the child or want to force on it our own wisdom; for he has no use for either! On the other hand one must give the child certain ideologies not only because he needs them in later life but because he needs them for growth. Just as the child eats because he is hungry and does not take his meals to please the parents, so he will instinctively grasp the collective ideologies offered him, because he needs them as props, for the unfolding and justification of his individual ego. It is not only ineffectual when the parents enforce on him these ideologies as their own, but it is also untrue that the child has to accept them to please the parents. The child accepts them in his own interest, and should also have them offered on that basis. Naturally much depends on what kind of ideologies one offers him and also to what extent the adults themselves are impregnated by these ideologies, so to say, represent them and not only teach them.

In this respect our present epoch is doubtless inferior to the earlier epochs in pedagogic fitness. We no longer believe sufficiently in the old ideologies and not yet enough in the new ideas to present them to the child with sufficient conviction, or even to live according to them. So the child himself has to bear much more responsibility which in other ages was taken over effectively by the collective ideologies and their representatives. Hence the modern child is so much more insecure and self-critical, in psychological terms, he has feelings of inferiority and of guilt which one cannot so easily take away from him later even though one offers him the new psychoideology. For he grows up in a neurotic atmosphere and so manifoldly forms his ideal of being grown up according to neurotic patterns. In this category belongs the not uncommon type of neurotic who is in no way ill but suffers only from the fact that he is dissatisfied with himself and would like to be different. If one investigates this desire for self-idealization more closely, it frequently turns out to be the reaction to a non-acceptance of one's own self, for the compensation of which the individual has chosen a neurotic pattern. These types would be much better to accept themselves than to attain their self-ideal which only seems more desirable because they see it in the majority of others. In other words the more the neuroses increase within a certain stratum of society the more will the neurotic become an ideal within that

stratum, because the healthier type would feel isolated in it and hence he would endeavour to gratify his collective needs by becoming like the majority. Hence also the ungratifying results which could not be avoided in applying modern methods of education to small groups of children because the child then felt himself to be the undesirable exception compared to the majority of children brought up differently.

Unfortunately one cannot even train the child to accept his own Self although this would—as pointed out—protect him from false attitudes and faulty ideal formations. For in the first place the child has no pronounced personality that he can accept, and secondly, he needs for any kind of self acceptance precisely collective ideologies in order to justify it. It almost seems as if the child had first to become guilty, and experience suffering, as for instance the Fall of Man implies. This means to say, that, as neither the collective education provides sufficiently powerful ideologies nor is self-education in the child possible in the sense of an adult self-discipline, the child has to pass through a much more critical childhood than perhaps has ever before been the case in the history of man. This seems also to be generally shown in that modern man is altogether less stable than the average type of former epochs. Previously man remained more or less the same type in his development from childhood, through puberty to maturity, than does the human being of our

epoch who so quickly, and apparently also more easily, changes, although at the same time these increased demands of adjustment lead more frequently to neurosis. Perhaps the stronger fixation tendencies that one has found in the neurotic are only reactions to the quickly changing conditions of life and ideologies and are not due to a fundamental lack in man, who has been accustomed to a slower tempo of development. However that may be, all the *general* conclusions drawn from the study of the present-day type of neurotic must be received with great caution, for under other conditions man reacts differently, has formerly reacted differently and reacts today differently. The primitive man was no child and our present-day child cannot be compared with primitive man. Therefore it is perhaps better that we should not desire for the present-day child too definite an education, because the individual at maturity and in age will possibly have to adjust himself to quite different conditions, for which a too narrow and one-sided education may be only a hindrance. In established civilizations with austere ideologies, this danger is much less, in any case, was not so obvious as it is today. Perhaps the present-day crisis in civilization teaches us to think as little in terms of eternal values in pedagogy as in any other sphere, but to keep before our eyes only the immediate and relative values. This, however, presupposes a constant vigilance which is less comforting than the feeling of security

that emanates from lasting values. Indeed, we now possess the self-consciousness necessary for the becoming aware of momentary needs, but the psychological ideology which is a consequence of it easily misleads us into the belief that it may give us eternal values and indeed to a far greater extent than earlier ideologies because it has for itself today the appearance of *the* truth. And yet this truth is exactly as relative as all former truths; in certain respects still more relative (if one may say so), because it is much more individual. Concerning pedagogy in particular, we know already that we have arrived at the present-day therapeutic ideology of education (the prevention of neuroses) from the neurotic type, which certainly is a product determined by present civilization.

The most general therapeutic idea of education derived from the psychological ideology of the neurotic can be summed up as follows:—the general result should be that the individual is able to accept himself as such, that is, as being different from others, in other words can affirm himself constructively. Hitherto this was not possible purely individualistically, but the individual needed for this the corresponding collective ideologies such as the child still needs today. What is the matter with the psychological (including the sexual) ideologies offered the child today, we have already discussed in detail. For the adult, acceptance of his own Self follows today by reason of acceptance



through the other, characterized by the modern love experience and marriage relationship. This moral dependence on another, is, however, not—as *Freud* thinks—a consequence of the parental relationship, but both are a result of the loss of spiritual ideologies (especially of religion) which have been gradually replaced first by the parents, and finally by the love partner.<sup>1</sup> Today we seem to stand on the threshold of the collapse also of this moral vindication in the other, which already must be substituted in numerous cases through the therapeutic transference situation. All these different relations of the ego that must be justified by the “thou” (whether the parents, or spouse, or therapist) already signify, however, the replacement of the collective ideology by an individual one. Whether the individual is at all in a position to grow beyond that and to affirm and accept himself from himself cannot be said. Only in the creative type does this seem possible to some extent, when and in so far as he is able to make use of his own work as a justification for his individual existence. The average human being wrestles for the moment desperately with this task set before him, which since the collapse of the collective as of the individual ideologies of justification, has become his vital problem and that of the civilization in which we live.

The majority of individuals today are not able to

<sup>1</sup> See “Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit” as well as “Die analytische Reaktion” (both 1929).

solve this problem of self-responsibility, indeed they are scarcely able to recognize and to bear it. We have learnt this from the psychological study of the type whose neurosis signifies failure in this task. In him, self-criticism which refers to his individual difference, remains in the ego and leads to the denial of his own Self that can neither be accepted nor changed. The more successful type who can still find in love the justification of his Self with simultaneous tribute to the species, is fortunate in being able to project on to the other both self-criticism and also a part of self-idealization. The third most successful type is a mixture of the first two, in that he projects self-criticism creatively on to the outer world (not on his fellow men) and so in work creates, reforms, and newly creates not only reality, but also himself, according to his wish. Thus he projects self-criticism creatively into his work, the neurotic projects self-criticism destructively on to his own ego, and the average type projects self-criticism complementarily on to the love object. The result of this dynamic conflict depends on whether and how self-criticism and self-idealization, the emotional life and the impulse life, the will and the intellect are *distributed* between the personal and vocational life. The necessary tendency to self-improvement growing up from self-criticism should not be restricted to one's own ego, nor spend itself on the environment but should be expressed in work. Here we refer back to

what in an earlier chapter we have described as vocational psychology, which naturally in its turn will again influence the personal life. The final result will here again depend on how the idealization is accomplished in relation to the will, emotion, and sexuality.

We can here only briefly review the different possibilities resulting from the dynamic interplay of the above mentioned forces. We must find out whether and to what extent self-criticism following from individualization, that is, from diversity, unlikeness, operates neurotically as criticism in one's own ego with the tendency to change one's Self; or whether and to what extent self-criticism is projected on the other as criticism or punishment. Finally it may lead to idealization of the Self or the other or to self-improvement in work. According to these varying issues there will be different types of personality and corresponding vocational types: namely, the educator, who improves himself but will also criticize and punish himself in the other; the therapist who will help himself in the other; the lover, who will idealize himself in the other, or the artist who does all this symbolically in work. The foundation for the later distribution of the different dynamic aspects of personality will be laid only to a certain extent in childhood and in the first discipline of the impulses, and in any case should leave room for a later transformation and reorganization. For whereas the child's psychology is built up on the im-

pulse life and should aim rather at an acceptance of it, the adult life as a rule—the more so, the more successful he is socially—must be built up on the vocational life. Education or re-education, in both stages, has to take more care that this does not result one-sidedly, that is, that already in childhood there will be granted to the forces of the will the emotions and the intellect, a corresponding share in the construction of personality, whereas for the adult professional man, there must be room made for the impulse forces and emotions apart from his occupational life. However that may be, in the course of life there is at least one—often more than one—reorganization of the total adjustment, which early childhood's education can only comply with in a negative way, that is, by not endeavouring to give lasting ideologies or any of eternal value, but to leave room for a certain laxity and slackness in the individual personality for later experience. We are not surprised when the child outgrows his shoes and clothes, we have even already accustomed ourselves to the fact that he loses his childish beliefs; and so perhaps we shall also have to get used to the fact that he develops his character and his personality, that is, however, that he exchanges the educational ideologies which we have given him in childhood for other collective or individual ideologies, which mostly do not agree with the earlier ones especially if it is a matter of such tempestuous times as our own.

One of the typical crises in the development and in the reconstruction of personality is the love experience which is so much the more momentous the more individualization advances. Here there is always a trenchant, sometimes radical new construction of the whole personality on a basis hitherto not in existence. To the formerly mentioned distribution of the dynamic factors of personality in the vocational and private life there is another distribution in a different dimension, namely, the distribution on to the other sex, in which it is of decisive importance what tendencies are left in one's own self and what are transformed to the love partner. The task of the normal average woman is in this respect simpler; she has marriage as a vocation and the child as work, the husband as ideal, and so she finds her Self justified. Here the later vocational and social life is constructed on the personal impulse forces, whereas in the man as a rule it is the reverse and he finds in the woman the impetus and emotional supplement to his personality focussed more on the will and the intellect. The difficulties, as presented by the neurotic type, spring from the endeavours of the ego, which, however, are not "infantile" but correspond to a resistance of the developed personality to its new orientation and reconstruction. Instead of finding in one another the described psychological, characterological, and moral supplement, the neurotic type of man or woman tends either to

make the other like him or herself or to become like the other. Which kind of assimilation the individual chooses will depend on whether he is more the type that projects or that which identifies; <sup>1</sup> that is, whether he possesses more will or more guilt. But in each case it is a matter of a tendency to equalize the difference in the psychological moral sense instead of making it supplementary in the biological sense. This indeed looks as if a too strong acceptance of one's own Self cannot accept at all the foreign, contrary, complementary self. But actually it is only another attempt to accept one's own rejected Self in the other, by making him just that. For the real acceptance of one's own Self, includes also the acceptance of one's lacks, imperfections and limitations, and hence is at the same time an acceptance of the other, whom one needs as a supplement and on whom one is dependent. The resistance of the ego against admitting this dependence tacitly presupposes a perfection of one's own Self, against the untruthfulness of which sooner or later one's own conscience will rebel in the form of self-criticism. Whether one wants to recreate the other in one's own image or whether one wants to make oneself like him, in either case it is a denial of the difference or unlikeness, that is, however, a denial of the complementary dependence in which the two sexes stand one to another and

<sup>1</sup> See the corresponding arguments in "Genetische Psychologie," Parts I and II (1927-1928).

not only biologically. Therefore it is ethically justified when two people are happy and efficient only with one another, that is, if they are of social value and morally good; and it is not necessarily a sign of weakness when the one without the other is not only unhappy but also inefficient and morally bad. From the standpoint of a high ethical ideal we might wish that such utter dependence on one's nearest might be less vital, but this high ethical ideal is perhaps also strongly coloured by the resistance of the ego to admit such a dependence, even to allow it, although in our civilization it is the order of the day.

We even see numerous cases where the one directly uses the other as a moral support, with the cessation of which the whole personality collapses and becomes un-social whether in the sense of inefficiency or in the sense of evil-doing, or even as suicide. But such cases also show how wholesome an opportune admission of this dependence can be, although it does not always paralyse the rebellion against it. But the study of such cases likewise teaches us that the anti-social type (the criminal) does not only result from lack of control due to insufficiently developed inhibitions; but we can detect in him just as strongly developed moral, indeed hyper-moral tendencies with the decisive difference that they are with him personified in the other. In case this other tries to withdraw from the rôle imposed on him, then there follows a moral collapse which only

demonstrates the earlier denied dependence on him. In this sense, the moral support granted by another person can become the worst tyranny since one cannot live without it and hence must purchase it by all kinds of permanent sacrifice. These cases naturally go beyond the relation of the sexes, although they frequently are to be found within a sexual relationship, most frequently within marriage. Where it is a matter of dependence on the same sex the conflict is not as one would think simpler, but only complicated in another way. For here, there exists from the beginning the element of similarity to a far greater extent than in the sexual relationship, thus it leads to still closer identifications and idealizations, but with it also still stronger disappointments and still keener condemnations and persecutions which can increase to the idea of persecution. This always relates to an outer projection of the moral part of the ego, that can appear as father figure or as homosexual object (Freud), but fundamentally represents an ego conflict. Sexuality then appears here as elsewhere as a symbol of the rejected ego, as the scapegoat of self-criticism; but not because education in childhood has made it that, but because it represents that part of our personality which obviously makes us dependent on another and threatens also to subjugate our personal will.

Education has hitherto only supported the child in this critical attitude towards sexuality, but has not



made it a scapegoat. It has been falsely assumed that with the cessation of the educational condemnation of sex, the child will have no conflict with sexuality, but will accept it as something natural. But sexuality is not natural to the child, it might rather be conceived of as the individual's natural enemy, against which he defends himself from the beginning and with his whole personality. If one does not recognize this fact which modern experiments of education have proved, then one makes education the scapegoat for the moral sexual conflict in the individual, as one formerly made sexuality itself the scapegoat for the moral conflict. The only thing that an education founded on the understanding of this state of affairs can do for the child seems to me to be an *absolute diversity of education for both sexes*. But that does not mean a one-sided emphasis of the difference between the sexes from the ~~man's~~ point of view, whereby the girl from the beginning is made to feel inferior. But each sex should be educated more for him or herself and for the acceptance of his or her own Self with its privileges and shortcomings. Thus the completion by the other sex will seem to be something natural and necessary and not as is so often the case today a sign of weakness and imperfection. This mutual supplement, that is, making oneself complete through the other, will also contribute much more to the necessary *de-moralization* of the sexual life than any full life of pleasure however free,

which often signifies only a replacement of the moral dependence by a sexual one and so leaves the individual just as unfree. Up till now marriage has been the only form of the sexual relationship which to a great extent provided for all these psychological conditions. Marriage signifies a public admission of sexual dependence and of the moral completion brought about through the other, whereby the justification is collective as also the responsibility is borne by the institution of marriage (society) and not by the individual alone. Naturally with increasing individualization these collective qualities of marriage lose significance and hence it comes about that today so many marriages are conducted like free unions whereas the free unions continually take on the form of marriage.

But this is also connected with the change of the marriage ideology, which at the climax of the development of our small family was essentially based on the child. The matrimonial community, the family, served as a protection to the child and since the child represented the racial immortality it indirectly served as a protection to the parents, to their individuality. Today the child who must early be treated as an independent autonomous individual has lost this collective significance for the parents, who therefore seek their individual justification and continuance in personal happiness and work in this world. Besides the collective educational ideologies this parental educational ide-

ology, which at least tried to mould the child in their image, also threatens to collapse. The psychological insight into their own inferiority is not favourable to the parental educational ideology of training the child to be like them, whereas formerly the children were always referred to the unattainable example of the parental superiority. Curiously enough this had a stimulating rather than a paralysing effect on the child, who nowadays takes its parents afflicted with the feeling of inferiority as an example, and hence also feels itself inferior. As the significance of the child has changed with the meaning of marriage, so with it the parental educational ideology has suffered a change which more or less equally concerns all parents of one and the same social stratum. It is, that along with this general change of the marital ideology and also in the course of individual marriages, the relation between man and woman has changed particularly with and through the child. The parents themselves are decisively influenced and changed by the child in their personality and in their relationship one to another. They themselves, as it were, experience with the growth of the child, a new orientation and a new education which in turn works itself out in the kind of education they give to their child. Here we find ourselves directly face to face with experience, which is neither scientifically nor technically controllable, indeed hardly comprehensible while it is being enacted. What the peda-

gogue and the psychological adviser in education see, are mostly fairly late after-effects of an already past phase of life, the correction of which mostly takes more time than the child in its quick development has at its disposal. Thus all education is ultimately *post festum* approbation or reprimand or understanding of what has already happened and indeed of something that perhaps never appears a second time in the same way.



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


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